Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-92-057 *24 March 1992*

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Yugoslavia

Bosnia-Hercegovina—In an interview with DANAS, President Alija Izetbegovic said that the "comparison between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia has been unjustifiably exploited." Bosnia, he claims, "is not a miniature Yugoslavia." "Yugoslavia is an idea, a good or bad one... but an idea." When asked about his sympathy for the breakup of the SFRY, Izetbegovic stated: "As for whether I mourn over Yugoslavia, the question is certainly a bit strange when you take into account that I was sent to prison twice in Yugoslavia, and spent almost nine years there. However, I must admit that splitting this territory into lots of tiny states is not to my liking. I can say that much. I used to believe in some sort of integration, but a democratic and open one, of course."

Kosovo—BORBA reports that Serbian "armed special forces have turned up" in the republic and have "opened up a recruiting center for the territory of southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosmet." "The Serbian Volunteer Guards have their own people, trained special forces for operating immediately in case of danger in a self-organized manner, without a special command," according to Guards Commander Dragisa Vukcevic. "We have an extremely elaborate system of communications, reporting, and intelligence, with well-trained people who are ready to go to the defense of the Serbs on the shortest notice," he pointed out.

Croatia—VJESNIK reports that the Zagreb Exchange has been accepted as an associate member of the European Community Federation of Exchanges. The Zagreb Exchange's acceptance into the "European guild of exchanges" is considered important because "an institution of the EC has recognized a Croatian institution."

Albania

Tirana radio carried a news conference held by Democratic Party (PD) Chairman Sali Berisha in Tirana on 23 March. PD spokesman Genc Pollo confirmed that "out of 100 constituencies, the PD won in 87... The Socialist Party won in only four constituencies and the Social Democrats in only one." Berisha proclaimed that "yesterday marked the end of the communist night in Albania and a great and blessed day has begun..." In an effort to build a democratic future, the PD will utilize an open-door policy and will rely on aid from other democratic countries. Berisha concludes that the PD "will remain a perty dedicated to human rights and fundamental human freedoms."

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) launched its spring political campaign with a thousands-strong rally in Sofia, BTA reports. The speakers "leveled severe criticism" at the Union of Democratic Forces and the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms and their work in the National Assembly. There were also "chants" for the government's resignation. BSP leader Zhan Videnov claims that the BSP is unwilling "to share the responsibility for the political brinkmanship" with the DPS. "We are for parliamentarianism and pluralism," but not "opposition pliancy," he maintains.

CSCE Considers Croatia, Slovenia Membership

LD2303221392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2004 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Helsinki, March 23 (TANJUG)—An admittance of Croatia and Slovenia to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will not influence the conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels, nor will it [word indistinct] its outcome, maintain CSCE ministers. "The ministers support the efforts of the Brussels conference on Yugoslavia in the quest for a comprehensive political solution to the Yugoslav crisis." This is a draft conclusion which should be approved by the CSCE ministerial conference tomorrow. This provision was included in the draft decision on the accession of Croatia and Slovenia to the CSCE in Helsinki today through the efforts of Yugoslav diplomats.

This necessitated considerable diplomatic skills. The Yugoslav diplomats—head of the delegation, Ambassador Vladimir Pavicevic, and Sladjana Prica—were receiving warnings from every side that their excessive insistence on Yugoslavia's rights would produce quite the opposite effects and raise the question of the delegation's legitimacy.

Germany was a priori against all similar reservations being included in the conclusions. The U.S. delegation is believed to have had to resort to pressure to induce Germany and the rest of the European Community to accept the provision. Tomorrow, when the CSCE Ministerial Council verifies today's decision of the committee of high officials, Croatia and Slovenia will become full CSCE members, and the organization will comprise 50 states.

Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, however, were again unable to leap over the barrier put up by the European Community and, despite the support of the United States and other countries, were not accepted even as observers. Both the admittance of Croatia and Slovenia as full members and the rejection of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia are results of an extensive and firm plan drawn up by Germany and the E.C., whose implementation began with support for the breakaway Yugoslav republics and the gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia.

SFRY Envoy Comments on New Tasks

LD2303154292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1423 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Helsinki, March 23 (TANJUG)—The main task of the CSCE at this stage was to take decisions which would enable efficient transformation of the countries which, each in accordance with its possibilities, replaced one system with another, believes Ambassador Vladimir Pavicevic, head of the Yugoslav delegation at the fourth CSCE meeting of continuation which opens in Helsinki on Tuesday. Pavicevic stated to TANJUG correspondent that not only political action and pressures be used, but also adequate and genuine assistence to these countries.

Among the key tasks of the third CSCE summit to be held on July 9-12, Pavicevic cited the precise defining of conflict-prevention mechanisms, settling of disputes and all non-military aspects of security, as well as the procedure of control of arms and disarmament, in which the CSCE member-countries would also take part.

Pavicevic was confident that the CSCE role in Europe in new conditions, but also exceeding the borders of the continent, would gain in importance. The Helsinki conference, he said, must exceed the existing CSCE, which was based on only jointly adopted principles, and to become essentially an organization which would formulate a joint policy.

There was no full accord on this as yet, but this seemed to be the sole way and framework capable of uniting also those who were already firmly organized, such as the E.C., the superpowers such as the U.S., as well as the countries emerging from the disintegrated Soviet Union, the neutral and non-aligned countries, both the most and least developed countries, on the entire space the CSCE embraces, Pavicevic set out.

In his view, all the ethnic and human rights of the minorities must, coupled with respect of the standards valid for the CSCE, be secured through legislation and through obliging the relevant administrations and judiciaries to implement them.

In that case, Pavicevic noted, the minorities would in the inter-state relations really be "bridges above the borders and divisions," and could no longer be the object of political games, as was often the case in the past. He set out that the CSCE must attain such a level as would provide for its activities to be bereft in the future of attempts on the part of some countries to use human rights as a means of pressure.

The head of the Yugoslav delegation made special note of the U.S. initiative for an economic forum to be created within the CSCE to boost governmental political decisions to be in the interest of development. Economic aid, Pavicevic said, cannot be separated from democratic development, but it was realistic to expect that only economic joining in the highly-developed West on a large-scale, such as the Marshall Plan had been, could turn the countries in want of aid into genuine economic partners and enable general prosperity.

CSFR Briefs Arms Forum on Antichemical Agents

LD2003164992 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] At a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the CSFR submitted a document about its protective antichemical agents. The CSFR wants to be the first state in the world to grant such a list to a future international organization working on a ban on chemical weapons. The list could become the basis for the organization's databank of agents. The antichemical agents in question are those at the disposal of Czechoslovak Army. Juraj Kralik, Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations, lent support to Australia's initiative to finalize a treaty on a ban on chemical weapons as early as this year.

Democratic Party's Berisha Speaks on Victory

AU2303181992

[Editorial Report] Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian at 1310 GMT on 23 March carries a 60-minute live broadcast of a news conference held by Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Sali Berisha in the Palace of Congresses in Tirana.

Opening the news conference, Democratic Party spokesman Genc Pollo states in English: "Ladies and gentlemen, I am very happy to inform you of the victory of the PD. One year ago, we sat here to confirm the bad news that we had not won. Now I hope you understand how we feel after a sleepless but joyful night. Our optimism has proved to be realistic, and our expectations were even modest. The results speak for themselves. Here are the figures we have so far. Out of 100 constituencies, the PD won in 87 and in 10 constituencies there will be a second round. The Socialist Party won in only four constituencies and the Social Democrats in only one. Out of about 36 percent of the general vote, the PD won 67.4 percent. Those are the figures, and now Mr. Berisha will give a speech."

Speaking in Albanian, Berisha states: "Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to present to you today the results of yesterday's elections and to stress that you, friends of democracy in Albania and of the entire Albanian people, the democratic public, and the democratic governments of various countries that support Albania and its democratic forces in this transitional period, experienced with great joy the profound victory of the PD and the entire Albanian people. "Yesterday marked the end of the communist night in Albania and a great and blessed day has begun in the history of the long-suffering Albanian nation, a centuries-old nation whose vote showed that it is determined to join Europe, to build a democratic future, and to open its doors toward Europe in the hope and total confidence that Europe will respond in the same spirit.

"However, not all our brothers and sisters who dreamed and aspired for democracy through the long night of communist slumber survived to the present day. We must honor them today more than at any other time. As Adem Demaci, the Albanian Sakharov, says: They were all lovers of free speech and free Albanian thought.

"Of course, in the light of democracy today, the enormous damage and suffering of the former regime loom larger and more obviously. However, I have great faith that we will employ all our energies to build a future and construct a democratic society. I believe that this great confidence of the Albanians in democracy will be transformed into great energy for the construction of a democratic Albania.

"Of course, the PD and the future democratic government will rely on an open-door policy and on the powerful aid of other democratic countries. However, its main support will be the energies, skills, and talents of the people who destroyed the dictatorship and who are determined to build democracy.

"On Skenderbeg Square two hours ago, speaking to the people who were celebrating their victory, I remembered the words of President Kennedy, who in January 1961 turned to the American people and said: Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country. These words are just as relevant today for all Albanians who have struggled for democracy.

"In building Albania, we need many things, but what we do not need are hatred and revanchism. The PD invites all the democratic forces in Albania not to waste time in destruction and confusion, but to devote their talents and energies to building the future. It is true that in the past the dictatorship committed ugly deeds, but it is also true that the Albanians as a whole are at the same time the accomplices and fellow victims of the regime under which we lived.

"Our common responsibility and our common suffering must unite us with the ideals of democracy for the construction of a new Albania. We cannot have conflicts among ourselves. We must work, and I guarantee that I will put all my energy and strength in the service of democracy. I will work to give Albania a government that will pursue an open-door policy that will aim to integrate Albania with civilized Europe politically, economically, and militarily.

"The establishment of democracy in Albania is no doubt a highly favorable precondition for the solution of the Albanian question as a whole, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act. It is also an important factor in stabilizing the state of affairs and creating a calm and peaceful situation in the troubled Balkans. The Democratic Party will strive for dual nationality for all those with Albanian blood, wherever they are."

"We will establish public order and peace. We will have an agricultural policy that will lead to increased agricultural production and the protection of the interests of Albanian peasants. We will strive to approve a constitution worthy of a democratic country. We will also restructure local government very soon. I am convinced that local elections will establish democratic local government in Albania.

"However, I must remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that we have been from the outset and always will remain a party dedicated to human rights and fundamental human freedoms. This implies that the human dimension will come to the fore in our new policies. We must tell our opposition that, if it Remains a loyal opposition, it will always have our respect. We will consider it to be a very important element, vital for the development of democracy in Albania. We will not exploit our power to restrict its legal activities. Thank you."

Berisha then replies to reporters' questions. Asked by a Voice of America reporter whether dual nationality for all Albanians would further destabilize the situation in

"what is left of Yugoslavia," Berisha replies in English: "Multiple citizenship applied for European people did not stabilize Europe. In contrast, it reinforced the integration of these nations to each other. Why not for Albanians?"

Asked about his attitude toward President Alia and what steps he will take if Alia does not resign, Berisha replies in Albanian: "This is not a matter for a party chairman, but for the future Albanian parliament."

Asked to give a message to Kosovo, Berisha continues in Albanian, and states: "We have been very touched by the joy of our brothers in Kosovo at our victory, because last year it was Milosevic who rejoiced, but this year it is the Albanians. Our message is clear. We will struggle for a solution to the Albanian question. The Albanians in Yugoslavia must have the right to self-determination like other nations."

Asked about Cameria, Berisha states: "In our program and all our discussions with political circles in Greece, we have always considered the Cam problem as one that must be solved. Of course, it is not a matter of the border. However, we consider that our Cam brothers have an alienable right to return to their homes and property, because they were forcibly ejected by a non-democratic Greek regime. The present Greek regime must now respect their rights to their property and homes."

Asked about priorities in the economy, Berisha states: "Finding incentives to increase agricultural production, resuming production in those enterprises of the econonmy that are viable, transportation, tourism, foreign investment—these are the fields on which the PD will concentrate."

Asaked whether he himself will agree to become president, Berisha states: "If I am not mistaken, I said yesterday evening that I have struggled to become a citizen of a free Albania."

Asked about the future fate of Nexhmije Hoxha and other members of the former Party of Labor Politburo who are now in prison, Berisha states: "I must state that I would rather not interfere in the work of the organs of justice.

Asked about the royal family, Berisha states: "The royal family has no meaning for the PD. Mr. Leka, as a citizen of this country, may come when he wants, but the PD is, of course, definitely in favor of a republic, and it wants Albania to join Europe as a parliamentary democracy.

Regarding the Communist Party, Berisha states: "I see it is a genuinely Enverist party, but I am, of course, not in favor of banning political parties."

Socialist Party's Pellumbi on Election Results

AU2303204492 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Interview with Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi by Bujar Shtepani in Tirana on 23 March—recorded]

[Text] [Shtepani] Will you accept the will of the Albanian people?

[Pellumbi] Yes. We have said so, and we have been the only political party to have done so from the start of the campaign. We are a serious and balanced party that aspires to democracy. We consider democracy to be the monopoly of the people, not of a single party.

[Shtepani] The Albanian Socialist Party [PSSh] has powerfully supported the initiative of some intellectuals for national conciliation and unification. Will you continue to support this initiative after losing the elections?

[Pellumbi] Yes. We will stand by this initiative, because national conciliation is, after all, one of the most vital things Albania needs today. Although the final election results have not been published, it is a fact that the people gave their verdict, and the Democratic Party won a noisy victory. It is now no doubt faced with the historic test of keeping the promises it made to the electorate during the campaign. The PSSh did not achieve its goals in these elections. Nevertheless, I do not consider it a defeat. It is a loss, but not a defeat. The PSSh is a new party and represents an alternative that the country requires. No doubt, as the party turns into a constructive opposition, it will find the strength to further pursue its work and to make better known this alternative of the European left, of democratic socialism.

[Shtepani] What do you think about the opening of parliament and the governing of Albania? Should the Democratic Party invite into a coalition the Socialists that lost in this elections?

[Pellumbi] I would have wished these elections to have produced a genuinely pluralist parliament, i.e. not a unipolar but a multiparty parliament. This would have been good for the country in this difficult transition period. In this sense, I would say that the best form of government is a coalition government that has the support of the entire people. How the situation develops and how these issues will be solved depends on the Democratic Party.

Democratic Party Wins Four Seats in Diber

AU2303172892 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1700 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Zamira Koleci report]

[Text] This afternoon, members of the Central Electoral Commission contacted the constituencies of Diber District by telephone. No information had been received

until this telephone contact. After great efforts, it was ascertained that the four Democratic Party candidates—Safet Xhulali, Agron Coku, Natasha Shehu, and Bashkim Gazidede—had won in the four constituencies of this district, gaining between 60 and 70 percent of the vote.

It must be emphasized that the Central Electoral Commission is doing the impossible to accelerate the arrival of protocols from the polling stations and constituencies, and the protocols from 34 constituencies in all have now been received and are being processed by computer. Protocols have still not arrived from 66 constituencies. Constituencies No. 5 in Berat; No. 20 in Elbasan; No. 28 in Fier; No. 30 in Gramsh; No. 36 in Kolonje; No. 43 in Korce; No. 55 in Mat; Nos. 70 and 71 in Skrapar; Nos. 75, 78, and 79 in Shkoder; and, amazingly, Nos. 85 and 91 in Tirana have sent no reports at all, not even by telephone.

Results Update Gives Democratic Party 79 Seats

AU2403101492 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 0900 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Zamira Koleci report from the Central Electoral Commission in Tirana]

[Text] Dear listeners, we have so far provided information about the results of the voting for winning candidates and the percentages won by the parties nationwide. We will now give details about the parliamentary seats won by party candidates in the first-past-the-post system. In the 98 constituencies from which reports have arrived—thus, excluding two Shkoder constituencies that have not sent details—it emerges that:

The Democratic Party [PD] fielded 97 candidates and has gained 77 seats. Let us not forget that two Shkoder constituencies have sent no reports. The PD's headquarters has meanwhile informed the Editorial Board that the PD has also won in these two constituencies, so the PD's 77 seats will increase to 79.

The Socialist Party fielded 100 candidates and has gained only six seats—two in Fier, one in Kucove, two in Skrapar, and one in Berat.

The Social Democratic Party fielded 97 candidates and has gained only one seat in Elbasan.

The Republican Party fielded 95 candidates and has gained only one seat in Elbasan District.

Meanwhile, the Human Rights Union fielded 29 candidates and has won in two constituencies in Sarande and Gjirokaster.

So far we have 11 constituencies in the balloting:

Constituency No. 4 in Berat, Constituency No. 19 in Elbasan, Constituency No. 31 in Gjirokaster, Constituency No. 36 in Kolonje, Constituency Nos. 52 and 53 in Librazhd, Constituency No. 62 in Permet, Constituency Nos. 67 and 68 in Sarande, Constituency Nos. 80 and 81 in Tepelene.

Democratic Party Candidates for People's Assembly

92P20190A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 11 Mar 92 p 1

[Article: "Democratic Party Candidates for People's Assembly Deputies, by Constituencies"]

[Text] Constituency No. 1 (Berat) Agron Musaraj; No. 2 (Berat) Abdi Baleta; No. 3 (Berat) Perikli Teta; No.. 4 (Berat) Peri Dishnica; No.. 5 (Berat) Ermal Permeti; No. 6 (Diber) Safet Xhulali; No. 7 (Diber) Agron Coku; No. 8 (Diber) Natasha Sheh; No. 9 (Diber) Bashkim Guzidede; No. 10 (Durres) Nevruz Cela; No. 11 (Durres) Bashkim Kopliku; No. 12 (Durres) Vedat Sazani; No. 13 (Durres) Azem Hajdari; No. 14 (Durres) Rustem Gjata; No. 15 (Elbasan) Engjell Dakli; No. 16 (Elbasan) Agim Hoxha; No. 17 (Elbasan) Robert Ndrenika; No. 18 (Elbasan) Coalition; No. 19 (Elbasan) Gaqo Rota; No. 20 (Elbasan) Gezim Mema; No. 21 (Elbasan) Coalition; No. 22 (Fier) Rexhep Uka; No. 23 (Fier) Bujar Nepravishta; No. 24 (Fier) Lazar Lengu; No. 25 (Fier) Hasan Halili; No. 26 (Fier) Mitro Cela; No. 27 (Fier) Daim Rrapaj; No. 28 (Fier) Coalition; No. 29 (Fier) Fadil Cepele; No. 30 (Gramsh) Albert Karriqi; No. 31 (Gjirokaster) Genc Rruli; No. 32 (Gjirokaster) Sotiraq Hroni; No. 33 (Kavaje) Sali Berisha; No. 34 (Kavaje) Halit Shamata; No. 35 (Kavaje) Luan Skuqi; No. 36 (Kolonje) Uran Butka; No. 37 (Korce) Gezim Agastra; No. 38 (Korce) Teodor Keko; No. 39 (Korce) Coalition; No. 40 (Korce) Eduart Selami; No. 41 (Korce) Natasha Lako; No. 42 (Korce) Petrika Minga; No. 43 (Korce) Bahri Bregu; No. 44 (Kruje) Sadedin Balla; No. 45 (Kruje) Rushen Golemi; No. 46 (Kruje) Alfred [illegible]; No. 47 (Kukes) Mustafe Mustafa; No. 48 (Kukes) Shefqet Hoxha; No. 49 (Kukes) Skender Jaku; No. 50 (Lezhe) Rudolf Marku; No. 51 (Lezhe) Tonin Alimehilli; No. 52 (Librazhd) Pellumb Malaj; No. 53 (Librazhd) Kurt Xhepa; No. 54 (Lushnje) Tritan Shehu; No. 55 (Lushnje) Izet Shehu; No. 56 (Lushnje) Isan Cabej; No. 57 (Lushnje) Kujtim Gina; No. 58 (Mat) Shyqyri Cela; No. 59 (Mat) Agim Cupi; No. 60 (Mirdite) Zef Brozi; No. 62 (Permet) Vasil Gjika; No. 63 (Pogradec) Arban Mece; No. 64 (Pogradec) Jemin Gjana; No. 65 (Puke) Coalition; No. 66 (Puke) Marash Ibraj; No. 67 (Sarande) Ritvan Peshkepia; No. 68 (Sarande) Coalition; No. 69 (Sarande) Coalition; No. 70 (Shkraper) Coalition; No. 71 (Skraper) Mustafa NaNo.; No. 72 (Shkoder) Pjeter ArbNo.ri; No. 73 (Shkoder) Ahmet Osja; No. 74 (Shkoder) Ali Spahia; No. 75 (Shkoder) Gezim Luli; No. 76 (Shkoder) Pjeter Pepa; No. 77 (Shkoder) Mendu Derguti; No. 78 (Shkoder) Dode Kacaj; No. 79 (Shkoder) Kol Tonaj; No. 80 (Tepelene) Blerim Cela; No. 81 (Tepelene) Coalition; No. 82 (Tirana) Ylli Vejsiu; No. 83 (Tirana) Arben Imami; No. 84 (Tirana) Dylberi Vrioni; No. 85 (Tirana) Skender Shkupi; No. 86 (Tirana) Tomor Malasi; No. 87 (Tirana) Dashamir Shehu; No. 88 (Tirana) Aleksander

Meksi; No. 89 (Tirana) Maksim KoNo.mi; No. 90 (Tirana) Shaban Memia; No. 91 (Tirana) Emanuel Heba; No. 92 (Tirana) Petrit Kolabula; No. 93 (Tirana) Ferdinant Petrela [and] Coalition; No. 94 (Tropoje) Besnik Mustafa; No. 95 (Vlore) Ibrahim Vasjari; No. 96 (Vlore) Abedim Elmazi; No. 97 (Vlore) Dhimiter AnagNo.sti; No. 98 (Vlore) Afrim Jupi; No. 99 (Vlore) Gramos Pashko; No. 100 (Vlore) Roland [illegible].

Zhelev Explains Position on Intelligence Service

AU2403095692 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 19 Mar 92 p 1

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Elena Lyubenova; place and date not given: "Control of Rather Than Monopoly Over Information"]

[Text] [Lyubenova] Mr. President, would you explain your position on the issue of control over the National Intelligence Service?

[Zhelev] I am not trying to monopolize the special services. Since I am responsible for the country's national security I must control the special services. During the latest talks with the leadership of the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] we agreed that the control issue should be regulated by law, as is the case in every civilized country. It was explicitly pointed out at our meetings that what the issue needs is not a solution—after all, the decree of the former State Council on the intelligence service was also a solution of sorts—but the preparation of a law.

Second, things must be resolved in a way that will guarantee control and supervision of the intelligence service both by the government and the president. In addition, it is self-evident that there must be parliamentary control. The parliament has a National Security Commission, which can and must control and monitor the activity of these services. This is something that is natural under the conditions of parliamentary democracy, and we claim to have such a system. I do not mean to monopolize the information supplied by these services. This is information that must serve the needs of the entire state leadership. I am the last person interested in creating tension between the SDS and the Presidency.

[Lyubenova] Do you think it is purposeful to leave the two secret services under different and separate commands as is the case now?

[Zhelev] In half of the European countries these services are united, and in the rest they are under different command. However, everywhere their existence and functions are based on the law and on the common striving to divide control over their activity. If these services were subordinated only to the government, their activity would have an aura of insecurity. This is so because, whenever there is a crisis, the cabinet is always the most vulnerable entity. Whenever high tension develops the cabinet is first to be affected. On the other hand, the intelligence services do a purely national task.

[Lyubenova] How do you expect the parliament to exercise control over the services?

[Zhelev] I mentioned the National Security Commission. This commission is entitled to summon responsible officials of the services to come and clarify matters, to conduct parliamentary investigations, and to question candidates for high-ranking posts in both services.

[Lyubenova] Would you comment on the latest Kompromatgate [alleged leak of list of diplomats said to have worked for the intelligence service]?

[Zhelev] This case is still being investigated. I think it still is being clarified and I reserve the right to comment when the investigation is complete.

Ludzhev on Attempts To Discredit Public Figures

AU2403093292 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Mar 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev by Nora Stoycheva; place and date not given: "Behind This Business of Attempts To Discredit People Lie Individuals With Vested Interests and Their Circle Is Already Clearly Determined"]

[Excerpts] Our correspondent spoke with Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev. This is what he told us.

[Ludzhev] When one is in state authority, one must respect its institutions and its authority. This is why I believe that it is improper for a member of the government and of the National Security Council to comment on matters concerning national security. This was also my position right from the start when, as a member of the council, I received information about the kompromats [deliberate attempts to discredit officials]. The information was from Minister Sokolov, who passed it on to the president who, in turn, informed the members of the council. It is quite another matter (I am speaking in principle) that the Ministry of Interior Affairs was slow to act and that the mass media made a lot of fuss.

[Stoycheva] This fuss was caused by Stoyan Ganev and the 39....

[Ludzhev] Yes, I am not prepared to voice matters that require investigation just so that one or another set of people can be accused without grounds. This was also the stance that I maintained at the Varna meeting to which the organizers invited me (I was in Varna in connection with the visit of the German naval vessels).

As far back as December, I warned the Council of Ministers that intelligence information cannot be sent arbitrarily—the Foreign Ministry wanted information about the people who work there under cover. I personally forbade General Chervenkov, chief of Military Intelligence, from revealing such details. A good mechanism for interaction now exists between our ministry and the Foreign Ministry. However, the fact exists that several times in December lists were requested and sent in accordance with the Interior Ministry's regulations at the time.

[Stoycheva] Were matters really cleared up at the National Security Consultative Council's session on 13 March? Has it turned out that the lists were drawn up at the Foreign Ministry?

[Ludzhev] After looking at the matter of the kompromats from every angle on 13 March it is true that it turned out that my colleague Stoyan Ganev was not properly informed, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was slow in preparing the necessary information. At present we still cannot say who was putting this information together. At 2330 GMT Stoyan Ganev asked Chavdar Petkov to officially begin an investigation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because this is one of the places where the lists were drawn up. It is obvious that outsiders with a vested interest lie behind this whole business (their circle was also clearly determined on 13 March) and there will be a thorough investigation of the people who have afforded themselves the luxury of playing with national security. [passage omitted]

[Stoycheva] Are no accusations directed at you, and following on from these, at the president?

[Ludzhev] Look here, suspicions existed that someone had done something. Nobody has hinted that I am involved in anything and the attacks against the president were overt. The main error was that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was late with its investigation. The list was drawn up in December, a lot of people were dismissed who retained a wide network of connections. They know some things about the spy network and can use this in different ways. I believe that one of the centers that had a hand in this business is the house of General Zhivko Popov—in the past he was responsible for ambassadors.

[Stoycheva] The house?

[Ludzhev] He founded the "Club for the Victims of Communism" there; if you look at the lists, you will see that they are all former high officials. They may have suffered, but at the hands of their own people. During our very first conversation I told Stoyan Ganev that instead of making a fuss we had to carry out an investigation to ascertain the sources—these are mafia group centers, both economic and political, who are eating away at the new state authority. There have been not one but two incidents of infiltration and blackmail.

[Stoycheva] Did Dr. Zhelev dig his own grave when he agreed that the National Intelligence Service be transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs? Do you agree with this change?

[Ludzhev] If there is one point on which the parliamentary group and I differ, it is that I was against taking one service and transferring it somewhere else; this must be done by adopting a law.

We have draft bills on the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Service. The fact that the president has given his agreement for the draft bill to be submitted on transferring the National Intelligence Service to the Council of Ministers does not mean that he has dug his own grave. I have explained more than once that at the moment the budget and the payroll of the National Intelligence Service are determined by the Council of Ministers.

The chief and his deputies are proposed by the minister of defense to the government, who then proposes them to the president. This is because the Law on General Military Service is in force. The fuss that was made was the result of certain members of parliament having inadequate information.

Podkrepa's Chulev on Conflict With Government

AU2003154192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1024 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Interview with Oleg Chulev, vice president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, by Petur Donchev at the headquarters of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation in Sofia on 20 March—live]

[Text] [Donchev] The reason I am reporting today from the headquarters of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation is the decision of the Council of Ministers to cooperate with the trade unions. I am now with Mr. Oleg Chulev, vice president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation.

Mr. Chulev, would you state your view on the document in question?

[Chulev] Good morning. Mr. Donchev, this document is (?really very interesting), especially for those who are not familiar with our current talks with the government. Considering that the government is proposing that we pursue the agreements reached at the previous talks, I am obliged to say that, if we have agreed on anything at all so far, it was on establishing a working group to discuss our proposals and the proposals of [words indistinct] tripartite commission.

We have informed all our social partners [words indistinct], and I know that the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] has also appointed its own representatives, but this working group has not yet been convened by the government and has not started work, despite the prime minister's declaration of readiness.

[Donchev] In this case, could you specify how things should work out from the point of view of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation?

[Chulev] According to yesterday's decision, the government proposes that on Monday, 23 March we begin discussions on the Council of Ministers' draft related to the settlement of and compensation for losses resulting from the government's draft on freezing wages. I am certain that this draft, like all other drafts concerning wages, can be discussed only within the framework of a tripartite commission where all points of view can be put forward. The proposed talks, as described in the government's latest decision, will be outside the framework of the tripartite commission and cannot represent a normal

dialogue between social partners. I would like to point out the fine difference between negotiations, which is the normal procedure, and talks that have a more unofficial character and therefore are not binding.

[Donchev] Thank you. That is all from Podkrepa headquarters. I would just like to add that the KNSB's [Conference of Independent Syndicalists in Bulgaria] position is not likely to differ much from Podkrepa's, because it is a question of procedure and principle. I will try to find out what is going on in the Podkrepa Miners Federation, which has declared that there will be a strike. That is all. Goodbye.

Unions Dissatisfied With Government Proposals

AU2203162592 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Statements by Svetoslav Stavrev, deputy chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, and Yanko Khadzhigeorgiev, confederative secretary of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, to correspondent Petur Donchev in Sofia on 20 March—recorded]

[Text] [Stavrev] The decision by the Council of Ministers is yet another attempt to pull the wool over our eyes. I am tired of these attempts at making us look naive, and we will no longer join in such games.

We demand a clearly defined mechanism for partnership. When we sit down to talk, we have to know where exactly we are, and when we leave the talks, we have to know what the outcome will be. We will no longer take part in idle talks.

I have signed a letter addressed to the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which is empowered to conduct these negotiations, in which we inform them that the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] will not take part in these talks planned for 23 March.

[Khadzhigeorgiev] This is another attempt by the government to postpone solving urgent problems of the day. However, they will not get away with this, because no concrete, clear decisions have been made on the problems of the Miners Federation, on the problems of social partnership, or on the problems of the military-industrial complex. It is the government itself, not the Ministry of Industry and Trade, that has to solve the problems that have come to a head at the moment.

Regarding the issue of social partnership, we hold a clear and categorical position. We submitted our proposals in writing, and we could discuss them with the government's so-called contact group, and thus reach a decision on the status of the tripartite commission. What is most important here is the value that will be placed on the decisions adopted by this commission. Simply to meet and chat together is a waste of time.

BSP Accuses SDS of 'Political Brinkmanship'

AU2203162892 Sofia BTA in English 1948 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 21 (BTA)—A many-thousand rally of the Bulgarian Socialist (ex-communist) Party (BSP) was held in Sofia today. It raised slogans such as "Bulgaria," "BSP," and "Elections." This rally of the opposition BSP marked the beginning of its spring political campaign. The speakers at the rally were critical of the work in parliament of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). They levelled severe criticism at the government. There were chants for the resignation of the government.

"We are for parliamentarism and pluralism, but this does not mean opposition pliancy, nor willingness to share the responsibility for the political brinkmanship of the SDS and DPS," said Zhan Videnov, leader of the Socialists. Mr. Stefan Prodev, editor-in-chief of the Socialist daily "DUMA," launched the idea for an all-national movement for democracy in order to prevent the restoration of fascism. The rally was also addressed by leaders of minor parties with which the BSP entered a campaign alliance before the parliamentary elections last October.

Poll Shows Less Support for SDS, More for BSP

AU2303175892 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[24 CHASA staff report]

[Text] According to the opinion poll conducted in March by the National Public Opinion Research Center, support for the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] has decreased by 5 percent compared to January. The Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] following increased by 4 percent. The Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] support remains unchanged.

The changes are explained by the lack of mobilizing factors and especially by disappointment in the economic policy of two ministers in the new government who were also members of the previous government.

Support for the SDS has dropped by 7 percent in the capital and risen by 1 percent for the BSP.

In the villages, municipal centers, and large towns the Socialists have 3 to 8 percent more supporters than in January. Some 5 percent more pensioners and white-collar workers are inclined to vote for the Socialists, and there are 8 percent more blue collar workers supporting the BSP.

Some 5 to 8 percent fewer citizens in the villages and municipal centers would now vote for the SDS. The Blue coalition [SDS] has declined most in popularity among white collar workers (11 percent down in comparison to

January), and among blue collar workers and pensioners (down by 6 percent). At the same time the Blue idea has won over another 11 percent of representatives from the intelligentsia. The SDS finds reliable support among young voters. The BSP continues to rely on older people, but, in March its white-haired electorate was rejuvenated by 10 percent following from the 31 to 40 age group.

The number of unemployed who harbor sympathies for the Socialists, and those with sympathies for those in power, has decreased. The difference in the number of voters supporting the two parliamentary giants has shrunk from 18 to 9 percent during the period from January to March, but the electorate has not shifted from the one to the other political force.

Dienstbier Interviewed on Talks With Baker

LD2303162892 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Jan Smid report from Washington]

[Text] Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier is currently in Washington, the U.S. capital, following a brief stop in Miami and before going to New York where he is to meet the U.N. secretary general on Monday. In the U.S. capital, he had talks at the State Department with his American counterpart, James Baker, and Baker's deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger. The talks mainly concerned Nagorno-Karabakh, and the meeting was mainly for the mutual exchange of information and to coordinate the overall course of action because, according to our minister, attempts are being made to tackle the current situation at several levels. Representatives of Turkey and Iran, as well as the CSCE, are acting separately, and the establishment of a special corridor for humanitarian aid is being considered. For this reason it is essential that all these activities are harmonized mutually.

Asked if the talks at the State Department were solely about Nagorno-Karabakh, Jiri Dienstbier replied:

[Begin Dienstbier recording] Apart from this we discussed the whole development of the Helsinki process and many other economic issues and triangular operations, as well as the future of the airport at Milovice. I also had talks with representatives of various industrial circles, with people who are interested in investing in Czechoslovakia. I also discussed this matter with Under Secretary Eagleburger. It is a well known fact that the Americans have the feeling that they face worse conditions in Czechoslovakia than some other countries. Therefore, we clarified the matter both with the industrialists and representatives of the American Administration. Although it is true that European businessmen have better conditions in the sense that their governments guarantee their business ventures and provide state guarantees, which the Americans do not do to such an extent, Americans do have the Import-Export Bank and other institutions to promote business ventures, however, this is not comparable. Americans also complain about the terrible bureaucracy existing in our country, which is much more difficult to overcome from such a distance. [end recording]

Havel To Visit Russia, Sign Treaty 1 Apr

LD2303151492 Prague CSTK in English 1249 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 23 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel will pay an official visit to the Russian Federation on April 1, at the invitation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, presidential press secretary Michael Zantovsky today told a press conference.

During his visit a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Russian Federation will be signed. The treaty was initialed in Moscow February 18 by the Czechoslovak and Russian foreign ministers, Jiri Dienstbier and Andrey Kozyrev. According to Zantovsky, Havel is expected to meet with the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

EC Willing To Mediate Danube Dam Dispute

AU2303114392 Prague CSTK in English 2131 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Brussels March 20 (CSTK correspondent)—The European Community (EC) is ready and willing to mediate a solution to the current dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary over their joint hydroelectric project on the Danube provided the two countries agree to the EC's three main conditions.

This was told to CSTK today by sources close to the EC Commission.

Firstly, both countries must jointly formulate a demand for an EC mediatory mission, clearly stating their idea of EC assistance.

The EC will confine itself solely to scientific aspects of the controversy. It will provide an independent expertise, and submit recommendations and draft solutions, but will in no case let itself be dragged into possible political aspects of the problem.

The third condition is that from the moment the EC starts its mission, neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary will take any decision or launch any action that would be of an "irreversible" character.

The project to build the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros twin-dam on the Danube along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border was launched in 1978 but in 1989 Hungary stopped work on its part of the dam for environmental reasons. Since then, protracted talks have been held between the two states, with Czechoslovakia insisting on completing its part of the project.

The EC specified its conditions after Thursday's talks in Brussels between the EC commission Deputy Chairman, Frans Andriessen, and Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl.

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier discussed the Czechoslovak-Hungarian dispute with EC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors earlier. Delors then supported Dienstbier's idea that an independent EC commission be set up to present an objective assessment of the issue.

Havel on Slovakia Visit, Presidency, RSA

LD2303141392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Stanislava Dufkova in Prague on 20 March: "Conservations at Lany"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Dufkova] Mr. President, you have barely managed to take a breath after your two-day working program in Bratislava and here we are in your home to record the 83d installment of our conversations. In Slovakia you undertook a number of meetings and talks. Is there one to which you would like to return? I add that it is half past eight in the evening and it is Friday.

[Havel] It is not the custom in our conversation to provide a complete account of what I did during the past week. I would nonetheless like to recapitulate a bit what I did in Slovakia because all this at least for me has an importance for the future. [passage omitted]

A very important conference was held in Bratislava—attended by vice premiers of all three governments, headed by Minister Klaus, justice ministers, and ministers for privatization—where a precise and let us hope a final timetable of individual steps was agreed upon. This timetable should culminate on 18 May, which will be the D-day on which the first privatization round is to begin. As the date indicates, this should take place before the elections. I attach a great deal importance to the fact that this will take place before elections; not because this or that party would use it in the campaign and collect some votes on this basis— I do not at all perceive this as a matter of pre-election speculations—but it is important for another reason. It is important because of the confidence of our citizens in our democratic state. It is important because eight and a half million people purchased a registration booklet for 1,000 korunas [Kcs] and decided to share in the privatization, and these people are anticipating further steps with tension. People must not lose confidence in this process because they would also lose confidence in the whole economic reform and thereby confidence in the whole democratic power in our country. They could then succumb to frustration, doubts, and mistrust. They might decide not to vote, which would not be a good thing. From the viewpoint of future political stability I, therefore, regard it as very important that this should take place before the elections. [passage omitted]

At great deal is at stake. This is an unprecedented radical change in ownership relations. The most recent analogy would be the unfortunate nationalization, which was of course a much simpler process than privatization 40 years later, when it is necessary, after so many changes, to forge the natural plurality of the whole economy and create prerequisites for the play of market relations. [passage omitted].

Such a drastic change is something that will influence the life of all citizens for many decades. Here we are actually laying foundations for the prosperity of future years and the prosperity of future generations. In their own way, all those people who are diligently working on this project are possibly the most important people in our republic. Their work is coming to its culmination, and I realize what an integral role privatization is playing. It is playing an integral role not only within our own state, but also in the direction of advanced democracies, in the direction of Europe as a whole. Real preconditions are being created for the free flow of capital, labor, and people—all of which is already operating within the European community. This also has a large political ramification. This process must not be halted; everything must be done to ensure that it continues, that dates are observed, and that the first round takes place and others follow. [passage omitted]

I also met with the Bishops' Conference headed by Cardinal Korec. This was also a very interesting conversation. We spoke very frankly for an hour about various matters and welcomed very much that the Church in Slovakia—which naturally has a big influence in Slovakia since there are many believers there, hundreds of thousands of people gather in the churches—that the Catholic Church—through the mouths of their highest representatives—said clearly that it does not want to enter political controversies but wants to act as an amalgam, as a medium for conciliation. It wants to support civic culture; turn man to higher ethical values; support decency, toleration, and understanding among people; and not support dramatic polarization of our society. I believe it is very good news that such an influential force as the Church in Slovakia wants to preserve neutrality in the run up to elections. [passage omitted]

Why am I talking in so much detail about my visit to Slovakia? I am doing so to articulate the thoroughly positive impression I have from my working visit to Slovakia: that the majority of Slovaks are reasonable citizens who feel responsible for the future development of our society; who are capable of being immune to cheap, underhanded, and demagogic promises and offers; and who want one thing only, and that is that the Czechs perceive them as a separate community with its own traditions, its own somewhat different, I would not like to say mentality, but somewhat different mode of behavior. One could say that they have a somewhat different soul—like any other man or community—and want to be equal partners of the Czechs in a common state.

[Dufkova] I heard today that you have for the first time publicly acknowledged that you are willing to stand for the presidency. Have you ackknowledged this?

[Havel] Your information is not quite correct. My candidacy for the office of the president was mentioned today at a meeting with Slovak journalists. I told them that some parties have already expressed their faith in me and declared me their candidate, or hinted that they would support my candidacy. I am naturally pleased by this, but it still seems to me that the time has not yet come to announce publicly and definitely that I will accept the nomination. As I wrote in my book last summer, I am prepared under certain circumstances to accept the nomination. However, I will make a definitive decision and announce it publicly only when I decide that the time has come. At the moment, I cannot say when the right time will be. I do not believe that it would

be very appropriate to wait until after the elections. I would have a right to do that, since I would be elected by the deputies of the Federal Assembly and I could wait to see whether those who might want me to become president are elected, or whether some other deputies are elected. In theory, I could make the decision after the elections. Nevertheless, the Federal Assembly will have to elect the president practically at its first session, after electing its bodies like the presidium, etc. [passage omitted]

I think that it would be too late if I, or any other possible candidate, were to decide only after the parliamentary elections. Therefore, I think it is necessary to make the decision earlier. It is necessary to prepare the political terrain to a certain extent, and for that certain agreements are needed. It seems to me that the right time—unless the pre-election period brings some unexpected dramatic surprises—that the right time for announcing such a decision will only come when some sort of agreement is reached among such a number of political forces in the future parliament as might be able to elect a joint candidate. At the moment, the majority of Czech political parties have named me their candidate in one way or another. Only a few Slovak parties, however, have done the same thing. It is quite clear that only a person who enjoys the trust of the citizens of both our republics, and who enjoys the trust of at least the main political forces in our republics, can become the federal president.

[Dufkova] At the beginning of February, during the visit of South African President de Klerk, you said on this program that his visit gave you some cause for optimism. De Klerk has now succeeded in holding a referendum in the Republic of South Africa [RSA] in which goodwill and honest intentions prevailed. You have sent him a message of congratulations.

[Havel] I would like to say the following on the subject. The Republic of South Africa is a country that has enormously greater worries about its future than Czechoslovakia. People here can hardly imagine how complicated the situation is there. During his visit, President de Klerk explained to me at length the extent and depth of these problems as well as his intentions, including his plans to hold a whites-only referendum to gain consent for his course, his reforms, and his plans to turn the RSA into a genuinely democratic state where everyone would be equal. This was a big gamble for him. It was not at all clear whether he would really win that referendum. He gambled the whole weight of his personality and his political future on this matter. He was assaulted several times during the campaign, but the ideals and values that he holds were more important to him than presidential office. He won and I rejoice a great deal, above all for the citizens of the RSA for whom a long, thorny, but nonetheless good road—because it is a road heading in the right direction—is opening. I must confess that for me President de Klerk is now an example of a man who puts certain values above his own personal interests, who is willing to gamble everything, who is willing to risk mass criticism by his opponents, and who is willing to undergo risks because of his certainty of the quality of what he is pursuing. He is a brave man and it would seem that it would be a good thing if all politicians possessed this kind of courage. [passage omitted]

Havel Opposes Separate Slovak President

LD2303161192 Prague CSTK in English 1341 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 23 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel does not think Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic or the Czech Republic would profit from Slovakia having its own president, Havel's press spokesman Michael Zatovsky told journalists today.

In Bratislava on Sunday, the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Vladimir Meciar, said at a HZDS two-day congress: "We consider it inevitable that we should take steps as soon as possible after the elections (June 5-6) to declare Slovakia's sovereignty by adopting a constitution of the Slovak Republic, with a president as the head of the Slovak Republic." The HZDS is the strongest opposition party in Slovakia.

Referring to the HZDS programme, Zantovsky said it is not entirely clear what is meant by "Slovakia's being subject to international law."

"Were this really to mean that Slovakia should fully be subject to international law, this would make Slovakia a separate state," while the HZDS programme seems to indicate that the movement counts with a certain form of a common state of Czechs and Slovaks also in future, Zantovsky said.

Election Campaign To Start 13 May, End 3 June

AU2303141792 Prague CSTK in English 2152 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 19 (CSTK)—The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is ready to grant Czechoslovakia a standby loan worth $350 million to strengthen Czechoslovakia's reserves to be drawn at the end of 1992 and at the beginning of 1993, a report discussed by the Czechoslovak Government today says.

The report on Czechoslovak ministers' talks with an IMF mission in Prague in mid-January says the IMF assesses positively the ongoing transformation of the Czechoslovak economy.

The mission recommended to the Czechoslovak Government to ask the IMF to pardon Czechoslovakia for not having fulfilled all criteria set to it as a condition for admission to the IMF and for receiving IMF loans.

Czechoslovakia failed to have a budget surplus last year which, on the contrary, ended in a deficit of 12,300 million crowns ($410 million).

The IMF mission took note of the explanation of the deficit which, the government said, was not due to easing

the fiscal policy, but to lower budgetary revenues. The management did not regulate spending accordingly in late 1991.

The government approved an organizational timetable for the June 5-6 general elections. Under it, slates will be registered from April 16 to 21. The election campaign will start on May 13 and end on June 3.

The government approved principles of compensation to be paid to the Czechoslovak citizens whose property was damaged during the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968-91.

It is estimated that compensation, including both property and health, will not exceed 30 million crowns ($1 million).

The government approved humanitarian aid to the victims of a recent earthquake in Turkey worth 500,000 crowns (about $16,600).

At a press conference following the cabinet meeting, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Pavol Hoffmann said the government insists on its proposal of March 12 to expropriate the property of the joint-stock company Transpetrol and on founding a new company. The Czechoslovak Government will convey to the federal parliament, which is to deal with the issue at its April session, the negative stand of the Slovak Government on the transfer of Transpetrol to the federation.

When Transpetrol was founded in January 1991, the ownership of oil pipelines was transferred from the federation to the Czech and Slovak Republics' bodies by a decision of the two republics' governments instead of by the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament).

By setting up Transpetrol the founders failed to respect the law on power-sharing between the federation and the two national republics under which a decision on oil and gas pipelines and power lines is to be laid down in a special law.

Czech National Council Sets Up Foreign Ministry

LD2003214392 Prague CSTK in English 1852 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 20 (CSTK)—The Czech National Council (regional parliament) today passed a law on establishing a Czech Ministry for International Relations.

The ministry, to replace the Czech Government Committee for International Relations, will coordinate international relations of various institutions in the Czech Republic. Czech Premier Petr Pithart said the committee's powers are no longer adequate for the Czech Republic's relations with foreign countries.

Slovakia established a Ministry for External (later renamed to International) Relations in August 1990.

Pihart said the cost of setting up the ministry, estimated at 31 million crowns (about $1 million), is much lower than income expected from ministry's operation.

It is desirable for strengthening the (Czechoslovak) Federation to remove the impression of Slovak representatives that the Czech Republic feels to be represented abroad by federal bodies, said Pithart.

The law will come into effect as of June 1.

Czech Parliament Chairwoman Dagmar Buresova today met with a delegation of the Serbian parliament (Skupstina) Foreign Committee, headed by its chairman Alexander Prlja. Prlja said a federation of Serbia and Montenegro will probably be formed soon.

Approves Economic Transformation Report

LD2003232192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Today, Czech National Council [CNC] deputies adopted a resolution on the Czech Government report regarding progress in the transformation of the Czech economy last year.

It describes as the main and positive feature the fact that there was a reversal in supply and demand, and the balance of trade showed a surplus amounting to almost 40 billion korunnas [kcs]. In Slovakia, this balance ended with a deficit of approximately kcs12.5 billion. The report goes on to say that the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic was 2.8 percent last year, or almost one percent lower than expected. These liablities were balanced by the 22.5 percent fall in industrial output and by the 24 percent fall in real wages. This was reflected in lower revenues for the state budget, which showed a deficit of almost kcs16 billion. [passage omitted]

Slovak Government Condemns Transpetrol Issue

AU2003183492 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Mar 92 pp 1,2

[Frantisek Melis report: "The Slovak Government Has Come Out Against the Federal Government"]

[Text] Bratislava—At its session yesterday, the Slovak Government adopted a position on the draft law on ownership concerning oil pipelines, the transit gas pipeline, and the primary distribution networks for electricity—in other words, a position on the Transpetrol controversy. Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky made the following statement to reporters:

"The CSFR Government has approved a draft law that was not submitted to the Slovak Government for review. Both national governments received the federal government's draft containing four alternatives prior to their previous decision. Both governments adopted the fourth alternative. The CSFR Government, however, postponed debate on this issue and tasked Economy Minister Vladimir Dlouhy with drafting new material. Moreover,

this material contained a new alternative completely unknown to the republic governments. The federal government approved this alternative." Therefore, the Slovak Government considers the CSFR Government's decision of 12 March to be incorrect and would welcome its reappraisal. "The alternative approved by the CSFR Government is at variance with Article 4 of Constitutional Law No. 143/1968. The legality of the federal government's decision would have to be preceded by the adoption of a constitutional law entrusting the oil pipelines issue to CSFR jurisdiction. A three-fifths majority of all Federal Assembly deputies would be necessary for this," states the Slovak Government's position.

In conjunction with last week's debate, the government approved a 10 percent cut in the state budget in noninvestment expenditure on state administration. According to individual departments and central organs, the savings will amount to almost 88 million korunas. The government did not recommend the adoption of a proposal by a group of Slovak National Council [SNR] deputies for an SNR law on measures aimed at protecting the public interest and establishing a state commission for protecting the public interest, as it contained several ambiguities. It discussed a proposal by a group of deputies to draft an SNR law that would change and supplement law No. 330/1991 on land regulations, settling land ownership, land offices, the land fund, and land associations. It stated that the SNR law on regulating certain property ownership relations deals with this issue. It agreed, with comments, to the proposal put forward by the SNR Committee for Trade and Services to amend law No. 427/1990 on transferring state ownership in some matters to other legal or natural persons. This is intended to eradicate the problems caused in the small-scale privatization process by the new owners of commercial units not paying for the stock they acquired through auction. It has been proposed that the transfer of ownership for auctioned property be conditional upon payment for the stock in auctioned commercial units and that the deadline for paying the purchase price be extended to 60 days.

The government approved, with comments, the draft SNR law on support for science and technology and the draft Federal Assembly law on the mass media. This law standardizes conditions for freedom of speech and for the right to acquire and disseminate information via the press and other mass media. An individual's civil and legal protection from misuse of the freedom of speech also forms part of the draft. The government also made note of a report from the Slovak Interior Ministry on the security situation in Slovakia last year. A total of 128 murders were committed and 111 were successfully cleared. Seven of the 17 unsolved murders were committed in Bratislava. Robbery is the most common crime. Some 1,347 robberies were committed last year and 840 were cleared. The culprits' brutality is a characteristic feature of these crimes. Most crimes are property-related. A total of 64,292 crimes were reported. This is an increase of 43.5 percent compared to 1990. Some 23,380 were cleared.

The government approved a proposal on the appointment of Slovak judges. It agreed with the creation of 300 federal bursary places annually within the framework of Czechoslovak foreign assistance for 1991-92. It also discussed other issues.

Carnogursky praised the security measures adopted during the rallies held to commemorate the 53d anniversary of the declaration of the Slovak Republic. He also praised the peaceful nature of the rallies. He added that the dramatization of the rallies by the Czech Government Presidium was unnecessary and that 14 March in Prague was marked by a much more violent demonstration in contrast. In connection with Slovak Christian Democratic Movement [SKDH] policy principles, he stated that they differ from the original KDH program in their approach to the steps necessary in the constitutional and legal arrangement issue. According to him, the SKDH separation inevitably alters the work-related legal relationship of some of its functionaries to KDH headquarters on Zabotova Street in Bratislava. He also expressed his hope that SKDH deputies will not vote for Minister Ivan Miklos' recall at the upcoming SNR session because when they parted ways, the Christian Democrats agreed to preserve the government's stability. Carnogursky directed the biblical quotation, "He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword," at Christian Democratic Party Chairman Vaclav Benda following his statement that, if the left wing wins the elections in Slovakia, the Czech side will use the Army to alter the situation.

Carnogursky on Economic, Electoral Objectives

LD2303150892 Prague CSTK in English 1105 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 23 (CSTK)—Slovakia having equal rights as other countries in Europe and throughout the world continues to be an objective of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), its chairman Jan Carnogursky says in today's Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA.

Carnogursky, Slovakia's premier, is commenting on the developments on the Slovak political scene following a split from the KDH of the national-oriented "Slovak Christian Democratic movement" (SKDH) on March 7.

Carnogursky says building Slovakia means to continue economic reforms, since only reforms can bring economic balance to Slovakia, secure an acceptable standard of living and help establish relations between Slovakia and other countries based on the equality principle.

Carnogursky is quoted as saying the KDH sticks to social market economy. He says Slovakia should take advantage of its position in the centre of Europe and orientate itself towards smaller businesses, tourism, agriculture and transport.

On the June 5-6 general elections, Carnogursky says the KDH would not enter into a post-election coalition with the movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) as long as it is chaired by Vladimir Meciar (Slovak Premier between June 1990 and April 1991). Carnogursky, who was Meciar's deputy premier, says Meciar has proved to be a destabilising element.

Commenting on the situation in the Slovak left, Carnogursky says Czechoslovak Parliament Chairman Alexander Dubcek's decision to join the Slovak Social Democratic Party is useful for developments in Slovakia.

Carnogursky Discusses Sovereignty Question

LD2103193792 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by station editor Lubomir Lindtner; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lindtner] Let us now talk about the events at home. You predicted in our interview a week ago that not more than 0.01 percent of the inhabitants of Slovakia wou. come to Bratislava square in connection with the 14 March events. This prediction of yours did indeed come true and so I would like to ask you: Did you make this forecast on the basis of confidential information or on the basis of a more intimate knowledge of the situation in Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] I forecast it on the basis of a more intimate knowledge of the situation in Slovakia. Truly, the situation in Slovakia was dramatized outside Slovakia before 14 March, and not only in the economic sphere or as to the past, present, and the future. We cannot count on automatically transfering our experience from other times, in this case the emergence of the Slovak state in 1939 and so on. Indeed, Slovakia does not base its current aspirations on the Slovak state of 1939-45, but on the current situation, our present constitutional arrangement, international law, and simply on our position in the world. That is why the commemorative celebration on 14 March this year had no justification in the current conditions existing in Slovakia. It had no justification from the point of view of the solution of the current problems of Slovakia, and that is why it attracted only a small number of people.

[Lindtner] Czech Prime Minister Pithart said in this week's radio interview that, and I quote: The national element of aiming toward greater independence need not be decisive. A different relationship brings about a stronger motive—and that is Slovakia's attitude toward economic transformation. People do not consider it necessary to move so fast and with so many sacrifices along the path toward basic transformation of the economic system. Slovakia does not feel how deep we have sunk.

So much for the quote of the Czech prime minister. Do you agree with him?

[Carnogursky] I respect Mr. Pithart very much, but I told him during our personal conversation that Czech politicians should, perhaps, be more reticent when commenting on events in Slovakia. How can he say that people in Slovakia do not consider it necessary to move so fast and with so many sacrifices along the path toward fundamental transformation of the economic system, when in Slovakia there is three times higher unemployment than in the Czech Republic? We realize in Slovakia that we must carry out the economic reform as fast as possible, and we are carrying it out. But there is simply a more artificial economic structure in Slovakia than in Bohemia. And it is more artificial because it was created on the basis of decisionmaking that was not Slovak; it did not stem from Slovak interests. I am not saying that it was Czech or that it stemmed from Czech interests, but only that Slovakia was a dot on the map of the former eastern bloc into which large factories—for weapons and other things—were planned from the point of view of the interests of this eastern communist bloc. That is why we are now finding it more difficult to convert these factories or to draft alternative production programs for them. Slovakia and the Slovak Government are making economic policy in a way we think corresponds to the interests of Slovakia, and if we are managing to maintain social peace in Slovakia—I think a little more successfully than in the Czech Republic—then I think it is good evidence of the work of the government rather than a reason for criticism.

[Lindtner] Mr. Prime Minister, the 23d meeting of the Slovak National Council will open on 23 March and, in the words of Slovak National Party Chairman Jozef Prokes, the deputies from this party will again submit a proposal for the declaration of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. I quote Mr. Prokes: At least it will be clear before the election how the individual political parties view this matter.

What position of the parliament do you expect?

[Carnogursky] If the deputies from the Slovak National Party submit a proposal to declare the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic we will have a situation that we had several times before during the period of the Slovak National Council. On the one hand, the proposal to declare the sovereignty of Slovakia would be a pathetic proposal without any actual consequences. It would not affect anything. Let us say that the Slovak National Council accepted it. Then what? Life would go on. I think that such a proposal would not be very beneficial to the authority of declaring the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic.

On the other hand, if the proposal to declare the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic also contained real legal consequences, it would diminish the effectiveness of the Slovakian constitution. It would represent a breach of the current constitutional state, and the achievement of true sovereignty for Slovakia would thus be hampered rather than aided because laws would cease to be valid, there would be the threat of chaos.

We can see in other countries—the former Yugoslavia, the former USSR, and also elsewhere—what tragic consequences can arise if law and constituion cease to be valid. During meetings with foreign visitors and also during my trips abroad, I reiterated that Slovakia is viewed abroad as a partner because laws are valid in our country, because we are progressing along a lawful path, and because we are preserving democratic rights.

In the next few years we can expect literally basic changes in the approach toward small states, toward components of multinational states. One can expect changes that will raise these states to the level of the current bona fide states. But this level can only be achieved if we can safeguard order here. And order can be safeguarded only if we observe our own valid laws, and that goes for the Slovak National Council first of all.

Meciar on Movement for Slovak Sovereignty

LD2303163292 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Excerpts] The discussion at the second all-republic congress of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia [MFDS] culminated today in the adoption of the MFDS draft program for the forthcoming period. The 240 delegates also approved the movement's election program and elected its chairman and members of individual commissions.

Olga Keltosova became the Movement's secretary; Milan Knazko, Augustin Marian Huska, and Michal Kovac are vice-chairmen.

The delegates of the congress elected Vladimir Meciar chairman of MFDS. He has been interviewed by Vladimir Lach:

[Lach] Mr. Chairman, before the congress many people assumed there would be a conflict of various tendencies within the movement.

[Meciar] Several people spoke in the discussion, and all speakers confirmed that there is absolute unity within the movement. Differences of opinion and ideas exist, but the motive behind these is for the movement to progress further. As far as trends go, the matter is a fabrication. There are none.

[Lach] The basis of the movement's election program, which was adopted at the congress, will be published in the coming days. What was the order of priorities when you wrote and adopted it?

[Meciar] The first priority is the issue of social policy. Second, are the issues of economy, structural changes, and economic reform and planning. The third priority is the area of the state and citizen. The latter includes the issue of morality, world outlook, the freedoms of the citizens, their solidarity, equality, and so forth. It also includes the issue of state-forming structures. [passage omitted]

[Lach] Could you briefly characterize how the movement's election program envisages the sequence of post-election steps of the new political representations in respect of state set-up?

[Meciar] If we succeed, we assume that the following steps should follow the election. First, the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic would be declared unconditionally and without consultation with anyone. This is our right and we shall not beg for it. The second step would be the adoption of the constitution of the Slovak Republic with a president as head of state. Third, there are alternative proposals to be submitted on the selection of forms of coexistence with the Czech Republic. That means that once the sovereign subject has been constituted, citizens will decide in a referendum what the state will accede to regarding coexistence with the Czech Republic, if the latter is really interested in such coexistence.

As far as international policy goes, one very important piece of knowledge has emerged from the congress. We no longer seek to sort out Czechoslovak relations alone, but the Central European space as a whole. We would want to be the fourth participant in possible cooperation among Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

Meciar Hints at 'Secret' Agreement With Dubcek

AU2403090692 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 19 Mar 92 p 3

[HRI report: "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Candidates"]

[Text] Bratislava—Roman Kovac, the Czechoslovak trade union leader; Ivan Gasparovic, former CSFR prosecutor general; and Ladislav Dolgos, former chairman of the Slovak Anti-Monopoly Office will be featured on the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] slate of candidates. HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar said at yesterday's briefing by his movement. Concerning Alexander Dubcek's switchover to the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar observed: "This is the first time the Castle has made a laudatory mention of Dubcek. Everyone thinks that this is directed against us. Let them wait and see," he said, and spoke vaguely about some "secret" HZDS post-election agreement with Dubcek.

ODU-VPN Official Resigns; Platforms Set Out

LD2203182192 Prague CSTK in English 1514 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 22 (CSTK)—Jozef Kucerak resigned from the function of first vice-chairman of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN) and other party functions, ODU-VPN representatives told reporters Saturday.

The representatives said after an ODU-VPN republic council meeting that Kucerak will be replaced by Ivan

Miklos, the Slovak minister for the administration and privatisation of national property.

ODU-VPN Chairman Martin Porubjak said Kucerak, who remains an ODU-VPN member, explained that his function was incompatible with his post of member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Property Fund. Kucerak was also disappointed that a project for setting up a right-wing parties' bloc had failed, Porubjak added.

ODU-VPN Vice-Chairperson Helena Wolekova told reporters that the ODU-VPN will go to the June parliamentary elections independently, adding that "post-election cooperation with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) and the Democratic Party (DS) is possible."

Wolekova said the party's election programme, to be approved at the ODU-VPN congress on March 29, "continues asserting a federation based on two equal republics as a condition for a speedy transformation of the economy."

Referring to recent calls in the Slovak Parliament for dismissing Miklos from his ministerial post on account of his Ministry's alleged lack of concept for privatisation, Porubjak told CSTK "if recalled from his post, Miklos' popularity will grow as this step would cause public indignation."

KDH Deputy Chairman Comments on Party Split

LD2003190292 Prague CSTK in English 1528 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 19 (CSTK)—Deputy Chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Jan Petrik, today said that even though the KDH split earlier this month, those fearing destabilisation and undemocratic developments will continue to trust the original party.

A group within the KDH led by Deputy Chairman of the Slovak Parliament Jan Klepac broke from the KDH on March 7 to form a new national-oriented party called the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH).

Petrik added, however, that demagogic slogans could cause some drop in the number of KDH supporters. According to him KDH groups throughout Slovakia had split, but in no group had more than half left for the SKDH.

Petrik also said he believes Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel is one of the few people in Czechoslovakia who could be an acceptable presidential candidate for both the Czech and Slovak Republics. A new president will be elected following the June 5-6 general elections.

Fur Conducts U.S. Military Cooperation Talks

Confirms 'Expanding' Relations

AU2303145292 Budapest MTI in English 0818 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 20 (MTI)—After the graduation of the first Hungarian officers trained in US military institutions, another 30 to 40 officers are to start their studies this year. From next May, the two countries, expanding military cooperation will be coordinated and organized by a joint committee. This is how Hungarian Defence Minister Lajos Fur summed up what he had agreed upon during his American trip.

Heading a delegation, Fur paid an official visit to the United States at the invitation of Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, who visited Budapest last December.

Fur held talks with senior Pentagon and State Department officials, and congressmen, and visited the Academy of the Land Forces and the Airborne Division No. 18, which played a key role in the Gulf War.

Interviewed by Hungarian correspondents, Fur emphasized how cordially and friendly he had been received by officials of the administration and the armed forces. He highly appreciated that, after Britain and Germany, Hungarian officers have now an opportunity to obtain up-to-date knowledge in the United States, too. If all goes according to plan, he said, dozens of Hungarian officers a year will be given US scholarships and trained in any of the 150 military institutions of that country.

Further fields and chances of cooperation will be explored by the Joint Committee which will hold its first session in May with deputy state secretaries in the chair.

The idea of US involvement in modernizing the arsenal of the Hungarian Army was only raised in general terms, the minister said.

On Thursday [19 March] evening, Hungarian Ambassador Pal Tar gave a reception in Fur's honour. After visiting the defence university on Friday [20 March], the minister is to return to Hungary.

Returns, Assesses Results of Visit

LD2203155492 Budapest MTI in English 1815 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 21 (MTI)—Returning from the United States to Budapest on Saturday [21 March], Hungarian Defence Minister Lajos Fur said his negotiating partners had confirmed the U.S. standpoint that relations between Hungary and NATO should be institutionalized this year, even if this country's admission to the military alliance is not yet on the agenda. Heading a military delegation, Fur paid a one-week visit to the United States. The delegation held talks with Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney, and several senior officials of the U.S. Administration. The talks focused on the security of Europe, with special regard to the situation of Yugoslavia and Ukraine, Fur said. The U.S. negotiators spoke in terms of satisfaction about the security policy role Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland were playing in Eastern Europe. Bilateral military cooperation was another important item on the agenda of talks, Fur said. The sides agreed on setting up a joint committee in May to elaborate the concrete forms of cooperation. For the time being, 40 Hungarian officers are being trained in U.S. military institutions. The United States is expected to raise the sum earmarked for the purpose from 75,000 to 600,000 dollars a year in the near future, Fur said.

Defense Minister Fur Discusses Political Tasks

AU1703151392 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Mar 92 p 9

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Government Condemns Any Revanchist Tendency"]

[Excerpts] "The existence of national minorities in our region should be guaranteed by a system of autonomies that would create the conditions for preserving the ethnic character for both small settlements and larger communities"—Lajos Fur said in his interview to MAGYAR HIRLAP. Asked whether he was giving this interview as a historian, executive chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, or as defense minister, Lajos Fur said the following: "As a thinking Hungarian, if you allow me to choose the highest possible rank for myself." According to Lajos Fur, "if West Europe gives adequate political and economic help to this region, the emergence of democratic institutions will accelerate in all the countries in this region, and extremist trends will disappear. We should pay special attention to the economic problems and to solving these problems, because economic misery could lead to dangerous political trends." Lajos Fur added that "essentially, the Hungarian Government is conducting a national minority policy that is acceptable and can be followed by the Hungarians living beyond our borders. The Hungarian Government condemns any aggressive and revanchist tendency. Our government wants to guarantee the continued existence of the Hungarian nation by goodwill endeavors compatible with a democratic framework. In this respect, relations between the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian opposition are absolutely adequate." [passage omitted]

[Pinter] You travel in Hungary a lot. What do you experience? To what extent do the people understand this government's steps and intentions?

[Fur] One should not draw far-fetched conclusions from declarations made during personal meetings, because mostly it is the same people who are talking on such occasions and their tone is not one of satisfaction. The criticism directed at the government is sometimes justified and sometimes unjustified. Those who look further in time support this government. People for whom the case of the Hungarian nation is very important, both

within and beyond our borders, also support us. However, it would not be honest only to say this in answer your question, because a considerable proportion of the Hungarian society displays a total lack of interest in any kind of politics. I cannot tell you what these people think about us.

[Pinter] To what extent do the people in the surrounding countries understand the intentions of the Hungarian Government?

[Fur] I think that people who speak Hungarian understand us. We hope that others will also clearly understand this government's concepts and policy. For example, the Serbs could get into a situation in which, as a result of the internal developments in Yugoslavia, some Serbs will be living outside Serbia and, naturally, the Serbian politicians do not want this, but such a situation could nevertheless emerge. If so, people in Serbia will understand much better what it means when a government has to feel responsible for people who speak the same language but are living beyond the country's borders. The ethnic relations are so confused in this region that the formulation of a proper solution can no longer be delayed. Historical examples show that such attempts in the 20th century have been unsuccessful so far. We need something new, and there are European models and historical precedents for this. We should probably examine the solutions that emerged from bitter experience in the middle of the last century. In line with these concepts, we should guarantee the existence of national minorities by a system of autonomies that would create the conditions for preserving the ethnic character for both small settlements and large communities. There could be different types and ways of such autonomy and they would lead to a more liberal atmosphere and deeper political relations between the neighboring countries in this region. Take the example of the Swedish minority living in Finland? Why should we not take this as an example? If this pattern has been working perfectly in Finland for decades, why would this not work here in the Carpathian Basin? However, as long as certain states would like to somehow homogenize their ethnic image and they think in terms of a political nation, nothing can be achieved. This ethnic confusion also created confused relations between the states in this region. It is not at all impossible to find a solution acceptable to all if we come to an agreement on the basic principle, namely the need for some level of autonomy. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Why do the neighboring countries so often attack the awareness of your Hungarian mission that transpires from your statements? Could Hungarian policy play a role in the democratic development of the countries in this region?

[Fur] This is absolutely necessary, and we must accept this task with responsibility. If we also have another mission in addition to guaranteeing the survival of Hungarians, this can be achieved by helping the aforementioned democratization process. Within our country and within our language community, we must create a model that can also be followed by the others, namely the perfect functioning of democratic institutions and the creation of an economic structure that leads to prosperity. We have every chance of achieving this at the moment, because Hungary has minimal destructive forces such as characterize the other states in this region. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] The Hungarian Government often declares that the relations between Hungary and the neighboring countries are greatly determined by the fate of the Hungarian national minority living in these countries. How successful is this strategy?

[Fur] I would rather say that this is the only way in which we can advance. The results are clear in the case of Slovenia and Ukraine. After settling the internal problems, there are good chances for this in the CSFR, too. We would like to settle our old controversial issues with Romania as good neighbors and by adhering to the European norms, but we have been unsuccessful so far. The situation is even worse with the Republic of Serbia that makes up the central force in Yugoslavia, and which also includes Vojvodina and its large number of ethnic Hungarians. We hope that things will settle down. When I held talks with Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the largest Serbian opposition movement, his opinion on national minorities was very similar to ours. I informed him about our views on autonomy and, according to Mr Draskovic, these views are also acceptable to them, and they want to guarantee some territorial or other type of "cantonization" for their national minorities. If really democratically-oriented forces come to the fore, we will be able to understand each other more easily everywhere.

[Pinter] Do you think it is necessary to build a different system of relations between the Hungarian Government and the political organizations of the Hungarians living beyond our borders?

[Fur] The relations between the Hungarian Government, and Hungarian political life in general, with the Hungarians living beyond our borders have never been better than in recent months. It happens that we are rebuked for some of our positions or declarations, but the extent of this rebuke is not disturbing at all. Essentially, the Hungarian Government is conducting a national minority policy that is acceptable to and can be followed by the Hungarians living beyond our borders. The Hungarian Government condemns any aggressive and revanchist trend. Our government wants to guarantee the continued existence of the Hungarian nation by goodwill endeavors compatible with a democratic framework. In this respect, the relations between the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian opposition are absolutely adequate, and very few attempts have been made to use the national minority issue for party policy competition. We are quite close to each other as regards our steps and goals. [passage omitted]

National Daily Newspaper Readers Surveyed

AU2403104392 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 92 pp 1,8

[Unattributed report: "Pro-Government or Pro-Opposition?—Public Opinion Poll on Daily Newspapers"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Judging by the reactions of politicians and journalists—and scrutinizing the contents of the newspapers—the national political daily newspapers can be positioned according to their political tone fairly well along the pro-government to pro-opposition tangent. But do the readers perceive the differences between newspapers in this respect? The Szonda-Ipsos [opinion poll institute] attempted to find the answers to this question in a survey at the end of February and beginning of March 1992. (The survey was carried out on a sample of 1,000 representing the country's adult population.)

More than half (57 percent) of the Hungarian population does not read any national daily. It is mainly the people in the provinces who do not seek these newspapers, prefering to buy local or county newspapers. Although everyday experience is not absolutely necessary to form an opinion, in this case people who do not read the national dailies were less willing to express an opinion on them. Those who did mainly commented on NEPSZABADSAG. (Of those surveyed, NEPSZABADSAG was placed by four-tenths, KURIR by one-third, NEPSZAVA, MAGYAR NEMZET, MAGYAR HIRLAP, and MAI NAP by a quarter, UJ MAGYARORSZAG by a fifth, and PESTI HIRLAP was placed by a sixth in the pro-government pro-opposition dimension.) The assessments were made on a scale of -100 to +100, where the former indicates opposition and the latter indicates a pro-government position. When interpreting the figures, it has to be remembered that values between -7 and +7 are the middle of the scale, and newspapers in this range can be said to have no party bias in the view of those surveyed. Among people showing greater interest in politics, the differentiation between newspapers according to political affiliations increases with the level of education. People with low qualifications consider the newspapers to be closer to the government than to the opposition. The same unifying view can be seen among people living in villages.

Two newspapers are profiled particularly clearly by the public: KURIR is considered the most pro-opposition, and UJ MAGYARORSZAG the most pro-government. Both newspapers are relatively new and the surveyed people could not have been influenced by the previous life of these papers. More than half of those who replied placed KURIR on the "opposition side" of the scale, and this proportion is even higher among university graduates and young people (around 70 percent). This is the newspaper that the least number of people thought to be pro-government, and they were mainly older people who do not know KURIR very well. The UJ MAGYARORSZAG was established as a pro-government newspaper and, according to more than two-thirds of the people questioned, its barely one-year operation has proved this. The supposition of its being pro-government increases with the level of education (from 20 points by people with basic education to 69 points by university graduates), and this opinion is held by people in Budapest (68 percent) more than the average. It is interesting that both readers of UJ MAGYARORSZAG and people who do not read it hold the same opinion. The image of its being pro-government does not, therefore, come from its content, but rather from the circumstances of its launching and the surrounding publicity that raised certain assumptions (for example, from the frequent references in the television programs viewed by the public and considered to be pro-government, like HET and the news.)

Society is much more divided in the case of newspapers that already have a "past" and were published before the elections. In these cases, the role fulfilled in the past few decades has a considerable influence. All in all, MAI NAP, launched in 1989, is considered to be a newspaper on the border between the opposition and government. In this case, the opinion of the readers differs greatly from people who have only heard about it. People with direct experience consider it to be much more pro-opposition (-20 points) than others (-5 points). The latter group consists mainly of people who do not have access to this newspaper.

Looking at the overall opinion of the population, NEPSZABADSAG can be said to be somewhere in the middle between the government and the opposition, in a neutral political position. Closer analysis of the data shows that the readership is divided. People in higher positions and mainly the intelligentsia emphasize its opposition character (-20 percent), while people in lower status or living in the villages rather consider it as pro-government (around 20 points). The image of NEPSZAVA has a very similar character to NEPSZABADSAG, but opinions differ considerably in Budapest. NEPSZABADSAG is thought to have no party bias (-2 points), and NEPSZAVA is thought to be pro-opposition (-23 points) by people living in Budapest. The question still waiting to be answered is, how is it possible that a considerable part of those surveyed qualified these newspapers as pro-government. The reason is probably the old role. People suppose that newspapers that supported the power in the past support the government now, at least those who do not read these papers. In the case of the NEPSZABADSAG, opinions also differ according to the regularity of reading it, namely regular readers find a neutral attitude (-4 points) and occasional readers find a somewhat government-biased commitment (16 points) in this newspaper.

The assumption that the old role is still valid is even more characteristic in the assessment of the MAGYAR HIRLAP (30 points). Mainly it is people who do not read it who qualify it as pro-government (35 points). It is

interesting, however, that the overall readership (10 points) sees this newspaper to be on the border between pro-government and pro-opposition; people in lower status find it more pro-government while people in higher status see it as opposition or neutral. People's overall image of MAGYAR NEMZET shows it to be somewhat less pro-government (22 points) than MAGYAR HIRLAP. This must be the result of their different role in the previous political system, namely that in the 1980's MAGYAR NEMZET was seen as a relatively independent quasi-opposition newspaper giving room to many different opinions, as opposed to MAGYAR HIRLAP, which operated as a semi-official newspaper of the government.

According to the overall impressions of people surveyed, ESTI HIRLAP cannot be seen as politically neutral, and it is pro-government only to a small degree. Although recently this newspaper has been mentioned in political contexts, a relative majority regarded it as politically neutral. Although quite a few people see this afternoon newspaper as pro-government, they also consider the majority of the press to be pro-government—for example, people in low status and those living in villages. The latter only show their general attitude toward ESTI HIRLAP because they do not read it.

Few people are interested in PESTI HIRLAP and, based on the views of those who were able to form an opinion, its image is similar to ESTI HIRLAP. This average has a different content though, because fewer people see it as neutral and more as political than in the case of ESTI HIRLAP.

To sum up the research, the most interesting result worth further investigation, and which answers the question posed in the headline, is that party political analyses, assessments, and prejudices in the press are projected in society differently, mainly because the readers consider different points when forming an opinion on newspapers.

Walesa, Mazowiecki Discuss 'Expanded Coalition'

AU2303183892 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Mar 92 p 2

[KNYSZ report: "Mazowiecki at the Belweder"]

[Text] Following a meeting lasting over an hour between Democratic Union [UD] leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki and President Lech Walesa on 17 March, Waldemar Kuczynski of the Democratic Union told GAZETA that "President Lech Walesa has declared that he is ready to back moves to broaden the composition of the governing coalition and to reorganize the Jan Olszewski cabinet on condition that stability will be enhanced as a result."

"Possible, but not easy" is said to have been Walesa's assessment of efforts to reorganize the governing coalition.

Kuczynski stressed that the talks took place on the initiative and at the request of the Democratic Union leader. He added: "It is a question of satisfying the requirements of correct political conduct to inform the president about matters of such importance."

Mazowiecki met the president not just because he wanted to hear his views on the reorganization of the government, but because it was also important for him to win the support of the president for such efforts. Kuczynski stressed: "We also did not want the president to believe that these actions were directed against him."

As the Presidential Press Office reported, during the talks with Mazowiecki, President Lech Walesa stressed that "Poland needs an expanded coalition, but it has to be a coalition formed around a program."

The president said: "Personality issues and tactical disputes should be left aside so that a program can be constructed."

In an interview given to reporters from the WALL STREET JOURNAL and HANDELSBLATT on 17 March, Walesa stated: "I have always said that the government has too small a base."

Olszewski, Olechowski Address Media on Budget

LD2303203692 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1307 GMT 23 Mar 92

[News conference by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski and Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski at the Council of Minister's building in Warsaw on 23 March—recorded]

[Text] [Olszewski] Ladies and gentlemen, in this introductory, entirely introductory, presentation—it is quite simply, maybe, a reflection on this document, it is very initial and very brief—I would like to draw your attention to three elements which were the fundamental principles that directed us in our work on the budget. I hope that an expression of these principles has been found in the final shape.

The first assumption is the careful estimation of the budget's revenues. They have been estimated at just under 340 billion zloties [Z]. We worked from one basic assumption: this budget had to be a realistic budget. It may be, and it is, a very difficult budget, but it has to be realistic. Under no circumstances do we want to allow the situation that existed in 1991 to be repeated, when really all the fundamental sums turned out to be quite simply inadequate and unrealistic when faced with reality. And that is the first principle, that is the [words indistinct] on the pressures of the realities of the budget.

The second issue, which is very important, is the adjustment of expenditure to revenue. In the present situation, with the near breakdown of everything in 1991, the virtual breakdown of the public finance system, in particular the collapse of the budget, it was only with great difficulty that we could achieve this. The first version of the budget was drawn up on the basis of the necessary sums presented by the individual ministries, demanded—perhaps that's the right word—which greatly exceeded the possibilities of meeting them. It was not possible to avoid certain shortfalls when the budget was being put together. It was a question, however, of keeping the shortfall, the budget deficit, low, within a certain limit, a safety limit.

Another feature of this budget is the very great severity with which all the budget categories have been treated, but in particular expenditure in those areas where it is growing very drastically. This especially concerns the areas of social welfare protection, expenditure associated with financing from the state budget, which need to be financed from the state budget, such as pensions and annuities. Here, as you will see—Minister Olechowski will present this in detail to you—the drastic increase in expenditure necessary to meet all demands which are legally justified at present, has to all intents and purposes destroyed the budget. We had to apply a whole array of extraordinary measures to balance out (?these parts) of the budget, of expenditure and revenue.

And here I would like to move on to the third principle which we accepted. As I have said, due to the fact that it was impossible to avoid a budget deficit under existing conditions, while, on the other hand, some kind of safety limit had to be accepted. I am referring to a tolerance for deficits at a limit whose maintenance will not threaten to reduce our control over inflation. We accepted such a limit at a level of 5 percent of Gross National Product. In cash terms, that amounts to Z65 billion. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the limit which we are determined to hold precisely because of the danger to the process of economic equilibrium, to the maintenance of economic equilibrium. That is a prerequisite, after all, of continuing the entire process of economic reforms in Poland.

The principles accepted by us, in particular the latter, have gained the approval of the IMF and have been recognized as being sufficient to ensure economic equilibrium from the point of view of this institution.

Ladies and gentlemen, I think that this fact—the endorsement of the rationality of this budget by the most serious international financial [word indistinct], the IMF, is a very important moment which should be taken into consideration also in the parliamentary work during the coming (?weeks). We are not saying that this is absolutely the final word in the preparation of state expenditure and revenue. We are and will continue to be open in the budget debate to all arguments and (?suggestions) aimed at rationalizing the budget assumptions. But one principle will have to be remembered in this work [word indistinct] and it will have to be observed with iron consistency. If new items of expenditure are introduced into the budget, then real cover will have to be found in the budget for these new expenditures. And we will defend the budget in this respect, this version of the budget that we are presenting. We will defend it very firmly, with the full conviction that only this fundamental version can provide the basis for rational activity by the government over the coming year. And the [word indistinct] for the Polish economy, ladies and gentlemen, and for the entire process of transformation of this economy, will most probably be a process [words indistinct] of a truly momentous character.

I will not develop these thoughts because this would perhaps pull us away from the basic subject of our meeting today, but I think that we will soon have the opportunity to meet like this again. In addition, in order to establish broader support allowing, let us say, allowing, in the course of discussion of the proposed guidelines, for their evaluation from a certain point of view to pass to the Sejm in the form of a justification for this budget—but not only on this level—[words indistinct] that contain the guidelines for the government's socio-economic policy up to the year 1994. [sentence as heard] This is also the fulfillment of an obligation that was made to the Sejm and to society by me in my first Sejm speech. We wish to fulfill all the obligations that we made.

I have announced such a program, and in association with this we will present the fundamental guidelines of this program. They will be presented to the Sejm in the very near future, still in the course of the budget debate. And I think that when this document is being presented, just as today, we will follow the well-worn practice of presenting the basic guidelines of this document simultaneously. Thank you very much. I request the minister [Olechowski] to speak.

[Olechowski] Energetic, wise, and consistent activities are required to prevent a breakdown which would lead, in turn, to a breakdown of the state's credibility, the credibility of the state as the guarantor of the security of citizens, the guardian of the value of money, and the guarantor of the stability of the parameters and conditions on the basis of which citizens and enterprises make decisions with consequences that often bear on people's lives.

The financial situation is illustrated by the following trends: falling incomes, which is caused by a long-lasting and deepening recession; expenditure for social welfare which is growing in an uncontrolled and independent manner exceeding the financial capabilities of the state; rigid [word indistinct], costs, and privileges in the public sector which are a result of negotiations and preferences arising from the communist period; failure to meet tax obligations by a considerable number of tax-payers; lack of thrift in managing public money; limiting to a minimum the financing of projects which bring growth and development; the increasing cost of servicing both the internal and foreign public debt; the suspension of agreements with the IMF and,as a consequence, Poland's low credibility on the international scene. In this dangerous situation the government is proposing a budget of credible hope—a financial plan for 1992, which is to lay the foundations for a durable, credible healing of the public finances: a budget of hope because it links cuts and limitations with reforms which will bear fruit by the state meeting its obligations more efficiently and economically. The credible budget—it does not propose an untested third path, or lunatic promises to the effect that one can spend more today and earn even more tomorrow—forces the necessary and tested changes. It is also credible because it is likely to be accepted and supported by the internatinal community which is a very difficult thing to obtain these days.

The government proposes to set this year's revenue at a level of about Z338 billion. About one-third of this sum will be revenue from the turnover tax, about 40 percent will derive from income tax, and one-third [as heard] from other sources—tax on the growth of incomes, dividends, customs duties, incomes from banks, etc.

The planning of revenue in way will permit us to maintain the average rate of the income tax from legal entities at last year's level of about 37 percent. Personal income tax rates will be set at a level of about 17 percent. The reveine derived in this way will permit us to lower the dividend from 22 to 10 percent from the middle of the year.

On the other hand, the scope of the turnover tax will be broadened and its rate will also be increased for certain products. The average rate will be set at 7.5 percent compared to 5.4 percent last year. Such a taxation policy, that is, [word indistinct] of manufacturers' burdens and shifting the burden onto indirect taxes is one of the most important instruments being applied to halt the recession this year.

The government proposes setting expenditure at a level of Z404 billion. Over one-fourth of this amount will be spent on social welfare—disability pensions, old-age pensions, family income supplements, unemployment benefits. Real growth in this category will amount to 44 percent. Fifteen percent will be spent on the health service, 13 percent on education, 8 percent on housing assistance, 7 percent on defense, 5 on law and order. The government sees no possibility to lower this expenditure.

In many cases we believe that the bottom line has been reached, below which we would have to break agreements from previous years which are being implemented, and which should not be done.

The government sees no possibility of increasing this expenditure because it will then have to increase the budget deficit, with all the consequences.

In consequence, the government proposes setting the deficit at Z65.5 billion. As the premier said, the deficit is necessary this year. As I have already said, a reduction in expenditure is not possible. Simultaneously, planning a higher deficit would be an irresponsible act. First, the future debt would rise. We would be tightening a future noose for ourselves and for our children. Second, this would stimulate inflation in a way that would be threatening and difficult to control. Third, the stimulus provided by such a deficit would be solely and exclusively an apparent one. After the eventual momentary stimulus, a deep recession would once again ensue. And finally, fourth, this would make it impossible for us to regain the international credibility of our country.

The government sees two utterly indispensable conditions for implementation of a budget planned in such a way. First—I would again like to return to this—this must be a credible budget, credible in the sense that the political class, the political representation of the state, must coalesce around it. The budget must attain the necessary majority in the Sejm. That is understandable, but the government will also have to gain confirmation of the possibility of carrying through the policies necessary for to implement this budget. These will be very difficult policies. There will also be opposition from the groups affected by the savings, particular interest groups, and the government must be aware that it can stand against this opposition. Second, it will be necessary to achieve the economic scenario that lies at the foundation of this budget. This is the halting of the recession this year, the achievement of zero economic growth [ending negative growth].

For this to be possible, wage rise moderation will be required. We must all have an the awareness that our fundamental advantage today is the creation, perhaps unfortunately, of cheap labor, that can support relatively modest remuneration for the work that we do. If we do not continue to moderate this remuneration and do not slow our appetites for its increase, then we will not attain that which lies at the basis of this scenario, namely an increase in exports. Our international competitiveness will fall. In such a situation we will have to devalue. When we devalue there will be an increase in inflation, and so on. The (?consequences) are well known to you.

Thus, we will be addressing, and also undertaking the necessary activities in the public sector to halt and to moderate wage increases.

These are the basic characteristics of the budget for 1992 that is today being sent to the Sejm; an extensive document, in two volumes. That it is especially large this year is the result of the new practices in this area—the explanatory notes are particularly large.

Daily Details New Budget, Minister's Warnings

LD2303153592 Warsaw PAP in English 1452 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 23—Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski presented a detailed picture of the State of Poland's finances at the beginning of 1992 in an article published in the RZECZPOSPLITA daily on Monday [23 March]. They are marked out by recession-trigerred slump of incomes and uncontrolled spendings on social welfare, harshly limited expenditures for investments, increasing public debt and suspended agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A critical state of public finances is best illustrated by rapidly increasing expenditures on social welfare from 8.7 per cent of the current budget spendings in 1989 to 36.6 per cent in 1992. It is also reflected by a budget deficit which was 4.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GNP) in 1991 and is likely to rise to over 13 per cent of GDP if preventive measures are not undertaken.

The Polish Government is determined to take radical steps to halt these trends in economy, but according to Olechowski, "it is hard to improve the situation by reforming incomes." It would not be advisable to significantly increase budget revenues from domestic sources because of the threat of recession. It would be desirable, he claims, to increase foreign incomes, but this will be difficult due to suspended IMF stabilization programme and dwindling international credibility of Poland. The stress will be put on securing due payments to the budget.

Olechowski is of the opinion that it would be irresponsible to increase the budget deficit, because it would have to be financed with the credit of the central bank and this would lead to increased issuing of money and reigniting inflation. The target budget deficit has to be planned (5 per cent of GDP) and it cannot be exceeded.

Thus, the Polish Government has to cut spendings sharply. The reform is tantamount to the shift from consumption to investments. Savings should be obtained by ending automatic earning-related cost-of-living pay increases for state workers and by cutting state grants. The move has to be supported with a comprehensive anti-unemployment programme.

Poland should also cut spendings in public and transportation sectors. Sharp spending cuts can contribute to the increase of money for investments. Olechowski says that the ideal is that the budget deficit and growth-generating expenses balance in 1992. This is likely to happen later on, he adds.

Andrzej Olechowski expressed his conviction that the draft 1992 budget wins the approval of the Sejm and Senate. He is aware that its implementation may

encounter difficulties, but expects the MPs [members of parliament] to give it an overwhelming support.

Prime Minister Promotes IMF-Approved Budget

LD2303153292 Warsaw PAP in English 1456 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 23—Premier Jan Olszewski, speaking at a news conference on Monday [23 March], said that the government will stick to the 1992 draft budget already approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and added that it may be the springboard for the government's further actions.

Premier Olszewski explained how the draft budget was drawn up and said that cautious estimates of revenues were the basic factor in preparing it. Balancing the budget and maintaining its deficit below 5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) were also taken into account.

Olszewski pointed that this was not the last word in the work on the 1992 budget. He expects the MPs [members of parliament] to contribute to making it more efficient. He added, however, that introducing corrections in expenditures will be tantamount to finding the sources of their financing.

He stressed that these principles were approved by IMF and argued that this fact will have to be taken into account during the Sejm budget debate. He vowed to submit to the Sejm the government's document on the assumptions of the socioeconomic policy till 1994.

Olszewski Aide Discusses Economic Consistency

PM2303093992 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 13 Mar 92 pp 1, 5

[Report on an interview with Professor Stanislaw Gomulka, adviser to Prime Minister Olszewski, by Krzysztof Leski; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] In the fall of last year Professor Stanislaw Gomulka, lecturer at the well-known London School of Economics (LSE), together with Leszek Balcerowicz was advising the Russian authorities on the implementation of economic reform. More importantly, in Poland he held the position of government expert on economic matters for Prime Ministers Mazowiecki and Bielecki, and now he advises Prime Minister Olszewski and also has jointly created the "Socioeconomic Policy Guidelines." I began the interview by asking Professor Gomulka how it has been possible to advise three successive governments that apparently differed so much in their policies.

"Since September 1989 Poland has been applying the same free-market reform policy. Its main goals have remained valid throughout," Gomulka began. When asked whether Olszewski was really continuing the policy of his predecessors even as he was talking loudly—for political reasons—about a "turn," the professor said: "The present policy represents continuity in strategic terms with changes in tactics, because we have arrived at a different stage and we are working work in circumstances that are different from those of two years ago.

"The original objectives of the Balcerowicz plan were to stem inflation, fill the empty stores, and achieve a convertible currency. On the whole, these aims had been attained by the summer of 1990, and subsequently new aims appeared, with an emphasis on structural change and privatization. At that time, recession was still a thing of the future for us. Now it has become our major problem. This is why the new program places particular weight on counter-recession measures, although the main objectives remain the same."

I asked why the opposition groups which favor a free market option (the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress) are also talking about a departure from the Balcerowicz plan and a threat to the reform. "I am annoyed with our colleagues from the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress because of their criticism of our program," the professor replied. "They criticized it from the position of continuity, out of concern for a sound currency, but they failed to notice that last year the budget deficit increased to an extent which threatened disaster. It was necessary to augment the state's revenues and reduce expenditure while seeking to make economies. This means that the money policy will become firmer instead of more lenient. Only the rate of exchange policy will remain flexible; this is in order to overcome the recession by promoting exports.

"When you mention a departure from the Balcerowicz program," Professor Gomulka continued, "you should specify which Balcerowicz program you mean—'Balcerowicz I,' the real one, or 'Balcerowicz II,' as represented in second-hand interpretations. In the first year of his program, Balcerowicz was indeed firm, but by the second year he was firm only on paper, because—with the approaching election in sight—the current political situation did not permit such firmness." The professor added that this had been the time of the "expenditure explosion" which embraced expenditure on pensions and disability benefits, social welfare benefits, and housing construction subsidies. "It is essential to make economies, but these will cost us a lot in political terms. This is why Prime Minister Olszewski needs support."

Gomulka then went on to say that Leszek Balcerowicz did not resent criticism of his plan. However, the criticism should be correctly applied: "Balcerowicz II" could be criticized from the position of "Balcerowicz I."

I also asked about the notorious plan to "create" more money, which, according to opposition critics, demonstrates that the Olszewski plan entails the danger of hyperinflation. "This is nothing new. Since 1990, that is, even during Mazowiecki's term in office, the money supply increased at a higher rate than the national income," Gomulka answered. "This is precisely what I

have been talking about here: budget loans, loans for the economy, and loans for the population. Now the rate at which money is 'created' will have to be considerable, but it will still be lower than that which would have threatened us if we had retained, say, the principles of the pensions scheme.

"Many commentators," Gomulka said, looking me straight in the eye and making me feel uneasy and guilty myself, "looked at the government program through the lens of the various declarations—which were not necessarily consistent with one another—made by a number of government ministers. You will remember that Finance Ministers Lutkowski and Olechowski had affirmed that in all "macrofinancial" matters there would be a continuation of the current policy. If, now and again, we hear talk about a "turn," it is most likely in the sense that we must come to terms with the realization that we are in the middle of a recession and that we must accordingly adjust our economic policy by shifting the emphasis from certain points to others." [passage omitted]

Skubiszewski Briefs Sejm on Foreign Policy

AU2303185392 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 18 Mar 92 p 2

[BAN report: "Poland Only Has a Chance Together With the EEC"]

[Text] There is no other path that Poland can follow except that of acting together with the EC. While fully recognizing all the economic arguments favoring that course, it is Poland's long- term political goals that are of paramount importance in this respect.

"There are no group interests that can obstruct the program of moving closer to the EEC and, in due course, of gaining admission to the EEC for our country," said Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski at 17 March meeting of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

Minister Skubiszewski set out the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assessment of the current international situation and those factors affecting Polish foreign policy that stem from it. The end of the East-West conflict has diminished the military threat in Europe. However, the lack of stability in the eastern part of our continent means that there is an increased danger from tensions that are ethnic in character.

The Polish foreign minister set out our most important foreign policy priorities.

Poland's European Orientation

Poland's European orientation has to be enhanced through our country's inclusion in the network of international economic integration ties. There can be no talk whatsoever of renegotiating the treaty on Poland's associate membership in the EEC, and there can be no delay in implementing the terms of that treaty or in adapting to its requirements.

Security Issues

Poland is striving toward gradual and genuine participation in the NATO security system. "This should be achieved through concrete steps and not by making puerile announcements that Poland will enter NATO in the space of a few months."

Our country will also increase its involvement in the CSCE process. The coordination and distribution of functions between NATO and the CSCE is becoming the new basis of European security.

Poland's Relations With Germany

Our relations have a firm foundation in the form of treaty. A community of Polish-German interests should be created. Regional cooperation in border areas is an appropriate concept, but "the implementation aspects have to be worked out." We will work together with Germany on eastern policy so that it does not become a solely bilateral policy for Germany and so that the policy is not pursued above our heads.

East of the Bug River

Poland's twin-track policy, which has been pursued for the past two years, has created favorable conditions for the development of our relations with the countries located on the territory of the former USSR. Poland's swift recognition of Ukrainian independence is bearing fruit in the form of closer relations between Warsaw and Kiev. A bilateral treaty on neighborly relations and cooperation will be signed shortly.

Regarding our relations with Russia, the withdrawal from Poland of the former Soviet Northern Group of Forces is at the top of the agenda. It is a question of ensuring that the legacy of the USSR does not harm our future relations with Russia. However, there are no longer any political obstacles, and the withdrawal of the forces depends on economic issues. A breakthrough is essential in negotiations on the costs that have arisen in connection with the presence of the former Soviet forces in Poland. The signing of a treaty on neighborly relations and cooperation with Russia will take place once the issues of the withdrawal of forces has been resolved.

Talks on cooperation with the Kaliningrad district are at an advanced stage. The results of the talks will be taken into account in our agreement with Russia and in a separate accord between the regional authorities.

Other Neighbors

Poland's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are developing in line with our expectations. We are concerned about Lithuania's restrictive policy toward the Poles living there, and we are constantly bringing

pressure to bear on this issue. We attach great importance to cooperation with Czechoslovakia and Hungary and to cooperation within the framework of the Hexagonale, the organization will change its name to the Central European Initiative and within that of the Council of Baltic States.

Warsaw-Washington

We proceed from the assumption that the United States political and military involvement in Europe remains a condition for security and stability in Europe. We are seeking American investment, but that will be impossible if we do not ensure that our partners' intellectual property is protected, and this primarily means copyright laws, patents, and computer programs, the protection of which stems from international agreements and from obligations that we have already assumed.

New Central Bank Head Discusses Monetary Policy

AU2303124592 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 13 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the Polish National Bank, by Joanna Jachmann; place and date not given: "First Among Equals?"]

[Excerpts] [Jachmann] Second time lucky. After your appointment had already been approved, the president said: "Now tidy things up, put them in order...." Does that mean that you are to be a kind of Belweder-appointed orderly at the Polish National Bank?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I do not think that is how the president imagines the role of the central bank president. Although, from what I have heard, during the "interregnum," which has lasted several months, the Polish National Bank has been slipping deeper and deeper into chaos and some action aimed at establishing more order will no doubt be required, but the bank's primary, main task is monetary policy.

[Jachmann] Formulating monetary policy in the face of mounting social pressure, which the government cannot ignore, will not be easy.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The central bank is not a government agency. It must and should cooperate with the government, but it cannot give in to pressure. It also cannot, as happened in the past, be presented with faits accomplis, when the Sejm, for example, sanctions a growing budget deficit or, as was the case under the Bielecki government, it changes the law several times on the government's instructions. The role of the bank is to reliably inform the government about what is and is not feasible, especially in a situation in which the budget deficit might grow (and that danger does exist). Any government of whatever kind must realize that one cannot endlessly create money for which there is no backing in goods and services. [passage omitted]

[Jachmann] Inflation and recession are characteristic features of the state of our finances and our economy. You will not allow worthless money to be created. What about the recession? Will the government be able to count on the cooperation of the bank in fighting it?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It can. We could allocate part of the refinancing loan facility for the restructuring of industry, irrespective of whether it is state-owned or privately owned. Every enterprise that has orders and has a chance of survival should be able to make use of a credit facility that is partly financed out of the state budget. In addition, we have to find a way of making use of low interest loans from the West if only by making the system of bank guarantees more effective. It seems paradoxical that although the situation is such as it is, we have only made use of 2 percent of the World Bank loan that is available to us.

[Jachmann] What would make you resign?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] A situation in which the bank would not be able to finance the budget deficit and the government that is responsible for it would not resign. [passage omitted]

Iliescu, Snegur Hold Talks in Bucharest

AU2103143292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0900 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] Talks are under way in Bucharest between President Ion Iliescu and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur. The Moldovan delegation, which arrived this morning, includes Prime Minster Valeriu Muravschi and Parliament President Alexandru Mosanu. The Romanian officials attending the meeting include Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, and the presidents of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament, Alexandru Barladeanu and Dan Martian.

Comment on Kiev Meeting

AU2103210692 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1500 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Talks were held in Bucharest today between President Ion Iliescu and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur. [passage omitted]

At the end of their meeting, the two presidents made statements and answered journalists questions at Bucharest-Otopeni Airport. Iliescu and Snegur said that today's meeting is part of the meetings that have become traditional between the leaderships of the two states. They briefed each other on bilateral economic and political cooperation and on the stage reached in drafting the friendship treaty. A particular issue tackled by the two sides was the evolution of the conflict in Transdniestria. Snegur also presented a few conclusions on yesterday's meeting of Commonwealth of Independent States leaders in Kiev. Iliescu and Snegur hailed the declaration of the participants in the Kiev meeting, in which the efforts of the Moldovan leadership to find political solutions to the conflict in Transdniestria were appreciated.

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed the CSCE Helsinki meeting which will be attended by the foreign ministers of Romania and Moldova, and examined common viewpoints to be adopted by the ministers.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Kiev Talks

AU2203165692 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] A statement of Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the declaration adopted at the Kiev meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States heads of states in connection with the situation on the left bank of the Dniester River is an important position taken in support of efforts for finding political solutions to the problems in that part of the Republic of Moldova.

The fundamental ideas of the declaration, namely the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, the pledge to adopt measures that would not admit in any way actions of attracting their citizens into the conflict, and the pledge not to allow the use of their territories for transit of armed groups and illegal traffic of arms are in agreement with the essential requirements for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and for the establishment of calm and quiet in this part of the Republic of Moldova.

The declaration of the Romanian Government issued on 16 March 1992 and the letters addressed by Romania's president, Mr. Ion Iliescu, to the president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and the president of the Ukraine Mr. Leonid Kravchiuk, emphasized the need to adopt precisely such a position, the only one which is in accordance with the principles of international law and with the obligations incumbent on states in line with the UN Charter and the CSCE documents.

Romania's Foreign Ministry expresses its confidence that through the positions expressed and through the implementation the measures announced in the Kiev declaration, the outside interference will be stopped, the settlement of the conflicting situation in the rayons on the left bank of the Dniester River will be achieved, and the necessary climate will be established to facilitate negotiated solutions to all problems that are confronting the population in these rayons, in accordance with the provisions of the CSCE documents.

Solidarity Supports Moldova, Appeals to Yeltsin

AU2103191992 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] At a meeting organized today in Bucharest's Revolution Square, Bucharest-Chisinau Cultural Society stated its position on the bloody events in the east of the Republic of Moldova. On this occasion, an appeal to President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament was read in which firm measures are demanded to prohibit the penetration into Moldova of mercenaries from the Russian Federation, to disarm Cossacks and pro-Russian militants armed by the imperial troops, and to urgently withdraw foreign armies from the Republic of Moldova.

Chisinau Radio reports that, although the leadership of the Republic of Moldova and the bodies of the Interior Ministry are doing all they can to prevent conflicts on the left bank of the Dniester River, groups of armed separatists of the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian guards continue to intimidate peaceful people and to preserve the explosive situation.

On the other hand, Chisinau Radio reports that an exchange of prisoners, who had been captured during the armed conflict in Dubasari [Dubossary], was made today between the Republic of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Dniestrian Republic.

In accordance with an understanding concluded last night in the presence of General (Stolyarov), Marshal Shaposhnikov's deputy for educational work, and of Igor Smirnov, 27 policemen captured in Dubasari on the first

day of the conflict were released in exchange of a very high-ranking officer and four Cossacks detained in Chisinau.

In conformity with the decree issued by the president of the Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, regarding measures for defending the state border of the Ukraine with Moldova, a few military subunits of the National Guard have arrived in the border area where a special status was instituted.

As a representative of the National Guard of the Ukraine stated, the troops have begun fulfilling their tasks, namely supporting the border guards in detaining people who try to cross the border fraudulently.

Timisoara Asks Moldova's Kravchuk To End Conflict

AU2103193192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1930 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 20/3/1992—The residents of Timisoara, the city where the December 1989 revolution started, express their anxiety over the conflictual situation in Transdniestria (Bessarabia) owing to "the armed actions of the nostalgic communists and Cossack mercenaries they brought who are guilty of the armed crimes against the Moldovan peaceful population and the state of law."

In a letter to President Kravchuk they express their hope that the Ukrainian head of state will stop bloodshed in the territory of the Republic of Moldova and make the Cossack mercenaries to definitively leave Bessarabia's land, thus helping create a climate of peace and understanding.

Campeanu 'Does Not Exclude' Involvement in Moldova

AU2303175492 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Mar 92 p 3

[Sorin Rosca Stanescu report on statements by National Liberal Party leader Radu Campeanu at a news conference in Bucharest on 17 March: "Mr. Campeanu Does Not Exclude the Possibility of a Military Intervention"]

[Text] Mr. Radu Campeanu does not exclude the possibility of military intervention... "however, only in an extreme situation," he said during a news conference that was organized yesterday, 17 March, at the headquarters of the National Liberal Party [PNL] and focused on the situation in Transdniestria. Talking about acts of terrorism committed by Cossack commandos and their repeated attempts to cross the Dniester River, Mr. Radu Campeanu expressed the following views: This is the consequence of certain foreign involvement. We must examine the situation thoroughly and thus find the answer to the question what and who is behind those actions." Certain forces are looking for a pretext to create a state of extensive destabilization in that entire geographic area. The Liberal Party, together with the other parties, proposes to find the way "to actively defend the freedom and security of Romanians beyond the Prut River." However, no hasty action is advisable. "Let us not be dragged into an action that might have precisely this goal." As far as the role of the National Council of the Union is concerned, Mr. Sorin Botnariu mentioned that currently "the structures of the communist power have gained ground and are attacking the union supporters. It is our duty to support the union forces. We need a better drafted, long-term political strategy."

Fota Meets With Georgian Economy Minister

AU2303194992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1854 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/3/1992—Omar Verdzelashvili, economy minister of the Republic of Georgia, started his visit to Romania on Monday, March 23. During the talks held with Constantin Fota, Romanian minister of trade and tourism, analysis was made of aspects concerning the finalization of the treaties for the signing of the governmental agreement on commercial-economic relations and the technical-scientific collaboration and protocol including the exchanges of goods and payments between the two governments in 1992.

"The signing of these documents, the Georgian minister said, represents an important step in the development of the commercial relations between our countries. They will lay the bases of a new relationship between Georgia and Romania and will contribute to the rapprochement of the two peoples. Romania is the first country having recognized Georgia's independence in the first moments. It is natural that the first relations be set with Romania."

Coposu Wants To Keep, Campeanu To Ditch CD

AU2303141192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1149 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 23/3/1992—Radu Campeanu, chairman of the National Liberal Party: "I do not believe in the future of the Democratic Convention" [CD] opines the chairman of the National Liberal Party of Romania, Radu Campeanu, in a dialogue with an editor of the daily LIBERTATEA. He added that the Democratic Convention—a 14-party opposition alliance—had been a political understanding for the local elections.

"I think that, for the legislative and presidential elections we have to reshape an alliance, pivoting around the historical parties (i.e. National Liberal Party, National Peasant Party), to have in view the stability of common targets in the parliamentary activity. I do not think it is imperiously necessary to go for the elections on a joint ticket or joint tickets, which has proved not to be the most efficient to obtain the biggest number of deputies.

And our target, of the National Liberal Party and the opposition, is to get as many seats as possible in the future parliament."

Corneliu Coposu, chairman of National Peasant Party: "It is not only a duty, stemming from pragmatic reasons, but equally a national necessity to keep the Democratic Convention working, which has proved its usefulness," Corneliu Coposu, chairman of the National Peasant Party, said in an interview with the daily "LIBERTATEA." He added that the party he was head of would firmly back the idea of maintaining the alliance for the "legislative" and "presidential" elections and that of presenting only one nomination to the presidential elections. "We think that the opposition obtained good results at the local elections, owing to he convention, that came before the electorate with the idea of a change, a message that was well received in the big cities. The conclusion can be drawn that the votes obtained (by the Convention) mirrored the population's need for a change, its hostility against the cryptocommunist power, and not the result of the dissemination of the programmes of the opposition.... The presence of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania in the Convention, caused a diminution of the number of votes, especially in Transylvania."

Bucharest FSN Organization Begins Local Convention

Roman Opens Session

AU2203184092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1504 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/3/1992—The Bucharest organization of the National Salvation Front [FSN] started its local convention in Bucharest on the morning of Sunday, 22 March.

The very opening of the convention set a stormy pace with ovations and booing alternating and triggered by the agenda itself which initially did not include among its items any reference to whether the FSN might back Ion Iliescu's possible candidacy for a new presidential mandate. Voices from the attendance proposed the topic for the agenda, but no decision was made on the spot. Petre Roman, who is chairing the convention, suggested that the entering of the issue on the agenda be later decided by vote during the debates.

Surprisingly, although the agenda distributed to the participants listed three motions, to be read by their authors, that is Petre Roman, Petre Ninosu and Vasile Secares, the FSN national leader announced that he no longer intended to present his motion, while Mr. Ninosu stated to a ROMPRES editor that he was not very determined to present the motion of the "Group for the Unity of the National Salvation Front". Vasile Secares however, in a similar statement, confirmed his intention to read the motion "A Future for Romania".

Dijmarescu Resigns as President

AU2203164992 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The proceedings of the third National Salvation Front [FSN] convention of Bucharest Municipality organization began this morning at the Bucharest Children's Palace. The agenda, endorsed by the majority of the delegates present in the hall, was presented by the president of the Organizational Commission, Mr. Mircea Porojan.

Mr. Eugen Dijmarescu made a brief political analysis of the Bucharest Municipality FSN organization and presented his resignation from the position of this organization's president, our reporters informed us.

The second point on the agenda included a report by Mr. Alexandru Sasu, who, referring to the results of the local elections in Bucharest Municipality, said that they have been unsatisfactory.

Then, the report of the Auditing Commission was presented, which noted that out of the 750 delegates of the organization, 685 are present in the hall, thus the convention can be held in accordance with the statute.

After Mr. Ovidiu Musetescu, vice president of the Organizational Commission, presented various modifications to the statute of the Bucharest Municipality FSN Organization, 70 delegates expressed the wish to take the floor, our reporters informed us.

Roman Pleased With Meeting

AU2203195992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1754 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/3/1992—The Bucharest Organization of the National Salvation Front (FSN) held its Convention Sunday, 22 March in Bucharest.

The proceedings were marked by tension mainly due to the confrontation between the two leading trends: pro-Iliescu and pro- Roman.

Under the circumstances, the agenda proposed initially was changed and the three motions announced (Petre Roman's "Future Today", Vasile Secares' "A Future for Romania" and Petre Ninosu's "The Group for the Unity of the FSN") were no longer presented.

The debates revealed the dominant wish for the unity of the Front, for reconciliation between the two political personalities, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, as the only means to keep the FSN on the national political stage and stop rightist tendencies.

Under the pressure of a majority, the proposal that Ion Iliescu should candidate on a FSN ticket, if he so wishes, for Romania's presidency, was put to secret vote. Out of 607 votes expressed, 485 were cast for the entering of

this proposal on the agenda. Upon Petre Roman's intervention, the attendance accepted that the issue should be dropped and deferred for the FSN National Convention.

At the end of the debates, the thorny issues remained unsolved, pending the National Convention of the National Salvation Front. The Bucharest convention approved some changes of the organizational pattern of the Bucharest FSN branch.

At the end of the Bucharest FSN section convention's debates FSN National Leader Petre Roman made an address analyzing the results of the recent local elections and explaining the causes that brought about a loss of votes in some towns, mostly among laborers, estimated at 700,000. He ascribed this to the difficulties Romania has been facing in the transition period. For the next elections Petre Roman deemed as necessary a clear definition of the Front's political and ideological tasks as a political party.

In a statement to a ROMPRES editor, Mr. Roman said: "the convention consisted, more or less, of two parts: the first, less conclusive, after which many serious, real problems were raised, problems the Front has to solve and which will give a clear image of what it has to do at its national convention. From this point of view, I think that, in fact and after all many important things were expressed, some of them in a direct, straightforward manner, and this is good."

FSN Group Accuses Roman of Violating Norms

AU2303113292 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 17 Mar 92 p 4

["Position of the FSN Unity Group"]

[Text] The members of the Group for the Unity of the National Salvation Front [FSN], who are members of the FSN Steering Collegium, want to inform the public that they completely disapprove of and repudiate the way in which Mr. Petre Roman organized and conducted the meeting of the FSN Steering Collegium at the Dacia Club on 12 March 1992.

In the typically authoritarian and intolerant way in which he has led the most important party of post-revolutionary Romania—a party to which the country entrusted its destiny in the wake of the crucial events of December 1989 through the majority vote on 20 May 1990—Mr. Petre Roman—this time, too—behaved as a dictator who is going through a power crisis. Realizing that he is losing the support of increasingly larger circles within his own party—now, on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections campaign—and that so far he has been unable to set up the personal party he desires—as he has often stated to the press at home and especially abroad—he tried an embarrassing forceful attack at the meeting. The disparaging show he put on and the direct attacks against honest and serious party members, who are no longer able to support him, clearly revealed the thirst for power of this man, who is violating all principles and democratic and moral norms to preserve his prerogatives and to actually divert our political formation from its objectives and the place due to it in post-communist Romania.

Petre Roman makes a lot of noise about his struggle against communism and communist structures, but his actions prove the opposite, not to mention the fact that he does not have the moral legitimacy to do so when considering his past. The press has noted and innumerably pointed out that prior to the elections in May 1990, the National Salvation Front went to the election campaign with a program and statute; a reform program for a European type of modern democratic society with a market economy and a state of law by restoring private property to be achieved, however, on the basis of a social-democratic concept and by guaranteeing the people's social protection. After the elections, at the FSN National Convention in March 1991, Mr. Petre Roman imposed the adoption of an antidemocratic statute to validate his dictatorial leadership and his right to interfere in the affairs at all levels of power in Romania. As the national leader—a position that is fully at variance with the democratic spirit and that is actually a vestige of monolithic parties—and government chief, Petre Roman wanted to dominate both the parliament and the presidency, as well as all other state institutions. When this failed, he began his direct and disguised attacks—by means of the obedient press that he officially or covertly patronizes—ordered the exclusion of certain parliamentarians from the FSN, and directed campaigns to compromise other people, including the presidents of the two parliament chambers. This is how the crisis within the National Salvation Front emerged and deepened.

Through a policy of incoherence and disinterest in the strict application of the laws, as prime minister he compromised the party that brought him to power. In promoting the reform, whose architect he claims to be, in practice he made arbitrary decisions that often were at variance with what the parliament had endorsed. Proof of this is the fact that the acute social tension calmed down once he resigned.

After losing the prime ministership, Petre Roman continued concentrated and persuasive actions at home and abroad to compromise President Ion Iliescu and the presidency. The latest interviews—granted to TINERETUL LIBER, the Italian daily IL GIORNALE, and the Spanish daily EL PAIS, as well as to JOURNAL DE GENEVE (which were also published by our press)—which are full of attacks lacking any real basis, are clear-cut proof and also reveal the purpose of these attacks.

The affirmation that President Ion Iliescu is violating the provisions of the Constitution, because—at their request—he received and conducted talks with the FSN parliamentary group, is nothing other than another diversion; irrespective of his political color, the president cannot be indifferent to what is happening in the

ruling party in general, especially since that party proposed and supported his candidacy. This is something that can be proved with the political mechanism in any country with long-standing democratic traditions.

Although the situation in the FSN requires urgent clarification, it is clear that Mr. Petre Roman does not desire a free, open, and democratic discussion in the party. This is the only way for the FSN to emerge from the crisis and to develop its own political thinking and practice in step with developments in our country. We note with regret that in this respect Petre Roman is joining those people abroad who present a distorted image of Romania and of its realities and institutions.

To conclude, we believe that, in actual fact, the 12 March meeting convened by Mr. Petre Roman was nonstatutory, because, aside from Steering Collegium members, it was attended by numerous "people accredited by the national leader," journalists, and other categories of people who together formed a noisy pressure group that behaved hysterically and whose role it was to impress the electorate with televised pictures and to present Petre Roman as "the providential savior of the Front."

FSN's Changing Political Orientation Examined

AU2303085592 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 14-15 Mar 92 p 1

[Tia Serbanescu article: "About Turn!"]

[Excerpts] At the meeting of the National Salvation Front [FSN] Steering Collegium, Mr. Petre Roman plunged into a brief examination of the "rightist movement," represented by the Democratic Convention [CD], which is threatening to force the party that he is leading out of the game. Failing to mention that both "sides" admit their "center-right" and respectively "center-left" orientation, neither of them sees the other as being centrist in orientation. Let us see what is the mistake of Mr. Roman's apprehension. He firmly proclaimed (with a delay that was fatal for his credibility) the need for the FSN to move away from communism and thus—communism being nothing other than a leftist movement—to automatically turn to the right. There are two contradictions: The accusations against the rightist movement fail because the FSN itself is aspiring to this position; and second, it is impossible for the leftist movement to become the rightist movement without displaying opportunism through such a move and without showing that this is nothing less than a pretense of change. The two years of FSN rule have fully proved its communist origin. If, at the moment, the "leftist movement" is definitively compromised and needs time and needs to be "reeducated" in order to become decent, it is absurd to consider the opposition or even the repulsion provoked by communist totalitarianism as a "rightist movement." [passage omitted]

Under conditions in which society equally needs both the leftist and the rightist movements (just like any person), it is only natural that a party that has been compromised lately cannot be the ruling party. Thus, following 45 years of leftist-oriented rule, it is natural that after the revolution against it, against the "leftist movement" that was so erroneous and reprehensible, that it should "step out of the game"—as Mr. Roman says—and not try to turn around hoping that in this way it would pass as a right-wing party. The obstinacy of the "leftist movement" to stay in power risks increasing the reactions of rejection, on the one hand, and aggressive support on the other hand, and this would lead to conflicts, which might be open or simmering—something that cannot ensure a healthy political situation in Romania. Under these conditions, the "leftist movement" can do only one thing, which is to renounce pretensions of supremacy and "clean" its means of propaganda from communist impurity, and then wait for a while until it gets rehabilitated in the eyes of the public and until it rebuilds a proper political image. A long time will probably have to pass before the rightist movement in Romania will not mean simply "iron guard movement" and the leftist movement will not mean "communism," because, unfortunately, the passage from one movement to the other was sudden and both experiences were abominable in their expression.

The first duty of all Romanian politicians will have to be to pay great attention to all expressions that might favor one type or another of extremism. Romania does not need extremismg. Both types (iron guard movement and communism) were after all distortions and deformations of the tolerant spirit of our nation, and the effects of these deformations do not have to be supported or emphasized. In order to return to a normal moral situation, all excessive elements should be rejected. No party or organization that proclaims one type or another of exclusivism (political, racial, ethnic, moral, or religious) should be trusted. As long as we do not learn that people can only be judged individually, each person according to his deeds, we will not know how to live with the respect of the individual—and this will hamper democracy itself. As long as we do not examine seriously and without excitement what is and what used to be the meaning of "leftist" and "rightist movement" in the history of our country and what have been their effects, we will not be able to get out of the current political dilettantism that operates with feelings and resentments and maintains the confusion in which the assimilation of platforms and programs is carried out "by ear" and are heard erroneously. It is clear that at this moment we have neither "leftist" nor "rightist" movements. We only have communist political vestiges and the hope in democracy.

International

Croatian, Serbian Parties Negotiate in Vienna

LD2103000492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Zagreb, 20 Mar (TANJUG)—The meeting of parliamentary parties from Croatia and Serbia in Vienna showed that a Croatian-Serbian dialogue is possible and that it should be continued, despite the fact that the leading parties in Serbia did not respond. This was stated at today's press conference in Zagreb which was organized by the political parties from Croatia which took part in the Vienna meeting. The representatives of the parties stressed that modest efforts were made there to overcome the politics of fear and violence and to build bilateral relations.

With the response of the parliamentary parties, Croatia "has shown that it is ready for dialogue and a peaceful solution of the crisis", and the fact that the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Renaissance Movement, and the Democratic Party of Serbia did not respond indicates that "the desire for dialogue is not yet so evident on their side."

The representative of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, Ivica Percan, proposed that such talks be continued in the future, but between individual parties on a bilateral basis and not multilaterally as was the case in Vienna. In response to a journalist's question, he confirmed in this connection that he meant talks between the two ruling parties—the HDZ and SPS.

During the press conference it was stated that of the parliamentary parties in Croatia all of them responded—eight including the ruling HDZ—and that only the Croatian Party of Rights and the Croatian Social Liberal Party refused to take part.

Envoy Claims Vienna Embassy Croatian Property

92BA0661A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 92 p 9

[Article by A. Cubrilo-Kosovac: "Ambassador Steals an Embassy"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] What property our diplomacy possesses in the world. The SFRY has 124 missions abroad, of which embassies are the most numerous, and residences are the most valuable. The state has inherited part of this property from the old Yugoslavia, as the latter did from earlier sovereign states.

If embassies, residences, consular representations, and missions are the display window of the economic and political power of a country, then it is indisputable that the otherwise increasingly poor Yugoslavia is "selling" itself well in the world.

There are 124 pieces of the real estate cited in the form of buildings, apartments, and land, all outside the borders of the SFRY, says Milan Predojevic, ambassador in the SSIP [Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs]. It has been observed, he adds, that everything that represents a country in the world is luxurious, beautifully furnished, and even our country has not violated this unwritten rule, and this wealth in the world, according to 1990 figures, is worth 500 million dollars.

"In happy times, in a period of intensive ties with the third world, the SFRY had as many as 135 missions in the world. An army of about 3,000 employees served in them. They began to fade seven to eight years ago, and the number of employees, because of these reasons and the departure of the Slovenes and Croats from the SSIP (the Macedonians are preparing to leave), has dropped to the 1,300 people who are on the pay list of this federal establishment. The number of our missions abroad has 'fallen' to 124, and the closing of about another 20 is planned.

Paris the Most Expensive

Embassies are the most numerous of the properties cited, and residences the most valuable, because of the expensive furnishings. Some of them are the property of the SFRY; some of them are rented. There are more of the latter, in the words of Predojevic, but one should not underestimate the properties purchased either, of no small value in, to mention only the largest, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Italy, Canada, Hungary, Germany, the United States, Norway, Poland, Spain, Romania, the former USSR, Switzerland, Turkey. In the latter we have owned land since 1934, as well as in Lebanon.

Among the exceptionally valuable residences that are owned by the SFRY, Ambassador Predojevic singled out the one in Paris, which is assessed at 70 million dollars, then Japan, where there is exceptionally valuable land—20 million dollars' worth, as well as the UN Mission building on Fifth Avenue in New York, which is valued at more than 20 million dollars. The offices of the Mission are in a multistory building arising from 339 square meters of land, with a total area of 1,679 square meters, and the value is "enhanced" by the fact that the building, because of its architecture, is under the protection of the US Government, according to ambassador Predojevic.

The property of the SFRY in Italy is also of significant value, the embassy and residence in Rome, the consulate general in Milan, and seven apartments in Rome and Milan and five apartments in Trieste, all bought with SFRY money. After the unification of the two Germanys, the building of our representation in west Berlin has been in demand.

Are there missions in the world that the SFRY inherited from the old Yugoslavia or, by means of it, from earlier sovereign states in its makeup?

SSIP Only the User

"There certainly are, and this property is not to be underestimated," confirms ambassador Predojevic. "They are the buildings in Paris, New York, and some other cities. We are taking them into account, as well as the remaining property entrusted to us, but, I mention, all this is owned by the country of the SFRY, so one should not expect any kind of role by the SSIP in drawing up a balance for dividing the land, if it ever comes to this. It is up to us to sell the property undamaged, at an unreduced value. Other organs have the task of designating what is whose and what of that which we are using today belongs to whom."

We were recently able to read a report on the disappearance of valuable displays from certain of our embassies throughout the world. The ambassador of the SFRY in Vienna actually usurped the entire embassy.

"Of 124 representations in the world we have only two such cases," claims ambassador Predojevic. "The recent ambassador of the SFRY in Austria, Ivan Brnelic, now an ambassador of Croatia, proclaimed both the embassy and the residence in Vienna to be Croatian property and the SSIP initiated proceedings against him with domestic authorities, while a certain Simoniti, a Slovene by the way, counselor to the ambassador in Rome, according to his own statement, does not intend to vacate his apartment, the property of the SFRY, in Rome."

The part of the property of the SFRY administered by the SSIP is located in Belgrade. Those are missions of foreign states in our country, situated mainly on Dedinje, but also in some other attractive parts of the city. There are 134 such sites under the jurisdiction of the SSIP, or 40 percent of the total number of rented buildings. 40 percent are embassies and other missions that the city of Belgrade accounts for, and 6 percent of these sites are under the jurisdiction of the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense]. The remaining buildings are the property of foreign countries.

Jovic UN Talks Termed Successful

92BA0636D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Dusan Pesic: "Agreement With Ghali"]

[Text] New York, 7 Mar—At the end of a two-day visit to the United Nations, Dr. Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency and chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation With the United Nations, met last night with Dr. Butrus Ghali, UN secretary general. Final preparations for sending the blue helmets to our country and an exchange of opinions on the present Yugoslav situation and prospects for further cooperation between our country and the world organization on the joint job of maintaining the truce and seeking political solutions for surmounting the Yugoslav crisis were the principal topic of conversation.

Following an extensive exchange of opinions, it was observed that preparations are going according to plan and that the conditions do exist for sending the UNPROFOR (the English abbreviation for the peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia) to our country.

The two agreed that all the obstacles and doubts that existed previously have been successfully removed and that now both the people and the authorities on the territories where the troops of the world organization will be deployed fully support the action of the United Nations. Ghali gave recognition to the Yugoslav side for the constructive cooperation in bringing about the conditions for execution of the peacekeeping mission. The secretary general also accepted and approved the agreement which Jovic reached the day before yesterday with Under Secretary Goulding and Satish Nambiar, the Indian general who is the commander of the UNPROFOR. Nambiar departed today for Yugoslavia with his immediate staff, and that means that the peace mission has officially started. According to the schedule of deployment made known to Jovic, next week a sizable group of several hundred staff officers, civilians, and policemen will depart for our country and will visit the sites envisaged for housing the blue helmets. At the same time, they will also study the real financial needs and suggest to the secretary general realistic items for the new budget proposal. Beyond that, according to the plan confirmed by Boutros Ghali in last night's meeting with Jovic, the blue helmets will arrive in successive waves between the middle of March and the middle of April, when it is expected that the entire contingent of 14,000 soldiers will be in the areas under protection of the United Nations in our country.

Removal of Financial Difficulties

All the tasks required for this large peacekeeping operation (the largest since involvement of the United Nations in the Congo in the 1960's) have mainly been completed, it was noted in the talks with the secretary general. The only task that still has to be finished is adoption of the operation's budget. The first proposal of about $685 million was seen to be "too expensive" and an effort is now being made to reduce the costs. Ghali said that he expects this to be done by the end of the month, when, on the basis of suggestions he is receiving from officers in the field, he would submit the new budget proposal to the Security Council for approval. However, it was explained last night that work on the budget in no case jeopardizes nor slows down the deployment of the blue helmets according to the plan referred to.

As is well known, the resolution of the Security Council adopted at the end of last month resolved that the Yugoslav side should take on part of the financial burden of the peacekeeping mission. In the course of the discussions that took place in the UN headquarters, and this was repeated in yesterday's talk with Ghali, Borisav Jovic expressed Yugoslavia's willingness to cooperate constructively in this and help as much as it could. He offered facilities that already exist to house some of the

blue helmets, and then about 200 offices in Belgrade, a number of vehicles, as well as help in transporting the troops from the place where they reach our country to their destination. Since it is precisely the item of the costs of fortifying housing facilities that caused the greatest criticism in the Security Council, it is judged that this Yugoslav offer represents an important contribution and fulfills expectations, and this will be passed on in the form of a resolution to the Security Council.

Conditions for a Political Solution

Butrus Ghali was also interested in the situation in Yugoslavia and asked Jovic's opinion and assessment of further strategies for resolving the crisis. The two men agreed that a way out must be sought through political negotiation in a context of respect for the aspirations of every people.

In the course of yesterday, Borisav Jovic had a number of meetings with prestigious diplomats at the United Nations. He talked with Diego Aria, the Venezuelan ambassador who is chairman of the Security Council and who expressed satisfaction that the truce is holding in Yugoslavia and expressed readiness to do everything necessary for the Security Council to contribute to successful performance of the peacekeeping mission.

Jovic's meetings with the chiefs of the French and British missions to the United Nations, Ambassadors Merimee and Henney, as well as with Ambassador Watson, deputy chief of the U.S. mission, also attracted attention. The main topic in those talks was the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations in Yugoslavia, concerning which it was concluded that everything is ready for a successful beginning and that there are no longer any serious obstacles at all.

After that, there was also discussion of the political situation in our country just in advance of resumption of the conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels and concerning the most recent events in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The common conviction was expressed that the stability of the situation in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] is important because that will be the location of the headquarters and logistical center of the blue helmets and because possible unrest could threaten the normal course of the operation. It was pointed out by the Yugoslav side that it is very important that the European Community above all be cautious in making further moves. It is indispensable to be mindful of the essential fact, which is that the problem of Bosnia-Hercegovina can never be solved unless careful attention is paid to the desires of all three constituent nationalities. Only their agreement can yield constructive results. Anything else would only worsen the state of affairs. Those who took part in the discussions showed understanding for this approach, and it is assumed that they will so inform their governments before resumption of the Brussels conference on 9 March.

The ambassadors of France, Britain, and the United States expressed satisfaction in an exchange of opinions with Jovic because of successful removal of earlier doubts and difficulties concerning commencement of the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, which instills hope that the UN mission will succeed and that in future solutions to the Yugoslav crisis will be explored at the negotiating table.

In the first comments that could be heard among the diplomats in the United Nations concerning Jovic's visit, the conclusion is that the meetings that took place were worthwhile and in the last phase of preparations for sending the blue helmets to Yugoslavia helped in examining all the needs and clarifying all details and possible disagreements, so that the UN peacekeeping operation can now take place without any hindrances whatsoever.

Federal

Republics' Property Demands Termed Unfounded

LD2303113892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1047 GMT 23 Mar 92

(Text] Belgrade, March 23 (TANJUG)—The demands of the secessionist Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia for the division of the Yugoslav federal property are "unfounded wishes", according to Radivoj Radakovic, head of the Yugoslav Justice Ministry Division for Property Relations.

In an interview published in the Belgrade daily BORBA today, Radakovic specified that his assessment was based on the 1983 Vienna convention on the succession of states, property, and archives. "Only in case Yugoslavia was to disintegrate, those who made up that state could draw up a balance sheet" on the basis of which to divide the property of the former state, as Radakovic set out.

Slovenia and Croatia have decided to secede from Yugoslavia and now insist that the balance sheet for the division of the federal property be drawn up. The Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro have decided to continue to live in a common Yugoslav state, a state open to all other Yugoslav republics which wish to continue living together. The Yugoslav government holds the view that no balance sheet for the division of federal property can be drawn up for as long as Yugoslavia exists.

Radakovic said that, under international law, "there is no room for a division which would give equal rights to those breaking away from a state which continues to exist." Radakovic recalled that federal property of immense value on the territories of Slovenia and Croatia had been usurped by those two republics, and set out that "such moves have no ground in international law."

Radakovic said that Slovenia had no grounds when it recently called on some foreign states to prevent the selling of Yugoslav property on Slovene territory, and specified that none of that property had been sold. "If a time comes for it to be sold, it should be borne in mind

that it is the real estate of Yugoslavia as an existing and recognized state," Radakovic said.

UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali told a news conference in New York on March 19 that there were no legal obstacles for Yugoslavia to keep its membership in the world organization.

Customs Administration Sets Up New Checkpoints

LD2403104592 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1820 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, March 23 (TANJUG)—In order to adjust to the new situation, the Yugoslav Customs Administration has set up 28 new customs checkpoints, 18 of which in the Republic of Serb Krajina and ten in Serbia, director of the Federal Customs Administration Radosav Sekulic said today.

Speaking at a press conference, Sekulic explained that this was the first stage in a reorganization following the secession of the Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Slovenia. He said that, in the second stage, customs checkpoints would be opened in Knin and Vukovar, with outposts in Glia, Obrovac, Beli Manastir and Knezevo. Knin is the centre of the Republic of Serb Krajina, proclaimed by its predominantly Serb population on December 19 last, in response to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia and the downgrading of the Serb population in its territory to an ethnic minority. These areas are under the protection of the United Nations' Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

For the time being, Macedonia remains within the Yugoslav customs administration, because its customs officials are paid from the federal coffers and apply the federal customs regulations, Sekulic said.

Internal control has been introduced on the boundaries to Bosnia- Hercegovina and between Serbia and Macedonia, in order to prevent arms and drug smuggling, and damages which might be incurred in inter-republican traffic through the announced intention of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia to set up their own currencies, said Sekulic. The problem is western Hercegovina, which is still without any effective customs control, [words indistinct] explained Sekulic. The assembly of the Serb Autonomous Region of Hercegovina decided on March 10 that all the Serb-populated territories in the Nevertva River Valley, in the south of the multi-ethnic Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, form part of the Serb Autonomous Region of Hercegovina.

There are 44,000 Serbs living in the Neretva River Valley.

Speaking about the future of the Federal Customs Administration, [words indistinct] said that a federal state or federal states with confederal units would need a common customs administration. A federal state with confederal units, in association with other states, would necessitate a customs union, said Sekulic.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Koljevic on Upcoming Talks With Carrington

AU2303202592 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Interview with Nikola Koljevic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, by Milos Markovic in Belgrade—live]

[Text] [Markovic] Professor, you have seen and heard what has been happening in Bosnia-Hercegovina. What are your first impressions, and how do you view the whole situation?

[Koljevic] It is not enough to say that the situation is grave. The situation is obviously becoming increasingly chaotic. It is evident that in these tragic incidents the central authority, the state authority in Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot control the situation.

The old reasons for such tragic incidents are known—the ethnic conflicts that existed in Bosnia-Hercegovina before. However, it seems to me that there are also two new direct reasons. The first reason is a very negative reaction by the Sarajevo media, especially by Sarajevo Television, on the talks that nevertheless presented a sort of basis for peace and a peaceful solution. It is hard to believe that such a negative reaction was not conducted from one or more political centers.

The second reason, which is indirect but very recent, is that the task of negotiating has not been completed yet. I do not think it is good that the talks were interrupted, that they were continued, because in the meantime the people want to know what will happen to the regions in which they live. It is characteristic that the clashes have been breaking out precisely in the regions that are ethnically contentious—that is to say, contentious according to the newly offered maps—or in those regions where the Serbs constitute a minority, as was the case in Gorazde. Look at Bosanski Brod, Mostar, or eastern Hercegovina—these are all contentious territories on the future map.

[Markovic] However, the greatest part of eastern Hercegovina is not contentious—Bileca, Trebinja, Gacko, Nevesinje, Ljubinje—these are all 50 percent ...

[Koljevic, interrupting] This is not contentious, but that part toward Neum is obviously contentious for some. For us it is not.

[Markovic] All right, Professor, you are travelling to London tomorrow, where you will hold talks with Lord Carrington. In few days the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina will feature on the EC agenda. You will attend this meeting, and you will, of course, advocate the

interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Can you briefly present your stands?

[Koljevic] First, if I succeed in holding these talks, that is to say, if I contact Lord Carrington, I intend to say in the name of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina that reaching the final agreement would be much easier if we expand the topic of Bosnia-Hercegovina on the future association of Yugoslavia. To be precise, I refer to the following: It is an old idea of ours that in these reintegration processes that are forthcoming—we can see them in Serbia and Montenegro—Bosnia could be a bridge from the eastern and western part of the former Yugoslavia, if this is viewed positively, as it is obvious that the Croats do not wish to join what remains of Yugoslavia. However, through the Bosnian Croats we could establish a bridge toward Croatia, that is to say, through the Bosnian Serbs a bridge toward Serbia, while the Muslims would be left with a democratic chance. Therefore, it is necessary that these three constituent units have a sovereign status, or a possibility of confederal affiliation with Serbia or Croatia. This will be the basic topic of my talks with Lord Carrington.

[Markovic] Professor, thank you very much.

Izetbegovic on Prospects of War in Bosnia

AU2403102892 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar 92 pp 29, 30

[Interview with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by DANAS correspondent Jelena Lovric; place and date not given: "There Will Be No War"]

[Text] The president of Bosnia-Hercegovina maintains his usual quiet, typically Bosnian calm, even in a situation which requires quick action. It is not the right moment for leisurely chats, but Alija Izetbegovic, president of a country that is threatened with being split up like a puzzle never to be put back together, still finds time to talk to journalists. He does not fall prey to journalistic provocations, but reacts to them in the manner in which he probably reacts to political attacks—with a unique, perhaps oriental, but certainly impressive wisdom.

[Lovric] What is your assessment of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina now, after the referendum, the attempts to provoke war, the talks in Lisbon and Brussels, and the apparent nearing of international recognition?

[Izetbegovic] The situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is now somewhat clearer, but only because the contrasts are sharper after the events that you have just mentioned. Otherwise, it is still very complicated. That fact does not worry me particularly, simply because the situation in Bosnia has never been "clear". It is very tense, but we have learned to live under conditions of pressure. I do not know how we would manage without that.

[Lovric] Could the attempt at spreading the war into Bosnia-Hercegovina, which failed this time, be repeated, or do you think the critical point has been passed?

[Izetbegovic] I keep being asked that question, and I always give the same answer: There will be no war in Bosnia, not local, nor imported. That is because of some positive and some negative feelings. Of course, under the latter I mean fear, mutual fear. Perhaps it should not be like that, but fear plays an important role in life, most often a useful role.

[Lovric] Is it true that you have not managed to come to an agreement in Brussels after all, and that this uncertainty in Bosnia will continue?

[Izetbegovic] I do not know how far we managed to agree on certain issues. We shall know soon. But we did talk, and that is important. The public needs to get used to hearing certain things and will do so by listening to these discussions and arguments. For example, "the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina," "ethnic regions," and suchlike. Political problems are sometimes actually psychological. The importance of these talks lies partly in that.

[Lovric] Would the cantonization, or federalization of Bosnia- Hercegovina, as suggested in Lisbon and Brussels, really solve the problem, or would it perhaps only delay the explosion? Is it not really the beginning of the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina?

[Izetbegovic] One look at the ethnic map of Bosnia-Hercegovina shows that no (successful, functional) ethnic cantonization (federalization) is possible. One achieved by force, perhaps, but it would not and could not last. Only small parts of Bosnia are ethnically compact. The rest is mixed, and cantonization would not help, but just bring out anomalies. If, for example, you applied the majority principle, you could get only 41 percent of the Croatian, and 50 percent of the Serbian population into your imaginary Croatian (Serbian) canton. Fifty-nine percent of the Croatian, and 50 percent of the Serbian population would remain an ethnic minority in the "other" canton. The principle, therefore, does not function.

[Lovric] The preservation of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina is, at the moment, most consistently supported by the United States and the European Community. Have you received any guarantees from them regarding this?

[Izetbegovic] I have received no guarantees, but the strongest guarantee is there: their interests. They have clear interests in the preservation of a peaceful and stable Bosnia-Hercegovina. War in Bosnia would not only be Bosnian. They know that. It is a pity our immediate neighbors do not know it as well.

[Lovric] What is the purpose of the existence and preservation of Bosnia-Hercegovina? Many challenge it as a miniature Yugoslavia. They think that since Yugoslavia

is no more, Bosnia should cease to exist, too. Have you not done too little to promote the fact that the tradition of a Bosnian state goes back centuries?

[Izetbegovic] I think that the comparison between Bosnia- Hercegovina and Yugoslavia has been unjustifiably exploited. Bosnia is not a "miniature Yugoslavia." Bosnia is a fact—a geographical, cultural, historical fact. Yugoslavia is an idea, a good one or a bad one, as you prefer, but just an idea.

[Lovric] Is not one part of the policies directed from the neighboring countries toward Bosnia-Hercegovina the consequence not only of territorial claims and the desire to round up ethnic states, but also the attitude that as long as there is Bosnia-Hercegovina, Yugoslavia might be resurrected again? And you seem to mourn over Yugoslavia yourself? Why? It has not been too kind to you.

[Izetbegovic] I think it is the more selfish and down-to-earth reason: the desire for territory. As for whether I mourn over Yugoslavia, the question is certainly a bit strange when you take into account that I was sent to prison twice in Yugoslavia, and spent almost nine years there. However, I must admit that splitting this territory into lots of tiny states is not to my liking. I can say that much. I used to believe in some sort of integration, but a democratic and open one, of course. Things went the other way. There is no point in correcting history. It knows what it is doing. If things happen, then they were meant to happen. Everything else is just people talking nonsense.

[Lovric] In connection with Bosnia, someone said recently that if you wanted to be a bridge, then you would have to allow yourself to be walked over. How much of the trouble with Bosnia-Hercegovina comes from the fact that, independent of its wishes, it has been put in the position of a juncture between the two, now warring, sides?

[Izetbegovic] I must admit that I do not know for certain, but nothing can happen in either Croatia or Serbia without having an effect on Bosnia-Hercegovina. The past war between Serbia and Croatia—and that is what it was—had to leave both consequences and scars. It is a miracle that it did not spread into Bosnia. Those are the links that have now brought only bitterness and damage. In better times those same links could be fruitful and useful in many ways. It is true that a bridge gets walked over, but no structures in the world impress us as much as bridges. The view of a bridge—just like the view of Bosnia—leaves nobody indifferent.

[Lovric] How would you comment on the meeting between Karadzic and Manolic in Graz? As a repetition of the meeting between Tudjman and Milosevic with the well-known plan for dividing Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] You journalists ask all sorts of questions. One thing is clear. They are trying to come to an agreement against Bosnia. It is only that the level of the discussions and of the negotiators themselves is somewhat lower. That does not keep me awake at night. I have other problems.

[Lovric] A Slovene military analyst claimed recently that Bosnia-Hercegovina will endure because the nature of "cohabitation" there is completely different from elsewhere. Bosnia-Hercegovina has shown a great desire to resist war. There were moments when, to an observer, it seemed as if the people forced the national leaders to come to their senses.

[Izetbegovic] I have read the text by that wise Slovene, and I think he understands the problems in Bosnia better than some of its leaders. As for the astuteness of some of those Bosnian leaders, it is actually only a reflection of the people's wisdom here. They simply do not want to fight. Those who can see that are clever, those who cannot are not.

[Lovric] Is the army, under the pretense of helping, actually dragging you into the scenario already seen in Croatia? Or do you think it is not possible because the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] is now in a position that differs considerably from the one prior to the war in Croatia?

[Izetbegovic] What are you talking about? Are we thinking of the same thing? The army is no longer what it was several months ago. It is no better or worse, it is different; in quantity, in quality, in its psychology, even in its intentions and aims. The army will not occupy Bosnia, it will not carry out a coup d'etat. Why? I will give you one good reason: It cannot do it. If it does not want to, that is good, but in this case, you will have to admit, this is not very important.

[Lovric] But even if the army stays out of politics, how will Bosnia cope with its great economic and social pressure?

[Izetbegovic] Unfortunately, you are right about the economic pressure, the burden of military expenses is great; however, that problem will have to wait for a while. Of course, we do have some options in mind.

[Lovric] What in fact are the Green Berets? The Muslim army? It is said that there are some 30,000 of them.

[Izetbegovic] They are partly wishful thinking, partly reality. In areas where they are reality, they are a form of self- organization of the Muslim people.

[Lovric] There is apparently going to be a big purge in the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], which, although warned in time of the dangers of barricades being erected, lacked the strength, or whatever, to react promptly.

[Izetbegovic] I do not believe that there is going to be any kind of a purge in the MUP of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Not reacting (by force) to the barricades in Sarajevo was not a question of the strength of the MUP, or lack of it, it was a political decision. They needed bloodshed in Sarajevo

after the success of the referendum. We needed a peaceful Sarajevo and a peaceful Bosnia. The barricades were removed in less than 24 hours.

[Lovric] It has been said about you personally that you behave like a tightrope walker, changing tack too often. What do you say to that? How would you explain it? As a wish to compromise, or as a result of lack of power?

[Izetbegovic] You ask a man who is driving a heavy truck down a narrow steep road in the hills if he is driving slowly because his truck is not powerful enough, or perhaps because he is enjoying the scenery. My task is to get my truck and the goods in it - let us say, very fragile goods - safely into the valley. If I make it, I could not care less what anybody says or thinks; and especially not if I do not make it.

[Lovric] The Serbian side now claims that - I will be direct - you are a liar, with whom there can be no negotiations.

[Izetbegovic] You are too direct, so I will not answer that question.

[Lovric] You have recently been talking about Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state of citizens. Have you not missed out on the chance at one time to do more on the promotion of Bosnianism [Bosnjastvo] as a feeling of belonging in Bosnia-Hercegovina, notwithstanding nationality?

[Izetbegovic] I do not think so. If I had started telling people that they were Bosniaks just before the elections and census (1990-1991), I would have just created confusion. The English have been preparing to switch to right-hand-side driving for 30 years, and you give me three months to persuade the people here, or most of them, that they are not Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, but Bosniaks. And I have not been talking about the state of citizens only recently, but ever since I started talking politically. It is true, I gather Muslim people and try to make them realize the advantages of a civil society. Some see a contradiction there. I do not.

[Lovric] Although the Bosnian opposition has some strong and constructive names (Durakovic, Filipovic, Grebo, Kecmanovic), whose stance is more reasonable than that of some national parties' leaders, they seem to be pushed aside.

[Izetbegovic] I have great respect for some people in the opposition, but, I suppose, in a democracy nobody should (and nobody can) push anyone either aside or forward. I would sincerely want the more reasonable ones to be given a chance, but it is up to the voters. They say that people resemble their authorities, and vice versa. In any case, I take it that your question is an appeal to the people to vote at the next elections for "the best among the best," to use a saying that was at one time much loved. I join in that appeal.

Deputy Prime Minister Views Future of State

AU2403102992 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic by Nandor Pilcz in Vojvodina; date not given: "The War Is Caused From Outside"]

[Text] As we already reported, the Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians in Sarajevo first agreed to preserve Bosnia-Hercegovina and have self-government in the ethnic regions. Later, however, the Serbs completely withdrew their support, while the Croats withdrew their support partially. Dr. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic gave an interview to our correspondent in Vojvodina.

[Pilcz] What is the essence of the Sarajevo agreement? Will Bosnia-Hercegovina become a confederation?

[Mahmutcehajic] I would say that this is an attempt to make another proposal for the public administration and territorial organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina with the aim of easing the spiritual crisis of the population, which cannot envisage this republic as an independent state (the Serbs in Bosnia). Regarding the possibility of a confederation, I would say that Bosnia- Hercegovina should be turned into a decentralized civic republic.

[Pilcz] Do the various nations in Bosnia now have the right of self-determination and separation?

[Mahmutcehajic] There is nothing in this proposal about the nations that form this state or about their ethnic sovereignty. Ethnic sovereignty of nations can hardly work in Europe today. Nowadays, national sovereignty is also covered by every citizen's sovereignty.

[Pilcz] Will Bosnia have a central government?

[Mahmutcehajic] Yes, it will. Bosnia-Hercegovina is already a sovereign state, but it has unclear and forced relations with Serbia, which calls itself Yugoslavia. The aforementioned proposal implies a uniform currency, economic policy, foreign affairs, courts, defense, and army for Bosnia. However, local government bodies will have to carry out many other functions.

[Pilcz] Will Bosnia-Hercegovina become a demilitarized region, or will it have its own army?

[Mahmutcehajic] The majority of our population agrees with demilitarization. The implementation of the will of the majority depends on the circumstances. Bosnia's defense requires a republican army.

[Pilcz] Will the Yugoslav People's Army withdraw from this territory?

[Mahmutcehajic] Independence will automatically bring about the creation of a Bosnian army. The easiest way to achieve this is to reorganize some parts of the "Yugoslav People's Army" deployed in this region. This is in the interest of both Bosnia-Hercegovina and the "Yugoslav People's Army." Only people who do not accept the

constitutional order of this state and its legally elected democratic institutions will have to leave. Every Serbian and Montenegran reservist will have to leave. However, Bosnia-Hercegovina can provide a home and a homeland to all those who accept the independent state, its multinational population, its constitutional order, and its democratically-elected government bodies.

[Pilcz] How will you solve the national minority issue in the so-called majority nation areas?

[Mahmutcehajic] I do not quite understand what you mean by minorities. Individual rights and freedom make up the pillars of the whole political style in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and these rights must be guaranteed by a uniform parliament, justice administration, and an effective executive power throughout the entire territory of the republic.

[Pilcz] Has Bosnia avoided a war?

[Mahmutcehajic] The danger of war was the consequence of the great-Serbia policy. Belgrade wanted to preserve Yugoslavia by force, as a means of ruling others, and also to create a "nationally cleaner" state with new borders. Now that this attempt has failed, the circumstances in Bosnia have also changed. If a large-scale conflict erupts in Bosnia-Hercegovina—and I think there will be no such conflict—it will definitely be the result of an external aggressive policy.

Residents Angered in Gorazde; Damage Reported

LD2303133192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1009 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—About 100 Serbian households in the Povrsnica part of Gorazde are in shelters because they are under sniper fire. This was revealed by Branko Neskovic on behalf of Povrsnica citizens.

He told journalists that the citizens are angered by biased reporting of some media, specifically the reporting of an incident that occurred yesterday around 0300. He stressed that the mass media are intentionally overlooking pamphlets distributed in Povrsnica signed "Green Berets" when people were going to a funeral. Pamphlets in the Cyrillic alphabet said: "Green Berets are here. Your security and your civil rights are now safeguarded. You are no longer threatened." Other pamphlets in the Latin alphabet warned Serbs: "Pay attention to your behavior in order to avoid problems while there is still time for normal civilian life."

According to Neskovic, this caused anxiety and anger among Serbs, who were searching people after the funeral, but they did not harass anyone. He thinks that the republican government should intervene in Gorazde urgently in order to avert large-scale clashes. Neskovic confirms that there are casualties in certain parts of the town and that some buildings are mined.

Joint Patrols Arrive

LD2303220592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1624 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Gorazde, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—A mixed Bosnia-Hercegovina Interior Ministry and Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] unit arrived in Gorazde at about 1500 today where an outcome of the interparty agreement is expected with a view to their possible involvement. The interparty talks began behind closed doors at about 1600. The easing of the tension, which reached its climax last night when the Serbs and the Muslims erected barricades on the approaches to the town, depends largely on the outcome of these talks.

Intermittent firing from infantry weapons is still heard from the outskirts of the town. Snipers fron the town's high-rise buildings have also been heard.

According to unofficial reports, three people have been wounded so far. In addition, two people were injured when a first aid vehicle taking a wounded man to hospital in Foca overturned. It is virtually impossible to obtain official information in Gorazde. The local radio station is not working and this makes the situation additionally difficult.

Peace Brokered in Bosanski Brod

AU2303135792 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Goran Jorganovic report from Bosanski Brod—recorded]

[Text] [Jorganovic] It is quiet in Bosanski Brod this evening after agreement has been reached on establishing a lasting peace in this crisis area of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the presence of the EC monitors, a team from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and crisis headquarters of the conflicting parties, it has been agreed this evening, among other things, that the crisis headquarters would withdraw armed forces under their control from all roads, streets, public places, and other facilities in the communal area, and that police [word indistinct] should be established in the whole region of the Bosanski Brod commune. We asked Mr.(?Therp) from the EC observer mission for his comment. We asked him what he thought about this evening's agreement in Bosanski Brod.

[Therp in English] As I said last time, we really looked forward to this meeting. Of course, we had a few technical problems before this meeting could take place, but it is important that this meeting was held. Today a very big step was made to find a solution to final peace in this town. So, this is a very, very big step, and we are very optimistic about the future. As I said last time, we really looked forward to this meeting. Of course, we had a few technical problems before this meeting could take place, but it is important that this meeting was held. Today a very big step was made to find a solution for final peace

in this town. So, this is a very, very big step, and we are very optimistic about the future.

[Jorganovic] Zvonko Matanovic is chief of Bosanski Brod public security station. Mr. Matanovic, it seems that a big step forward has been made.

[Matanovic] Well, yes, I have to say that the meeting was very difficult and that it went on for about five hours. But the thing that pleases me most is the fact that both sides, the crisis headquarters in town and the one in Lijesce, have pledged their full confidence to the public security station and the people working there, and want this station to go on functioning in the proper sense of the word, meaning the way it functioned before the outbreak of conflict. I also have to say that the station itself, and the people in it, will do everything to restore public order and peace in the whole region of the Bosanski Brod commune. The agreement this evening that says that both sides will take control over their formations, that is, demobilize and disarm them, means that we will be able to function properly.

Ministry Says Serbs Take Over Radio Transmitter

AU2303201492 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] As we have been informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Trovrh radio transmitter was taken over yesterday afternoon. This transmitter was designated as a facility of a special importance for the republic by a decree of the Executive Council of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The station was first surrounded and then taken over by a group of some 100 armed civilians of Serbian nationality. During this action three employees of Sarajevo Radio and Television and two active militiamen of Serbian nationality from the Gorazde Police Station were inside the building.

Serbs Claim Information War Being Waged

LD2403102292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—On the basis of its analysis of the policies of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] for Bosnia-Hercegovina, the information service of the Serbian Autonomous Region [SAO] of Romanija has concluded that the HDZ called on Croats to vote in the referendum in order to encourage Muslims to go to war against the Serbs. This is stressed in a statement issued by the information service today. The SAO of Romanija holds that the information media in Bosnia- Hercegovina have for long been working under conditions of war and have been spreading hatred toward Serbs, Serbia, and Serbian officials. The so-called subliminal messages show clearly that Muslims are being invited to destroy Serbian shrines, the statement says.

It adds that YUTEL television "is a cancer in the information space of Bosnia-Hercegovina" and that the broadcasting of its programs should stop immediately.

"The SDA is reviving and strengthening Islam, which would provide the foundations for a jihad in Bosnia-Hercegovina," the statement stresses and adds that all Islamic centers in the world are assisting an Islamic Bosnia, because it would provide a bridge for conquering Europe. The Serbian people of the SAO of Romanija call on the Muslim people to show common sense and not to harbor historical illusions, as it did in 1914 and 1941, "because Bosnia-Hercegovina is the most sensitive spot in the Yugoslavia crisis," the statement says. The SAO of Romanija proposes that radio and tv programs and newspapers are divided in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Islamic Council of Elders Protests Attacks

LD2003163692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1403 GMT 19 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 19 Mar (TANJUG)—The attacks on Muslim religious buildings have escalated during the month of Ramadan when numerous Muslim believers are in these buildings. This is stressed in today's statement by the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community. A worrying fact is also that "no religious or political factor has disavowed or condemned these crimes."

The statement then points out that the day before yesterday the Alija Djerdjelez mausoleum on the border between the municipalities of Mrkonjici and Sipovac was again the target of a mortar shell. The explosion damaged the door. The ensuing fire engulfed the interior of this over 300-year-old monument of Islamic culture.

Unfortunately, the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community is almost daily protesting to the public, seeking protection and help to restrain this vandalism, especially during the month of Ramadan when numerous Muslim believers are in such buildings. In the past 20 days or so, there have even been 10 cases of shooting at the religious buildings and planting of explosives. This has caused invaluable damage, because in most cases it concerns cultural monuments under social protection. There is an understandable reaction on the part of the Muslim public.

However, the vandals have not been satisfied with the damage caused to the building. They want to raze it to the ground, as shown by this second attack on the Alija Djerdjelez mausoleum in the last 20 days, the Council of Elders emphasizes.

The Council of Elders of the Islamic Community is also astonished and worried by the fact that no religious or political factors have disavowed or condemned these crimes "although they all know where they come from." Instead, numerous statements about the danger and invented threats by Islam clearly encourage and support this vandalism, the Council of Elders emphasizes.

In spite of everything, the Council of Elders call on the believers to maintain peace and composure in these days of Ramadan, hoping that this is the best answer to the hatred by the extremists who by these acts are only causing the greatest harm to themselves and their people, the statement says in conclusion.

SDA of Sandzak Holds General Meeting

92BA0644C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by Z. Saponjic: "For a Sovereign and 'Clean' Yard"]

[Text] Novi Pazar—The SDA [Democratic Action Party] of Sandzak must do what the Muslim people voted for in the referendum on the autonomy of Sandzak. That is our first and main task. That is why at all levels we must support the documents of The Hague and fight for demilitarization of Sandzak, and at the same time also draw up school curricula for our children. The Hague guarantees us all that. Let no one be fooled that we are asleep. We are ready to respond to a possible unification of Serbia and Montenegro. And something else, brothers, because of various Muslims like Memic, Lakota, Mujo Bjelopolac, and others who are a disgrace to their people, we must draw up lists of our degenerates. We must first clean our own yard.

With these words, Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the SDA of Sandzak, set forth the main tasks facing the Muslims of Sandzak and their most populous party at that party's first general meeting, which was held in Novi Pazar the day before yesterday. Aside from Ugljanin's opening and closing speeches and just a few statements made by delegates participating in the discussion, the rest of the Assembly of the SDA was like a kind of summit meeting of Muslims from all parts of what used to be Yugoslavia.

Conveying "the greetings of dear Alija" to the Sandzak delegates, Osman Brka, member of the Executive Committee of the SDA of B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], was the first to speak. He said that he hoped that the people of Sandzak would "soon get everything the Muslims in Bosnia have and what they are about to gain."

Numan Balic, president of the SDA of Kosovo, delivered the message that the Muslims of Kosovo, between an expanded Serbia and a Republic of Kosovo, will in any case select the latter. Sadrija Asanovic, president of the SDA of Macedonia, informed the meeting that "Gligorov has no understanding whatsoever for the problems of Muslims in Macedonia and does not even recognize them, although he is a great friend of Alija." And Kasim Zoranic, president of the Bosnian Muslim Organization of Sandzak, repeated his earlier position "that the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina is worth the sacrifice even of peace in Sandzak."

The assembly ended with the agreement that every member of the main committee of the party will in future follow carefully the development of events in Serbia and Montenegro and that the party will be ready to react instantly to any change in the situation so as not to allow repetition of the "slaughter and killings in 1912 and 1941."

[Box, p 6]

Ugljanin President Again

The first Assembly of the SDA of Sandzak was at the same time an election meeting. Sulejman Ugljanin was elected president of the party for another four-year term "by an immense majority of the vote," a work program was also adopted in which one of the principal tasks is to form Radio-TV Sandzak and to start a newspaper. Other important tasks are internationalization of the Sandzak question, formation of a scientific and teaching council, and preparations to open a postsecondary teachers' college in Novi Pazar.

Ugljanin on Sandzak Offer To Help

92BA0644D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by Z.S.: "Ramadan Will Resolve Everything"]

[Text] Novi Pazar—Everything has to be resolved this month. For Muslims, Ramadan has always been a month of settlement. We will come out of it clean—either free or we will not be alive. I know of the arson, explosions, and murders to which our people were exposed in Plevlje. In Nova Varos, the Muslims were completely eradicated. That is a disgrace of both the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples. Today, the SDA [Democratic Action Party] will send a demand from the assembly to the Muslim National Council of Sandzak for an urgent meeting. As president, I will convene it, and we Muslims will decide what we will do. We will no longer allow police bands to enter our houses and search the people. The old authority will cease the day when I proclaim the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, and the Chetniks will no longer murder Muslims, declared Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the SDA of Sandzak in a press conference held Saturday in Novi Pazar.

Answering the questions of newsmen as to how the Sandzak plans to help Bosnia after the referendum, Ugljanin emphasized that "if Bosnia is in question, it will appeal to all Muslims in the world to pay attention, and then let Alija conduct a peaceful policy."

"I support that policy until the interests of Muslims are in jeopardy. Karadzic has been threatening the sovereignty of Bosnia for a year now, because they now have the greatest concentration of armed forces in the world. But he is not aware that that army is worthless, that they are a crowd of ragged drunks infected with lice with a bunch of old iron. No help can be expected from that band," Ugljanin said.

Muslim Leader Comments on Sovereign Bosnia

92BA0644B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Adil Zulfikarpasic, president of the Bosnian Muslim Organization, by Fahro Memic; place and date not given: "Europe Wants an Up-to-Date Bosnia"]

[Text] [Memic] The events in Sarajevo in recent days have done much to postpone a resolution of the political crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. Especially on the basis of the Lisbon arrangements. How do you interpret the sudden, and one would say organized, escalation of violence in these parts?

[Zulfikarpasic] The policy of the ethnic parties and of their responsible people has been traveling in the wrong channels since the summer of 1991. No one has been looking for real and possible solutions for Bosnia as a historic country for all its nationalities, for citizens, for their economic and general human problems. The three political parties have taken in their hands a monopoly of power and politics, and each on his own has tried to achieve the greatest advantage at the expense of the others. There is growing distrust, fear, and hostility. Instead of agreement, they are looking for capitulation of the other side.

By means of cheap demagogy, they have been winning the applause of the uninformed and manipulated masses. Lisbon is a logical consequence of a policy that is without reason and without purpose when it comes to the interest of the country and the people. This unscrupulous policy horrified the people when it came to light, because they nevertheless expected that they would not be betrayed and they would not be led to the barricades and gun barrels.

[Memic] It might be said of the Lisbon agreement that everything is known and nothing is known. Because you have been politically active abroad in the recent past, tell us your opinion of the "Lisbon agreement."

[Zulfikarpasic] In politics, it is intolerable to sign agreements in the name of the people and then to conceal their content.

Why conceal the text of the Lisbon agreement from the people? Above all, because a disastrous capitulation was signed there in the name of a people. I think that that is an evil for all of Bosnia, for all its nationalities, but most of all for Bosnian Muslims.

But I want to say something with full responsibility—no one in the world, neither America, nor the European Community, extorted or even sought such an agreement. On the contrary, they were surprised to hear that the territory of the state in Bosnia was being carved up on an ethnic and religious basis. That the country was being divided, and this was done thoroughly with the attributes of member states on principles which America and the European Community reject as remnants of the dark Middle Ages.

This casting of blame for the Lisbon agreement on the EC is a case of passing the buck for one's own fault and incompetence. The EC is ready to assist an agreement concerning Bosnia, but as to the kind of agreement, that depends on the people and their representative. The activity of the EC has never been, nor could it be, to prescribe the kind of agreement that should be reached.

[Memic] Has Europe offered a cantonal organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, or did the B-H leaders reach an agreement which many refer to as a "compromise of fear"?

[Zulfikarpasic] Europe, then, did not offer Bosnia the problems of South Africa, Ireland, nor Israel, as a minister from the EC told me over the telephone, but it expected an up-to-date democratic solution. That is, of course, what able people who are convinced of democratic principles are demanding.

[Memic] Your view of Bosnia-Hercegovina is mainly well-known. After what has happened recently in this republic, do you have any new solution for the further arrangement of Herceg-Bosnia?

[Zulfikarpasic] My solution to the problem is a historic agreement, the one which I reached in July 1991. And that is a free and intact Bosnia. Equal to Croatia and Serbia. Without any kind of regions and cantons. A free homeland of all its citizens and nationalities. I have advocated that from the first day, I made an agreement on that basis, but, as you know, it was wrongly portrayed to the people. Anyone who achieves something like that will have my support. An agreement is made openly, not behind the scenes, not secretly. The agreement which I and the MBO [Bosnian Muslim Organization] proposed was made public and, in my opinion, that was the highest historic moment for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia.

Even today, however difficult it may seem and however abnormal and excessively fanaticized people are, our only solution is to sit down together and talk honestly and openly. That means having people we can trust and who will not change their views the next day, because lies and intrigue are soon exposed.

[Memic] The people are "armed to the teeth," and there are many indications, as it is put, that they are out of control. Many blame the ethnic leaders for the arming of the people, but you as well. They say: Adil Zulfikarpasic established the channels for arming the population. Is there truth in those charges, which many base on the knowledge that you have exceptional business ties throughout the world?

[Zulfikarpasic] Anyone who has followed my return and work knows that I did not come to Bosnia to organize a civil war or conflicts. I have worked my entire life and I will continue the same in order to create conditions for

democratic dialogue and cooperation. That is the only weapon I have that I can give to Bosnia. People who seek and create agreements between neighbors cannot go looking for weapons, because weapons do not make agreements, they kill people. That is contrary to me and my policy. I have publicly stated on several occasions that nothing in our situation is gained by war or weapons. And that is my profound conviction.

[Memic] Way back in 1960, you wrote that "we support the creation of forces of the armed United Nations and the UNO for the destiny of small peoples and ethnic groups... just in case, as the saying goes." UN forces will soon reach the former Yugoslavia. What are your expectations from their presence in these parts?

[Zulfikarpasic] The blue helmets do not solve problems. But "...just in case," as I said then, they do prevent the worst. That case has now come, that is true, but we must find a solution among ourselves. I think that we always have a chance of that, because that is truly for the good of Bosnia and the people.

[Memic] Let us go back a bit. In 1963, you wrote: "One of the main problems of the Serbo-Croatian question is Bosnia-Hercegovina, that is, the question of drawing the lines between the Serbs and Croats, whether they remain in a federal community or set out on the road of division and creation of ethnic and independent states." The present period has shown that you were right. Are there any chances today of that demarcation without further casualties?

[Zulfikarpasic] There is no drawing of a line between the Serbs and Croats or between Croatia and Serbia.

That is a dangerous illusion of Balkan nationalisms. The truth is that the people are weaker and more frustrated, the more aggressive the nationalism is and the greater and less realistic the demands. These two neighbors of ours are the best proof of that. I have "historic" maps of Croatia and Serbia published and printed in Zagreb and Belgrade hanging in my office. There are borders of Croatia on the Drina, the Lim, and the Ibar, Serbian borders on the Kupa and Drava and similar stupidities. There have been kings and emperors, frequently small foreign vassals projected in fantasy into lords of great empires. That has been their tragedy and ours. Yet it is lucky that all of us are actually weak and unable to carry out these insane notions against one another. But we can cause each other much harm, but finally we cannot win. Nothing can help us except the reason and goodwill to understand that we must live together, that is, in good neighborly relations.

Bosnia is too large a bite for both Croatia and for Serbia, and its survival as a sovereign and friendly country equal to them is in their vital interest.

[Memic] Is there some way of drawing a line—ethnic, cultural, political—on the land of Bosnia-Hercegovina between the Muslims and Serbs, between the Serbs and Croats, between the Croats and Muslims without erasing any feature of ethnic identity?

[Zulfikarpasic] I think there can be no talk about cultural demarcation. We can find a way that affords the affirmation and prosperity of the ethnic, political, and cultural only in a free, but intact Bosnia. Without erasing anything. Perhaps in a competition and desire for domination, but without the possibility or any attempt to impose anything by force. I doubt that there can be a division that will draw the lines through the economic space of Bosnia which is like living tissue. This would be unprecedented violence. Every attempt will ultimately bring great evil and ruination, and it is better to seek a reasonable solution in good time.

[Memic] To what extent is life together possible after all the events that have occurred in Bosnia-Hercegovina, what concessions are necessary to bring it about?

[Zulfikarpasic] During the last war, the Chetniks killed several hundreds of thousands of innocent Muslims in Sandzak and Bosnia. The Ustashi carried out an unprecedented large-scale slaughter of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, and still after the war we found a possibility of living together. What is more, there was a convergence and new trust among the nationalities.

Most people, especially young people and truly civilized people in the field of culture, are showing a desire for reasonable relations. We must get rid of those who have been poisoning the well and we must be ready in our soul to follow the dictates of reason and interest. A willingness to make concessions is necessary to any agreement and to any friendly discussion. Once you hold out your hand, and you take that of another, no one gets everything, nor sacrifices everything. Nor even all that much, but only what is necessary. Believe me, it does not amount to very much, because when confidence is created, then even nice words have their importance.

[Memic] Recently, one of the leaders of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] said "that no one has the right on behalf of his own independence and identity to deny that same right to another nationality" and for him the denial of those rights to Muslims and Croats is not the same as denial of rights to the Serbs. It is obvious that the purpose here is to avoid a civilized solution of the crisis of Bosnia-Hercegovina. What do you think about a statement like that, which in one or another version figures as an integral part of SDS policy!?

[Zulfikarpasic] When we start an honest dialogue, many things, especially various statements, will take on different purport and meaning. You see, in my political discussions I have openly told my opponents or partners about both the positive and negative problems, and I can say that if the person to whom you are talking is convinced that you are not criticizing him out of hostility, that you are not praising him because you are clever, he will trust you and open up a possibility for agreement. That SDS leader has been diabolized by our neighbors, but it was his wish that the first team fly to

Klagenfurt for an agreement, and they did agree. That was detrimental to us, to be sure, but that is our fault. So, let us not close the door to anyone. Let us relativize statements and parties, but let us be firm and persistent.

[Memic] There have also been quite a few charges addressed to you—that you divided the Muslim people by separating from the SDA [Democratic Action Party]. Is there anything that the public still does not know in that "divorce"?

[Zulfikarpasic] I would not like to talk about accusations and slander. Those 40 years of communist power did most to demoralize people and created some people capable of improbable human baseness. What is happening to us is simply incomprehensible, at least for me.

[Memic] Recently, at least in Sarajevo, one hears more and more frequently from members of other nationalities that they would gladly join your party, but they are bothered by the prefix "Muslim." What is your opinion of that?

[Zulfikarpasic] The MBO is a modern European party. The Bosnian Muslims need one such political party in my opinion. It is certainly a thorn in the eye of those who favor totalitarianism, who want to cram the entire people in their pen. There is room in it for any liberal regardless of religion. If the Bosnian Croat does not like that "M," then there is something wrong with his liberalism.

[Memic] You have not been in Sarajevo for a long time now. Many interpret your absence in terms of a certain split in the top leadership of the party. What is the real truth?

[Zulfikarpasic] Various agents and intriguers and our political opponents have taken great pains to drive a wedge in the top leadership of the MBO, especially between Muhamed Filipovic and me.

We certainly have no need to synchronize our views, because the goals we strive for are identical, and they are a free Bosnia, the cause of Bosnia, and prosperity. In a liberal party and among politically sophisticated people, there is no desire for us to be the same, but rather we are different, but have the same objectives.

There have frequently been differences and discussions in the Executive Committee of the MBO, and that is constructive. To tell the truth, I must say that there has never been a split in the party. It is normal in the life of a party for people to withdraw, and others join for various reasons. I hope that it will remain that way.

[Memic] You recently spent a certain time in the United States. Many associate that visit of yours to the firm position of America concerning the indivisibility of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Did you talk to anyone on that topic, and who would that have been?

[Zulfikarpasic] It is my position that the United States is taking the correct position on the question of Bosnia and the role of Muslims, above all thanks to able and conscientious diplomats accredited in our country. Every political person must do within his own limits whatever he can for his country. I have always done that within the limits of my capabilities.

[Memic] Because you have lived in Switzerland, in Zurich, for decades, can you tell us under what conditions and at what time Europe would offer aid to Bosnia-Hercegovina for its more rapid economic recovery?

[Zulfikarpasic] I have invested some of my capital in certain economic activities in Bosnia, and I certainly will not hesitate to do that in the future. But I want to emphasize here that I cannot solve people's problems and destiny as individuals, which is something people are constantly asking me to do.

[Memic] Tell us something in conclusion about your preoccupations at the moment and your future plans?

[Zulfikarpasic] Right now, I am completely preoccupied with work concerning the "Bosnian Institute," which has expanded its activity. The idea of creating it in Sarajevo fell through, because the present authorities frustrate that in various ways. I take part and am consulted in the work of the MBO, and this will step up even more when I come back to Bosnia in the near future.

Muslim Organization President Interviewed

92BA0651A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
6 Mar 92 p 28

[Interview with Hasan Delic, president of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, by Jovan Janjic; place and date not given: "Hatred Beyond All Reason"]

[Text] Half a year ago, the strongest Muslim party in these parts between the two world wars—the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO)—was revived in Sarajevo. This party's revival was initiated by its two present leaders—Hasan Delic (president) and Dzevad Galijasevic (secretary), who are well-known to the Yugoslav public as the principal protagonists in the "Mosevac case."

Right from the start, following its resumption, the JMO obtained a large number of followers. According to Hasan Delic, this party so far has about 60,000 signed membership applications.

[Janjic] In spite of such rapidly acquired (or revived) popularity, one gets the impression that the Sarajevo press is boycotting this party. Is that because it is—Yugoslav?

[Delic] It is true that the activities and views of the JMO, and recently there have been quite a few of them, have a hard time getting coverage in the Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] media. The reason is probably that this party has a Yugoslav orientation, because the political forces and

organizations on the scene at the moment hold views which are predominantly anti-Yugoslav and against the state.

[Janjic] What are all the things your party advocates?

[Delic] The JMO advocates above all preserving the Yugoslav state community, an indivisible and unified B-H, the ethnic and cultural prosperity of Muslims in Yugoslavia, the equality of all nationalities, and the establishment of civil parliamentary democracy.

[Janjic] You believe, then, that there will continue to be a Yugoslavia?

[Delic] Certainly. The new Yugoslavia will take up the legal continuity of the joint state we have had up to now, and Slovenia and Croatia, which simply seceded, must begin to build a state from the beginning. In that way, it will be completely clear to the domestic and international public that this was a secession of the northwest "brothers." The same fate also awaits those who attempt to follow the example of Slovenia and Croatia.

[Janjic] The B-H government, that is, the coalition of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], has been persistent in its efforts for this republic, with the help of the European Community, to become an independent and sovereign state. Will it succeed in that?

[Delic] No one has a mandate, not even the top leadership of the SDA and HDZ to take Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Muslims out of Yugoslavia. All three leading ethnic parties in B-H (the SDA, HDZ, and SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]) have written in their programmatic commitments that they will work for the unchangeability of external and internal borders. It is with such programs that they obtained the confidence of the voters. So, B-H's application for recognition by the European Community is an act which departs from the will of its citizens. Incidentally, even under the current Constitution Bosnia-Hercegovina is a sovereign republic in the state of Yugoslavia.

[Janjic] Where does the policy of Alija Izetbegovic and the SDA lead?

[Delic] To new conflicts and division of B-H. And not a single Bosnian or Hercegovinian wants that. Izetbegovic's one-year rule has been disastrous. There is no social or civil security. War is knocking at our door, and he is constantly offering new plans which will break up our life together.

[Janjic] Do you think that the B-H authorities are also responsible for the war in Yugoslavia? Has not Tudjman, because of the indecisive behavior of B-H, been carried away too long by the thought that his border will be on the Drina and the Croatian standard on Romanija?

[Delic] The very policy of the SDA and its reliance on the HDZ have created the impression that Bosnia is on the side of Croatia and Slovenia, which have been conducting an open policy against Yugoslavia and against the state. The SDA has never denied the report that in Croatian paramilitary formations a large number of Muslims belonging to that party have been waging war against the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the Serbs. For example, it has never denied the figure that from Cazin Krajina alone 20,000 Muslims were recruited for the Croatian armed forces. The departure of such a large number of young men to fight cannot result solely from Tudjman's good salaries, but above all from the orientation provided by the SDA.

[Janjic] Many people would seem to want war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Can it be avoided in this republic?

[Delic] I do not believe that war will be carried over to this republic.

[Janjic] One "historic agreement" between the Serbs and Muslims has fallen through. Could there be another, a really authentic "historic agreement" between those two nationalities?

[Delic] The Muslims and Serbs must agree, especially after Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. The Muslims are now the second most populous nationality, and that is why it would be a great pity if they did not confirm their political mobility as a constituent nationality in the new Yugoslavia.

[Janjic] Well, what is the dispute between the Serbs and Muslims?

[Delic] There never has been a dispute between the Muslims and Serbs. Only extremist and antihuman political programs are involved. After all, what is the meaning of demands for return to the faith of their ancestors except denial of the freedom of religion? How far would we get if we called for the Serbs to go back to the faith of their ancestors!? When we came into the Balkans, we were all pagans. Serb-Muslim relations have been harmed the most by writing derogatory of Islam. The extremists can and should be attacked, those who use religion as a political instrument, but religion cannot be attacked.

[Janjic] Which is closer to the Muslims: Belgrade or Zagreb?

[Delic] Belgrade has always been closer to the Muslims. Not only because Belgrade is the capital, but also because in that city the most intelligent Muslims have obtained their education and been successful. We might mention only Mehmed Spaho, Osman Djikic, Mesa Selimovic, Skender Kulenovic, Zuko Dzumhur, Hamza Humo, Emir Kusturica, Muhamed Kesetovic.... In Belgrade, there has never been a case of conversion of Muslims as in Zagreb.

[Janjic] How do you look on the referendum that has just been completed in B-H?

[Delic] Our party warned even earlier that a referendum could not bring anything good to Bosnia-Hercegovina, but only new aggravations and even eruption of major conflicts. And that is exactly what happened. A policy that has not been thought through has resulted in unnecessary casualties and further exacerbation. In spite of all that, our party pointed out, again before the referendum, how a future Muslim Bosnia would look (this is advocated as the principal ideological, political, and legal determinant in a sovereign Bosnia), in which Muslims, Serbs, and Croats would be classified under the same term. We have said that in that case the Muslim representatives would be at the top of the "Bosnian crock." But what awaits the Serbs and Croats in that situation will be clearer to them if they recall the accomplishment of integral Yugoslavism in the first kingdom of Yugoslavia and the communist "brotherhood and unity" in the second Yugoslavia. It is our democratic duty and obligation to point that out.

[Janjic] What could all the consequences of that referendum be?

[Delic] No democratic steps whatsoever have been taken with this referendum. Its consequences can only be new conflicts. This referendum, just like any political decision which has been taken regardless of the will of a constituent nationality (in this case, the Serbs) can only speed up the disintegration of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Thus, there can be no constitutional consequences ensuing from it with respect to altering the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina or its possible international legal recognition. What we now have in Bosnia-Hercegovina is chaos. There no longer exists a political entity or governmental institution which can guarantee anything. Everything is for all practical purposes under blockade.

[Janjic] Which means, according to you, B-H cannot be sovereign and independent!?

[Delic] Even if there exists consensus among the three leading ethnic parties, Bosnia cannot be sovereign, because it is a scrambled projection of Yugoslavia. So, there can be a solution for B-H only when an overall solution of the Yugoslav political crisis is achieved. For Bosnia-Hercegovina, the way out certainly does not lie in sovereignty. That it cannot be. It cannot, because it must be open both to Belgrade and to Zagreb, because of its constituent nationalities—the Serbs and Croats. As for the Muslims, the question of a large or small Yugoslavia is no longer raised for them, but rather with whom they are going to live. And it is clear that they live from Cazin to Skoplje, and it is here that they should seek a solution, because that is the interest of the Muslims. It is another matter that the SDA is furnishing political guidance in a quite mistaken direction.

Croatian Parties on Events in Republic

92BA0647B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Mar 92 p 7

[Article by Ivancica Knapic: "Even Herceg-Bosnia on the Menu for Serbian Expansionism"]

[Text] Following the Lisbon agreement among the leaders of the three main Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] parties and the relatively peaceful referendum, it seemed that Bosnia-Hercegovina would leave the former Yugoslavia without territorial splintering and casualties. But the dark suspicions of those who said that everything "was going too easily to end well" were given their confirmation on Sunday—Sarajevo, the B-H capital, woke up to see its streets cut off by numerous barricades, people were armed, and traffic was blocked. And the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] is writing press releases and demands which have been seen before and are well-known. The news reports indicate that there have been casualties, and B-H is turning into a dangerous "powder keg." We asked leaders of the Croatian parties whether it will soon explode into war and what will happen now in B-H?

Stipe Mesic, Chairman of the Executive Board of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]

The main objective of Slobodan Milosevic's aggression was B-H, and the Serbs in Croatia were only used to arrive at that goal. Milosevic has used and sold out the Serbs in Croatia—the army will withdraw, the Chetniks will be disarmed, and all those who committed crimes and wanted privileges will have to leave Croatia. The front is now being opened in B-H. What is happening is the beginning of war, and I think it is inevitable. War can be prevented in B-H if the United Nations and America take a determined stance—if they put force in Milosevic's way. After all, he is behind this, and only a stronger force can thwart him. The army will perhaps realize that it has been deceived and used as well. I think that the army has strength enough to get out of this political game, but it first must remove the main culprits—Milosevic, Kadijevic, and Adzic. I foresee that the war will spread very quickly to Serbia—that will be civil war.

Zeljko Mazar, President of the SSH [Croatian Peasant Party]

We have been following the most recent events in neighboring B-H with extreme seriousness. Regardless of the tragic occurrences, that is, the killing and wounding which we condemn, the blood that has been shed is only a poor disguise for what has happened behind that. Incidentally, this is also confirmed by the press release of the SDS, which clearly shows dissatisfaction with the success of the referendum, that is, the fear that B-H will be proclaimed a sovereign republic. That, of course, does not suit the SDS, which has been persistently offering diverse versions for division of B-H, trying to underpin the idea of creating so-called minifederations, which

supposedly would maintain the continuity of Yugoslavia. We must expect that it will continue to escalate further the negative course of events with the clear intention of provoking conflicts on a broader scale and with unforeseeable consequences. It is the last hour for the world political public to halt Milosevic and Adzic and their clique in the name of peace in Europe.

Josip Vrbosic, Member of the Grand Council of the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]

The referendum vote of the population of B-H concerning a sovereign and independent B-H is in line with the commitments of the HSLS that sovereign republics should be created on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The territorial integrity of B-H contributes in any case to a better and faster resolution of the Croatian constitutional question. The anticipated vote "for" by more than 50 percent of the population of B-H, of course, places the leaders of the so-called Serbian krajinas in a very delicate position. We have to believe that the reaction to a legitimate decision by a majority of the population of B-H will not be with weapons, but will be to shape and strengthen the agreements in Lisbon, which ultimately guarantee both the Serbian and Croatian peoples equality and ethnic and civil sovereignty. That is, the times are quite different today from when Serbia, the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and some of the Serbs in Croatia were waging war against the Republic of Croatia.

Antun Vujic, President of the SDSH [Croatian Social Democratic Party]

The events in B-H are a continuation of the organized expansionist Serbian plan to achieve a bloody Yugo-Serbia. After the Croats and Muslims have voted in favor of an independent Herceg-Bosnia, the Serbian people in Bosnia, just as in Croatia, were drawn into betrayal of their own homeland. We cannot accept the madness of the clique which is today leading the Serbian people into a conflict with absolutely everyone else and which is indifferent to the casualties it is bringing upon the Serbian people itself, but it is also unacceptable that the Serbs themselves so easily allow themselves to be led in that way. As far as we are concerned in Croatia, there should long ago have been a more vigorous demand for the independence of B-H and the package should have called for the UN troops to also go to the borders of Serbia and B-H, which at one point Izetbegovic did call for. Croatia and the others should urgently seek international protection of B-H, all the way to the possibility of an international protectorate.

Anto Kovacevic, Vice President of the HDS [Croatian Democratic Party]

Even Herceg-Bosnia has been on the menu of Serbian expansionism. Nothing new. It is all well-known, ever since Vuk Karadzic and the "Outline" of Ilija Garasanin up to the present day. The madness of Serbian expansionism has not changed over the last 150 years. The scenario is well-known. Barricades, mistreatment of travelers, hijacking, looting, murders—war!

The empire of Yugocrime is falling apart. The Croats and Muslims have expressed their historic "yes" in the referendum. One of the Serbian leaders, B. Jovic, said a few weeks ago that war was inevitable if Bosnia becomes independent and self-sufficient. The Croats and Muslims, then, must prepare even for war, because they have common graves and a common past, and they also have interests in common, as well as a common enemy. Peace is the least expensive thing, just as war is the most expensive. If there is no other way, then, the independence of B-H must be defended by force of arms. B-H is the key to the Croatian question. The key to all Croat-Serb disagreements. It is in the vital interest of Croatia and the Croatian people to defend and defend successfully the independence of Herceg-Bosnia, because that is the best way to defend an independent Croatia. The Croats and Muslims recognize Serbia only to the Drina. Any division of Bosnia would be a loss, not only a loss of Bosnia to Croatia, but also of Croatia. The Serbs would cross the Drina and in that way link up all of their satellite little pieces to the parent Serbia. If Bosnia remains whole, all the "krajinas" in Croatia will fall into the water. The road to freedom will be difficult and thorny. I am deeply convinced that the peoples of B-H will get rid of the Chetnik dinar and the Yugoarmy, which is a synonym for Chetnicism, and I see hope for that in the fact that a great number of Serbs in Bosnia voted for an independent Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Spegelj Analyzes Events in Republic

92BA0647C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by General Martin Spegelj, National Guard Corps: "The Serbian Trial Balloon"]

[Text] It was not difficult to foresee that the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] could lead to war. For a long time now, there has been an effort to organize a coup in B-H and against its independence and sovereignty.

Serbian nationalistic radicalism, linked up with the nationalistic-communist remnants of the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], is not giving up on the creation of a "Great Serbia." At the same time, there is increasing evidence of the democratic and independent aspirations of a majority of the people on the soil of the former Yugoslavia.

It is thus possible to determine the parties to the conflict in the most general way. One can also see in that relationship the irreconcilability of the options. This happened in Kosovo, in Slovenia, and in Croatia, and it is now evident in B-H.

The Remnant of the JA [Yugoslav Army] Has Committed Itself

It is not difficult to find an occasion. Accomplices, flags, and murderers can always be found. In B-H, only a few hours after that atrocity, there were hundreds of barricades, and the most modern weapons were in the hands of tens of thousands of members of the "bare-handed" and "threatened" Serbian people in B-H. The remainder of the JNA is, of course, in that conflict, here again, just as earlier, it has taken sides—both the side it will attack and the side it will defend.

All in all, the scenario (that hackneyed phrase) is well-known.

I belong to those analysts who consider war in B-H certain, regardless of President Izetbegovic's customary flexibility and the influence of European and world politics. The gradual occurrence of that war has not been anything new either. It is just a question of the aggressor testing the capability of the defense in that gradualness, respecting the determination of the majority and rightly shying away from the likelihood of a subsequent absolute defeat both on the B-H front and also on the other fronts that exist and are possible on the soil of the former Yugoslavia.

The former JNA, which still possesses strong weapons, figures militarily as an arbiter in political developments, and that has been well-known even before now. Only if it is neutralized can the reactionary be quickly separated from the democratic.

Selectivity

A possible war in B-H could have an impact on events in Croatia, could slow down or even frustrate the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, and renew the intensity of the armed conflict. I see the possibility of escalation of the conflict in Croatia as well, but I am convinced that this would be a mistaken assessment of the aggressor. After all, it is quite certain that the aggressor cannot maintain all those fronts, regardless of his technical superiority. That would lead to an outcome in which the absolute defeat of the policy of a "Great Serbia" and the intentions of the communist orientation of the top army leadership would be inevitable. That is why we should be thinking along the lines that the radicalism of Serbian expansionism and the communist top army leadership will be aiming at selectivity in its actions, for example, in Kosovo to keep the Albanians subjugated through terror and to maintain an apparent peace, to keep a lid on the opposition parties and Vojvodina, to attain the status quo in Croatia with the help of the United Nations and certain world and European politicians and in that way demonstrate its peacefulness. To avoid, then, an escalation of the armed conflict, but not to allow the loss of what has been taken, and in B-H to be radical, and the technical (army) forces and personnel exist for that. It is only in B-H that it will show implacability and aggressiveness.

The events between 1 and 3 March, in my opinion, are a trial balloon in which Serbian radicalism seems on the one hand to be satisfied by acceptance of its demands, but is making the deployment of the immense forces of the remnant of the JA rather effective. Both are indications that events are yet to come. We must follow them very watchfully and be ready both for acceptance of a peaceful solution and also for an effective military response.

'Green Berets' Prepared To Defend Sarajevo

92BA0643A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 8

[Article by Ejub Stitkovac: "'Hand' Full of Rifles"]

[Text] "In 15 minutes or so we can mobilize between 50,000 and 100,000 people and cover every point in the city. We will never attack anyone first, but if anyone heads for Sarajevo, let them know what is waiting for them. We have all types of weapons that the Serbian armed formations have. It is all well-known. We have our people at various places. To be sure, we do not have airplanes." These were the words of one of the most important figures in the "Green Berets" armed formations, as they are called by the population and by the people in the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. The name is not appropriate at all, he told us, insisting that we not publish his name, and that was one of the conditions for the interview. In the room where we did the interview, quite a few things were Islamic, from the calendar to emblems of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. As for the actual name "Green Berets," the subject of the BORBA interview said that it had been coined only because they are worn by his people, and they are in fashion among the young men, who put various emblems on them—American, ethnic, and even certain others. According to stories coming from people who are usually well-informed, this is a Muslim organization known as "Bosnia," and that name is also written on the berets of its members. But the name is not the most important thing:

No One Is Going To Take Sarajevo

"We are in essence a large group of citizens most of whom are Muslims and whose main purpose is to defend Sarajevo. Those who think that only the Muslims would defend Sarajevo are greatly mistaken. That was best demonstrated the other day when members of the SDS set up barricades. Hundreds and hundreds of people reported to us and asked whether they should move against them. We said that there was no need yet. No one can take Sarajevo."

The men with green berets were visible in one section of Sarajevo on 2 March, which was the critical day. They were strolling peacefully, but at the same time they were rather striking because the streets were empty. Representatives of the SDS demanded that they be disarmed, but in Sarajevo, in certain political circles, that demand was

extended to disarming all armed formations except the army and police. But, we also hear, no one can accomplish that in these times. Even the top politicians acknowledge that. Reports have also spread that it is the members of these formations that prevented the arrival of a group of armed people from Pale, whom the stories say were Chetniks.

"They tried twice to enter Sarajevo. I think that this was only a probe to see whether they could enter Sarajevo or not. You can imagine what it looks like when two buses full of people armed to the teeth want to enter the city. We knew of their arrival. When they saw that they had no chance, they turned back. But they fired on some 15 Muslim houses in Jarcedoli. That was not done, let us be quite clear, by the true Orthodox or by the Catholics here. This was done by people from outside."

We Have No Ties to the SDA [Democratic Action Party]

"You said that you had all types of weapons except airplanes. How did you acquire them, if it is not a secret?"

"It is no secret, nor are many other things. We were the last to arm ourselves. But it is well-known who was first to get armed and from whom they obtained them. We bought weapons and did so when we saw that things would not work out. That there was no longer any way out. At this moment, the rifle has become a first necessity, because others have powerful weapons. You cannot be empty-handed. I never had a weapon before. What am I to do when I see on television that members of the Serbian armed formations have cannon at Pale?"

The subject of our interview said that his "group of people," as he called them, both does and does not have a command. If necessary, he says, they will easily create it. But even though it does not have an official organization, according to him, nor hierarchy, the procedure is altogether clear. They all have their war orders. The rules of behavior are very strict. This organization, if it can be called that, is associated with the SDA or with certain other figures, depending on who you talk to.

"We have members of various parties from the left and right in our 'group.' Quite a few of them have no ties with any party. They simply reported to defend the city if necessary. Let us hope it will not be necessary. For now, we are best suited by the policy of Alija Izetbegovic, because that is the policy of peace."

"Do you have any direct ties to the SDA or not?"

"We have no ties to the SDA, nor any official organizer. We began to organize ourselves when the reservists began to open fire in Hercegovina. People began to come together and organize out of fear and resistance to such things."

The subject of our interview said that they were not receiving any aid whatsoever from abroad and that aid in the form of drugs that had arrived from Turkey, for example, had mostly been distributed in the border areas of B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. And that no one had asked whether it was being distributed to Muslims, Serbs, or Croats, although many assumed that it had gone to the first of those. Asked whether there would be war in B-H, he said that that did not depend on them:

Politicians Who Do Not Last Long

"If they dared, they would have attacked us long ago. But it is clear to all that the SDS is losing support among the true Orthodox, who see that that policy leads to war. Just imagine the bad impression being left by the fact that Radovan Karadzic spent two days in Belgrade when the barricades were set up here. And from a safe place there, from a garden, he announced that B-H could not escape war. People have seen through him. Not a single politician in B-H fled from here when it got tough. And those stories about his not having any way to get back do not fool anyone. Such politicans do not last long."

"How about the relationship with the army and the attitude toward the army?"

"The army has nowhere to turn, and is aware that it must undergo transformation, but that will not go so quickly. We have no problems whatsoever with the army, nor do we want to have a showdown with it—unless they start it."

"I assume that you favor an independent B-H?"

"All the members of our 'group' favor a state of Bosnia. I would rather have Yugoslavia, but the one from Djevdjelija to Sezana. I cannot fight for the other one, nor do I want to."

As for information about himself, the only thing he revealed to us was that at one time he was a traveling salesman and worked for the BIGZ [Belgrade Publishing and Printing Institution] in Belgrade. He said that he did military service in Serbia and was enthusiastic about the hospitality and directness of the people there:

"When I was a soldier, I never entered a coffeehouse or restaurant there with my pals when they did not buy drinks for us."

Complete Breakdown of Economy Feared

AU2303135992 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar p 4

[Report by I. Selak: "Cornered"]

[Text] The inefficiency and general erosion of the economic system have, once again, prompted businessmen in Bosnia-Hercegovina to warn both the government and the Presidency of the possible consequences. The national product has been cut by $3 billion, dozens of factories have been put on hold—from the Modrica oil refinery, to shoe factories—the army of unemployed is

growing, not a single economic system is functioning normally, and even scientific institutions are being closed down.

Industrial production in January was 29.9 percent lower than in January last year, and the value of exports in the first two months has come down from $207 million last year to only $54 million this year. Practically everything has come to a standstill owing to the galloping inflation and market shortages. The economy is not asking for finances, but is calling for the rule of law, an economic system, and at least the minimum of conditions that would allow production.

These were the main points made at yesterday's session of businessmen in the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia- Hercegovina [name as published] headed by Mariofil Ljubic, vice president of the Parliament. Although some members of the Presidency, Assembly, and Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as vice presidents of deputies' clubs and presidents of relevant assemblies and committees, had been invited, the most responsible ones were, generally, not present. The facts presented by Mensur Smajlovic, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and repeated by many other participants, undoubtedly suggest that our economy has been driven into a corner. Muhamed Cengic, vice president of the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, drew attention to the fact that the inefficiency of the Assembly and the Presidency were blocking the activities of the government, which would no longer be able to carry out "the program, because it was aware of its inability to put it into effect."

Moreover, there are dozens of thousands of hungry people, and, on their behalf, Sulejman Hrle once again asked for an urgent session of parliament. The threat of a complete economic collapse, superinflation, social tensions, and poverty are a clear warning that it is high time we put our disagreements on ice, and turned our attention to the economy, work, and order. Does the solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina lie in continuous sessions of parliament, or in public disobedience of businesses and banks, in acting according to the economic codex, in radical changes in management, and pronounced centralism, or perhaps in the urgent bringing in of world experts into our banks and businesses, as well as in an urgent passing on of an anti-inflational program for Bosnia-Hercegovina? These are questions that will need to be agreed on by the end of this month.

Croatia

U.S. Consul to Zagreb Promises Recognition

LD2303232192 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] U.S. Consul General to Zagreb Michael Einik stated that the United States would, in weeks to come, most certainly recognize Croatia. He added that this has not been done so far because there was a wish to achieve a global Yugoslav solution. Einik stated this in Rijeka today, where he was received by town mayor, Zeljko Luzavac.

Tudjman Meets Interethnic Relations Committee Head

AU2303190192 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 92 p 3

[HINA report: "Bring Back Confidence"]

[Text] Zagreb, 13 Mar—The president's office announced that Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, today received Milan Djukic, president of the Serbian National Party and president of the government's Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations.

Djukic reported to the president on the activities of the Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations, the passing on of the Constitutional Law on Ethnic Communities and Minorities, the importance of such a law, on the position of the Serbian community in Croatia regarding the activities of the UN peace mission, and the consequences of the war and the suffering of the Serbian nation.

The announcement also stated that conclusion was reached during the talks that there is a political rift among the Serbs in Croatia. One section has decided to use violent measures in trying to bring down the constitutional order of Croatia and is directly in the service of the Greater Serbian politics. Another section is refusing to cooperate with the Croatian authorities and is seeking a solution outside the legal institutions of the Republic of Croatia. There is also a significant number who see the solution to the Serbian question in the Croatian European-oriented policies as presented in the constitution, and the constitutional law on the freedom and rights of citizens, ethnic communities and minorities, as in the EC documents.

Djukic informed President Tudjman about the obviously maliciously fabricated story on the "rebaptism" of Serbian children. He did, however, point to the many cases where it was evident that various means were being used to jeopardize the freedom, rights, property, and lives of the members of the Serbian population.

President Tudjman confirmed that legal, investigative, and police organs would, in accordance with the constitutional order of Croatia, be deployed in the inquiries into each of the crimes, and every breach of human rights of all citizens regardless of their nationality.

"We will do everything," said President Tudjman, "to put a stop to lawlessness and autocracy aimed at innocent citizens."

"Croatian policy on the Serbian question," he concluded, "is now directed toward ensuring a peaceful life

and creating confidence among the citizens of all nationalities. This policy has received a great stimulus from the Brussels declaration of the European Community and the United States."

Official on JNA 'Evictions' Near Vukovar

LD2303231692 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 29 Mar 92

[Excerpt] In view of the report on yesterday's eviction of 110 Ruthenians and Ukrainians from Petrovci near Vukovar, we have approached Adalbert Rebic, head of the Croatian Government Office for Refugees:

[Begin recording] [Unidentifed correspondent] In recent days, there have been frequent evictions of Croats as well as other nationalities from the villages in Slavonija. The latest reports speak of the eviction of Ruthenians and Ukrainians from the village of Petrovci, south of Vukovar. What information do you have about this?

[Rebic] This very afternoon, we have received 112 people evicted from the village of Petrovci. They are all Ruthenians. On Wednesday, we received 155 people evicted from Sarengrad and Tompojevci, and earlier we received several people evicted from Boksic and other villages. On the whole, in the past 10 days, Croats and other non-Serbs have been evicted from four villages near Vukovar.

The way they are evicted is as follows: the Yugoslav People's Army is now leaving these villages and the Chetniks are immediately returning and evicting Croats from their homes. They give them 5 minutes in all and they can only take with them the bare necessities. We have now placed them in the Chemical Education Center and taken care of them, that is what we can do for them at this moment. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Speculation Surrounds Babic's Political Future

AU2303170092 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 92 p 2

[Report by B. Solesa: "Not a Career Diplomat"]

[Text] Knin—The rumors in Knin that the silence of the leadership of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], that was elected in Borovo Selo and Knin could be explained as secret negotiations to apparently offer Dr. Milan Babic the position of minister of foreign affairs in the "Borovo Selo" government seem to be unfounded. The president of the RSK (according to the decisions made in Knin), Dr. Babic, himself says:

"These people who present themselves as the leadership of the RSK elected in Borovo Selo do not seem to have any idea about the developments in this region up to 19 December last year, when we adopted the constitution and proclaimed our republic. Goran Hadzic, who was my personal guest when he last came to Knin, has not even let me know he is here now. He and his political affiliation are conducting a transparent concept of surrendering Knin into the hands of those against whom we fought for independence. That is why I do not want to comment on this apparent idea of offering me some sort of minister of foreign affairs position. They do not appear to realize that a document, publicly announced by Vladislav Jovanovic, the Serbian minister of foreign affairs, is in preparation for the Krajina Serbs, according to which they would become a nation with a special status in Croatia.

"There have never been any problems between Martic and me personally, but it is obvious now that he has become an advocate of a policy that is outside Krajina, and is, basically, against Krajina. The Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, or, as they call it, "Babic's hard seat," created all the institutions that made Krajina into a republic, and they joined it in a manner that suggested they did not know what they were doing. This confusion they carry within just causes disquiet among the people".

After the expanded session of the RSK Government, elected in Borovo Selo, its premier, Zdravko Zecevic, who is also president of the Communal Assembly of Benkovac, and who used to be vice president of the "Knin version" of the RSK, said that they were now working on their own concept, and, therefore, had no time for political speculations surrounding Dr. Babic. Goran Hadzic, president of the "Borovo Selo version" of the RSK, thinks that there is no need to engage Dr. Babic in the position of minister of foreign affairs, since that position "does not require a man who would need 10 assistants to do it properly; instead, it should be given to a career diplomat."

Following yesterday's session of the Borovo Selo Government of the RSK, no radical turns regarding that question are expected. There are at least two interpretations of this game surrounding the position of minister of foreign affairs. According to one, offering the job to Dr. Babic would be a way of appeasing his political ambitions by peacefully integrating him into the political future of Krajina as official Serbia would want it. The other possibility is that, by offering Milan Babic the position of minister of foreign affairs in the Borovo Selo Government, his activities as president of the Serbian Region of Knin would be curtailed.

Leader of Serbs in Croatia Criticized

92BA0659D Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Petar Vidakovic: "'Krajina Has Never Ceased To Be Croatian' (Part 2): 'Is a New Raskovic Coming'"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] "I must ask Mr. Pupovac whether he considers Croatia his homeland. If so, does he feel that his homeland has been attacked?" asks Petar Vidakovic.

It is incredible how indestructible Croatian naivete is. And it is even worse when it is present in the public

media. After all the sacrifices that have been made, the Croatian media, like hungry children, are capable of forgetting everything because of several verbal comments, and of declaring the recent comments by Dr. Milorad Pupovac a "positive sign" that peace and a political solution are in sight.

Croatia in the Balkan Crucible

His latest comment in the Friday, 28 February 1992 issue of Zagreb's VJESNIK aroused attention, experience, and political caution. In the article entitled "Krajina Has Never Ceased To Be Croatian," M. Pupovac talks about a "stalemate situation" in the "Yugoslav region," although it is clear that Yugoslavia no longer exists, whereby in a manner unknown to me he attempts to return Croatia to the Balkan crucible of Byzantine politics, as if nothing has happened. This is an uncivilized attack, this is the old doctrine of understated shysters who wish to avoid the truth by relativizing the facts.

I must ask Mr. Pupovac whether he considers Croatia his homeland. If so, does he feel that his homeland has been attacked, and in this regard, what "wrong moves" or "wrong words" could be made or expressed for him to decide to flee Zagreb? In pursuance of what goals, policy, and ideology, or worse yet, strategy, if one bears in mind that it is cowards and traitors who flee?

Contemplating the "stalemate situation" in this way, Dr. Pupovac sets out on an incredible ethical and logical adventure. He says literally, "As far as Croats and Serbs in Croatia are concerned, I think that Croatia does not have adequate forces to use them to resolve the Serbian question in Croatia, nor do the Serbs in Croatia have adequate forces to effect the secession of the territories that are currently under their control. Thus—and this was clear to us even before the war—the only solution is to agree on a political solution within the borders of the internationally recognized Croatia."

This prompts us to ask Mr. Pupovac a few questions. If we are talking here about forces (which could not have the force of argument in the dictionary of a benefactor), then what are these forces that justify equating a minority with a state? Does this mean that it is time for negotiations only when nothing can be achieved through force, or vice versa? If we had heard this in a bar or on the street, we would have regarded it as an awkwardly phrased statement, but coming from a young Serbian intellectual and scholar, such a statement is perverse and dangerous.

Phantom Third Side

Why? First, he takes things back to the beginning, and equates state sovereignty with minority rights. Second, a third (phantom and unnamed) side is tacitly introduced to the game. Third, there is no mention of the fact that aggression against Croatia took place in the territory of the so-called borderland. Fourth, if it were clear to Mr. Pupovac even before the war that only a political solution is possible, then why even bring the argument about the balance of forces into the discussion, as well as the fact that he took concrete steps to avoid bloodshed?

Why did Dr. Pupovac not state clearly that his homeland, Croatia, was insidiously attacked by Serbia and the "JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]" under the pretext of Yugoslavia, and that they used arms paid for in part by the Croatian people, under the watchword of Yugoslavia, not wanting to preserve it, but rather to occupy Croatian territory?

As far as the interethnic chasm is concerned, the Serbs in Croatia must provide a response to that: How will they live with neighbors whose homes they have burned down? What's more, many Croatian hearths were destroyed, and the fires in them have been extinguished forever by their next-door neighbor Serbs. This is horrible to imagine, much less experience, when we know that the hearth is sacred to every family. If Croats were to do something like that anywhere, in Cacak for example, I would be ashamed, and that is the least that you should exhibit publicly.

Moral Catastrophe

The task that the SDF (Serbian Democratic Forum) has set out for itself is an unenviable one, because there are no refugees in the classic sense of the word. Croats have been banished, and as far as the Serbs are concerned, their "refugee status" has unfortunately been excessively instrumentalized for the tactical purpose of destroying Croatia.

Dr. Pupovac's approach to resolving the situation in the Republic of Croatia resembles that of Boutros Ghali, and not that of someone raised on the rocky soil of our home. His political pragmatism and provincial political relativism are a moral catastrophe. It is inadmissible for a person with the dignity of a scholar to talk about the christening of Serbian children on the basis of imaginary conversations and newspaper articles, taking it as a factual situation.

The emergence of the SDF on the Croatian political and social scene must be genuinely welcomed, because we hope that it will provide the impetus for the creation of new and more advanced forms of political association among Serbs in their Croatian homeland. What we do not want is for positive phenomena such as this to be incarnated in an individual who has a tendency to callously exploit people's hopes for the purposes of political pragmatism. I am afraid that in this way, the SDF attempt to give the political mobilization of Croatian Serbs a civilized veneer could fizzle out into vulgar political prostitution.

Mr. Pupovac, it is time that you realize that we are living in war, and that that war was forced on the Republic of Croatia by the Republic of Serbia for the purpose of occupying all of its territory. You persistently refer to the

"Yugoslav region" and say that the "Serbian question in Croatia" must be resolved. What Serbian question?

In that regard, you say, "...I am deeply convinced that upon the return of, say, the first group of Croats to Benkovac or the first group of Serbs to Sisak, all those who were guided by extremist solutions will be confounded by one and the same fact: The people will realize that they must look for representatives who will be guided by the logic of cooperation, agreement, and full protection for others." Mr. Pupovac, this is your typical idle chatter. If it is that simple, then I invite you to drop in tomorrow on Sisak or any other city in the Republic of Croatia that is not occupied by your other side, while you can invite me to come to Knin, for example.

You Are Neither Sincere Nor Brave

It is time for you to stop acting the part of the well-meaning spreader of enlightenment to the people. You are not that, nor are you capable of that. You are neither open, nor sincere, nor brave, and without these personal, human virtues, it is not possible to avail oneself of the legitimacy of a nation, which you have not, in fact, gained.

Finally, is not the government of the Republic of Croatia getting a new Raskovic, the difference being that Pupovac is younger and lacks a beard on the outside, although judging from all indications the "beard" in his soul is even longer, and as such is even more dangerous, both for the Croatian and for the Serbian nation in Croatia.

Exchange Becomes Member of EC Stock Market

92BA0647A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Sanja Smiljanic: "Croatia Arrives on the European Exchanges"]

[Text] The Zagreb Exchange has been accepted as an associate member of the Federation of Exchanges of the European Community. According to the classification, it will be in what is called the group of central European exchanges. Payment of dues was the factor that decided between the status of associate member and observer. That is, observers (Vienna, Switzerland, Stockholm, Helsinki, and the exchange in Osh) pay rather high dues for that status, but they have the same rights as associate members.

Agreement in Brussels

The Zagreb Exchange's membership in the association of European exchanges resulted from an agreement in Brussels in mid-February, when Marinko Papuga, director of the Zagreb Exchange, and Zeljko Kardum, responsible for public relations, talked to the leaders of the EC Federation of Exchanges. They discussed future cooperation, above all technical help in the training of brokers and the drafting of new laws compatible with the legislation of the EC countries. The representatives of the Zagreb Exchange talked to Jean-Pierre Paelinck, chief secretary of the federation, and members of the working committee—Michel Maquil, director of the Luxembourg Exchange, and Kurt Neuteufel, chief secretary of the Vienna Exchange.

The EC Federation of Exchanges was established in 1979 in order to speed up cooperation of exchanges in the countries of the EC and to provide technical assistance in reconciling financial laws related to the business operation of exchanges of the member countries. The federation's president is Boudewijn F. Baron von Ittersum, who heads the Amsterdam Exchange, and the vice president is Edmond Israel, president of the Administrative Council of the Luxembourg Exchange.

Acceptance of the Zagreb Exchange in the "European guild of exchanges" does not signify merely an occasion for quality training of brokers and for coordination of laws, but it is also important because an institution of the EC has recognized a Croatian institution.

Waiting for Securities

But the Zagreb Exchange is preparing to commence operation, anticipating all those announced changes that are supposed to put securities on the market. But, as we frequently hear, in other papers—laws and regulations—there are still too many things that have not been resolved, that are not coordinated, or are unclear, for the exchange to begin to operate to any purpose.

The members of the Zagreb Exchange are the Bank of Zagreb, the Economic Bank, the Bank of Rijeka, the Istria Bank, the Trade Bank, the Bank of Dalmatia, the Varazdin Bank, the Bank of Slavonia, the Pozega Bank, the Karlovac Bank, the Bjelovar Bank, the Vinkovci Bank, the Dubrovnik Bank, and Croatia Bank. The Croatian Development and Investment Bank has also leased space. Among insurance companies, there is Croatia Insurance and Slavija Lloyd, and the enterprises who have joined the Zagreb Exchange are INA, IDEM, Magma, Kapital Trade, Agora, Medis, Marimpex, INVESTCO, COD-ING, FINVEST, EA Sistem, Fintrade, Uljanik, and the Rovinj Tobacco Factory.

Tudjman Role in Revival of Fascism Considered

92BA0636A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Zivko Gruden: "Croatian Neofascism"]

[Text] Even Mihovil Pavlek Miskina, the poet of *Red Poppies*, is now without a street (in Zagreb), but what did he do wrong (to the gods)? Nothing in particular. Nothing different from the other victims of fascism and fighters against fascism from whom the opstina and city authorities under control of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] have en masse and individually been taking away streets and squares in a hurry to leave their

own trace at least by erasing the traces and memories of the Croatian people's antifascist past. Miskina was a victim of fascism (of the Ustashi)—he was put to death in the camp at Jasenovac.

And why should a peasant poet, victim of the Ustasha terror, be left a street when, say, one has been taken away from Franjo Kluz, the first Partizan pilot, more accurately, the first pilot who fought against fascism after taking off from the soil of Hitler's new Europe? Kluz' professional colleagues and fellow fighters, RAF [Royal Air Force] pilots, have a commemorative plaque in the most sacred place in British history, St. Paul's Cathedral. How would anyone fare who would deface that plaque or propose removing it? How would that act and his motives be described? Nevertheless, why should a peasant poet still have a street when soon there will not be a single one—either in Croatia or Serbia—left to Josip Broz Tito, one of the greatest figures and legends of World War II, and undoubtedly the only political figure and statesman in Croatian history to have a world reputation and world stature?

There are cities and opstinas in which the HDZite assemblies have already gone far in their work, and every monument to Croatian antifascism has already been removed, at least in the names of streets, squares, and schools. That job is also making progress in its own particular way in other areas and by other means. Has a single opstina assembly concerned itself with the commemorative plaques and monuments to the fighters against fascism which have been blown up or removed by force? Does anyone know how many such monuments nave been destroyed and damaged? Is anyone keeping such records? Has anyone been classified as a suspect or charged or convicted of such crimes?

Where still in Europe can you find a street, a square, a school, a local community which is proud of the name of a man who, to be sure, was a writer, but who achieved the height of his career as a man by signing racist decrees and orders as a member of the very top leadership of a criminal regime based on concentration camps and the eradication of entire peoples?

Some three or four years ago, a large U.S. TV network fired a man who had been one of its basketball experts for many years because in speaking about the domination of the blacks in top-flight U.S. basketball, he expressed views which might be taken as racist. The media followed this move by the TV network approvingly, no challenging voice was even heard. The other day we read here a statement that was racist par excellence, but for the moment, except for the shudder of the broadest Croatian public, no one yet has taken a formal initiative to the authorities for removal from office of its author, who is the chairman of the Croatian Olympic Committee and director of Croatian television. Knowing that racism and racists have no access to the Olympic Games, are we waiting for such initiatives to come from the outside world? Is that the kind of reputation we need? And do we need such polluters in the "cathedral of the Croatian spirit"?

President Tudjman is today the only statesman in Europe and the world to whom in interviews foreign newsmen almost unfailingly put the question about the rise or revival of fascist or fascistoid aspects and tendencies in his country. Nor were such questions omitted from the last two interviews—in the Italian IL MESSAGGERO and the Austrian DER STANDARD—fragments of which were published in our press the other day. There is no doubt whatsoever that the influence of Serbian expansionist propaganda, for which "Croatian" and "Ustasha" are synonyms, cannot be ignored, but why would it be so successful concerning these issues when it otherwise has been experiencing only failure and defeats all over the world? To say that President Tudjman, in view of his (Partizan) past, does not bear any responsibility for the occurrence and frequency of such newsmen's questions would be to underestimate his function and role in Croatia today.

Proposal for Presidential Elections Noted

92BA0659C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "What Lies Behind Social Democratic Party-Party of Democratic Changes Proposal To Hold Presidential Elections: Opposition Seeks Opportunity"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] There are some who think that separating presidential elections from parliamentary ones is an effort to separate President Tudjman's probable electoral success from the results that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] will achieve.

After the SDP [Social Democratic Party-Party of Democratic Changes] leadership on Friday suggested publicly to the government that it schedule elections for the president of the Republic, political insiders are already wondering what could lie behind that surprising proposal by the leadership of Racan's party. Specifically, that proposal coincides with reports from political insiders that one of the most important Croatian politicians recently held talks with an unnamed representative of the United Nations, whose peacekeeping forces are supposed to pacify the occupied areas of Croatia over the coming weeks and months.

That UN representative allegedly stated that the pacification of the areas under UN protection would be slow and very difficult, but that UN representatives would be inclined to help organize elections in those areas—meaning presidential elections, but not parliamentary and local ones (!).

The SDP proposal is surprising because at all public forums in recent times, its representatives have openly opposed the holding of elections, warning that there is no

time for them since there are more important things to be done—such as establishing sovereignty over the occupied areas of Croatia. Now, however, they are saying something like this: Since you insist on elections and are announcing them, then let the presidential ones be held first, and then the parliamentary ones. The electoral infrastructure is mostly in place for presidential elections, because the entire Republic is one electoral district, while such an infrastructure is not in place for parliamentary elections.

Date "Concealed" From the Public

In the words of Ivica Racan, President Tudjman has on several occasions announced presidential elections in the foreign press, even indicated the exact date on which they will be held: June was first mentioned, and now there is talk of a date in July. If this is true, then it is unclear why this is being concealed from our public.

Indeed, a great deal more is unclear in this regard. There is less public discussion, while in the political back rooms it is noted quite frequently that the speedy scheduling of elections in Croatia is one of the important international obligations, which applies also to certain other republics of the former Yugoslavia. International circles are allegedly "pushing" Slobodan Milosevic in particular towards elections in order to render an accounting of his policy before the Serbian public.

At Friday's SDP press conference, journalists got the impression from the proposal on the holding of presidential elections that the SDP is acting to the advantage of President Tudjman. Many opposition parties will be inclined to interpret this as a move that they generally view in the context of an "HDZ-SDP coalition."

Specifically, part of the Croatian opposition expects presidential and parliamentary elections to be held simultaneously. Then again, it is not unknown that part of the opposition wants parliamentary elections to be held first, and then the presidential ones. Some of them want to raise the issue of curtailing the constitutional authorities of the president of the Republic in the interval before the presidential elections. In so doing, of course, they believe that the opposition will manage in the meantime to secure enough influence to initiate a change in the Constitution. Nevertheless, many question the possibility of a fundamental change in the existing power structure on the Croatian political scene, which is dominated by the ruling party.

In any event, it is obvious that behind the wrangling over the elections lies a struggle over how much power and authority will be concentrated in the hands of the president of the Republic in the future, and how much will be in the hands of the Assembly or government.

"Putting Things in Order" in the Ruling Party

It is interesting that in response to provocative questions by journalists, Ivica Racan declared that as far as the SDP is concerned, that party will give its support to those candidates who will seek a strengthening of parliamentary democracy and a curtailment of the authorities of the president of the Republic. Prompted by provocative questions, Racan also stated his conviction that the elections are also being imposed on Croatia so forcibly in order that "things be put in order in the ruling party."

However, there are some who think that separating presidential elections from parliamentary ones is an effort to separate President Tudjman's probable electoral success from the results that the Croatian Democratic Community will achieve. Specifically, it is supposed that President Tudjman's standing is greater than that of the ruling party and that by separating the elections the opposition would have a greater chance at making it into Parliament.

It remains to be seen whether this it tantamount to counting one's chickens before they hatch. At the conclusion of the aforementioned press conference, Ivica Racan "distracted" many of the journalists present by adding that he "bets that the proposal on presidential elections will not be accepted."

It is difficult to discern what is at stake here. It is obvious that there are "old-guard" and "new-guard" politicians in Croatia, more or less experienced, or more or less adroit political players. Observers often try to decipher their games, but once they figure them out a great deal of time has usually passed, and a new game begins, of which they are not even aware.

Kosovo

Christian Democrats Meet, Discuss Election

92BA0651D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by M.A.: "Updated Pan-Albanian Referendum"]

[Text] Pristina—The Christian Democratic Party of Albanians in Kosmet, whose members are mainly Catholic Albanians, held its election assembly in secrecy over the weekend and elected a 15-member presidium. Ljazar Krasnici, one of those involved in the marathon court trial in Kosovska Mitrovica, was elected president.

The Albanian-language news media have been carrying from that meeting extremely polemical themes, and one that especially stands out is the question of the legitimacy of the multiparty transitional government of Bujar Bukosi, because for several months it has had no defense minister, no ministers for internal or foreign affairs, no president of the Republic, no president of the Presidency, and so on. As for the party itself, the question has been put of why for several months it has not held a single meeting, where the party's secretary Ramus Tahiri is located, and who delegated him and Nik Djelosi to the government of the "Republic of Kosovo"?

The proposal for holding a pan-Albanian referendum for unification of all Albanians in the Balkans has been updated by the conclusion "that Albanians will try to gain their freedom by democratic and diplomatic pressures, but if that does not succeed, other means will follow."

Serbian 'Armed Special Forces' Detailed

92BA0651C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by R. Barjaktarevic: "Special Forces Practicing War"]

[Text] Armed special forces have turned up in Kosovo and Metohija. The Serbian Volunteer Guards have opened a recruiting center in Pristina for the territory of southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosmet. The first group of volunteers went off to Erdut for two months of training. Dragisa Vukcevic, commander of the Guards for southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosmet, talked to BORBA about what the volunteers are preparing for and what the Guards are doing in Kosmet.

"The extremely bad situation in Kosmet, where the powder keg can explode any moment, made it a necessity to open a recruiting center of the Serbian Volunteer Guards in Pristina for the territory of southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosmet. Young men and women of Serbian blood and origin who have reached age 18 may join the volunteers. A certain number of volunteers have gone through this recruiting center to Erdut for two months of training. Soon, a center for special training of volunteers will also open in Kosmet, most probably in the vicinity of Pristina. People from Toplica, Vasojevici, volunteers from Kosmet and from Macedonia will come here for training," Vukcevic said.

"We have worked out a plan for specific defense, for example, for Glogovac, Kacanik, Djakovica, Podujevo, Srbica, and other places where only Albanians live. We have worked out the movement precisely from topographic maps, and we also have the means and weaponry to defend the Serbs. If necessary, even our guns will go into action. We will operate throughout Kosmet, if necessary even in Sandzak, Bujenovac, Presevo, and Medvedja, or in Macedonia. The Serbian Volunteer Guards have their own people, trained special forces for operating immediately in case of danger in a self-organized manner, without a special command. We have an extremely elaborate system of communications, reporting, and intelligence, with well-trained people who are ready to go to the defense of the Serbs on the shortest notice. We also have an information system that was specifically developed. With computers, we monitor the movement and work of leaders of the Skipetar Alternative and their actions."

In answer to the question of who is financing all this, Dragisa Vukcevic said:

"The staff headquarters of the Serbian Volunteer Guards for southern Serbia was formed on the initiative of the Serbian youth, and it is premised upon the specific conditions of Kosmet. We have called upon all Serbs, honest people, patriots, to provide us material and financial assistance. And the help is coming."

'Final Act' in Establishing Republic

92BA0661B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 92 p 11

[Article by Milos Antic: "Elections in Kosovo: From the Introduction to the Epilogue"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The final act in closing the circle around the "Republic of Kosovo" has been announced with all bells, with an appeal to international parties to supervise elections, after the statement by Lord Carrington "that the problem of the Albanians must also be resolved."

With the arrival of spring, which is a synonym for all Kosovo events, the political balloon is being increasingly dangerously inflated and indicates a new "explosion" the extent of which "will by no means be of local importance." Leaders of the Albanian alternative are announcing their "honorary-victorious circle," because they consider that they have also won over Carrington, who stated "loudly and clearly" in Brussels that the problem of the Albanians must be resolved, both in Serbia and in Montenegro!

The number-one man of the Albanian Kosovo political scene, Ibrahim Rugova, reacted instantly to this possibility. In truth, only after the signal that he received from six American senators, who sent word to him that he could go on the "final attack," but this does not diminish the importance in the slightest among his countrymen of his last decision that the first free and multiparty elections be held in the "Republic of Kosovo." Just what many of his political rivals from the ranks of the Albanian opposition had demanded for months, and what he had stubbornly resisted, waiting, evidently, for the most favorable moment.

After the proclamation of the "Republic of Kosovo," the enactment of its constitution, and the holding of a referendum for the independence and sovereignty of Kosovo, all done illegally and under the veil of secrecy, the final act in closing the circle around the "Republic of Kosovo" has been announced with all bells, with a simultaneous appeal to international parties to come and supervise it.

There are a number of reasons for this appeal, but three basic ones: to prevent possible intervention and blockage by Serbia, to obtain international recognition in one swoop, since international institutions send their observers only to sovereign and independent states, and, thirdly, for Albanians, through free elections and in the only internationally recognized manner, to give democractic legitimacy to their illegal state.

The leadership of the secessionist movement in Kosovo has decided that Serbia, when Kosovo and the Albanians are in question, has "gambled away all its chances" and that it "must play the game that Europe and the world are dictating to it and at least give the Albanians what it is seeking for the Serbs in the Krajinas." As far as "gambled-away" chances are concerned, it is worthwhile mentioning that it is possible to hear with every step here that Serbia has not done that which it waved in front of the whole world so openly two years ago: at least approximately to establish ethnic balance in these areas. Specifically, it was announced that all Albanian immigrants who came to Kosovo after 1941 would be driven out and that all Serbs and Montenegrins who emigrated from Kosovo under duress, and there are more than 300,000 of them, would return to their old hearths and workplaces. Since nothing of the sort of all that happened, even in the most crucial moments of Yugoslavia, when great population moves were taking place, leaders of the Albanian alternative now believe that this "memorandum plan" for the conquering and "colonization" of Kosovo is forever history, because the facts presently indicate that there are 90 percent Albanians in Kosovo and 10 percent of all others. Playing this card before the world, the leaders of the Albanian alternative also cite the fact that they are physically present and numerically dominant in the whole region and that, therefore, as such they cannot be a national minority in any way.

In any case, whether one wants to recognize it or not, the announced Albanian multiparty elections in Kosovo will have their real echo only when some international parties that have "clawed" at the Kosovo "Gordian" knot speak out on this question.

Macedonia

Gligorov-Rugova Meeting Criticized

LD2403102492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1633 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Skopje, March 23 (TANJUG)—Madedonian radio today strongly criticized Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov for keeping practically secret his meeting in Skopje a week ago with Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Separatist Albanian Democratic Alliance of Kosovo. The Macedonian radio commentator wonders if Rugova, the leader of a party which is active in the territory of another state, is "a partner for talks with the president of a sovereign and independent state."

The commentator notes that, in addition to Parliament President and Interior Minister, only the Foreign Minister was missing in order to complete the impression of a top-level meeting. Rugova is the opposition leader of Albanian separatists in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo-Metohija. Ethnic Albanians have the status of a national minority in all Yugoslav republics.

The commentator also criticized Gligorov's cabinet for not denying certain claims by the Pristina Albanian-language daily SKENDIA which was the only one to report a statement by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo about the talks between the two delegations. The fact that Gligorov's reported statement about the position of Kosovo-Metohija as an equal nation-building unit was interpreted quite logically by the Serbian press as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Serbia, the Macedonian radio said.

Republic Forces Assume Border Controls

AU2103174892 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Boris Djordjioski report]

[Text] The Macedonian border patrols are now completely in control of the borders with Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. The section of the border with Albania which runs nearly through the middle of Ohrid and Prespa Lakes is being supervised by the ships that the Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] left for the members of the Macedonian Territorial Defense.

The Yugoslav flags at all border watch towers were removed and the Macedonian flags raised. The transfer of the borders passed without incident. Farewell lunches were held in honor of the border guards who are leaving and a joint review of the JNA troops and the Territorial Defense members was organized.

The JNA will completely withdraw from Macedonia by mid-April. The military airport in Skopje will be handed over to Macedonia next week. The same applies for the largest barracks in this republic, the Marshal Tito Barracks in Skopje.

Resignation of Assembly President Urged

92BA0651B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 92 p 6

[Press release of the VMRO-DPMNE: "Removal of Stojan Andov"]

[Text] Skopje—The leadership of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], a party that has 38 deputies of the 120 in the Macedonian parliament, issued a press release yesterday saying that in the meeting scheduled for 17 March one item on the agenda will be a question of confidence in Stojan Andov, president of the Macedonian Assembly.

The VMRO sees the reason for this move in the "continuous blockade of the work of the parliament by President Stojan Andov," who, in the judgment of that party's leadership, "has a monopoly in calling the meetings and proposing the agenda." The leadership of the VMRO-DPMNE says that Stojan Andov refused to call

an urgent meeting of the Macedonian Assembly to take up the situation in agriculture at the beginning of spring planting.

Among the reasons which in the estimation of the VMRO-DPMNE are sufficient for resignation of the president of the Macedonian Assembly, they refer to the "unprecedented looting of the Serboarmy on the territory of Macedonia...." Stojan Andov is also accused of failing to call a meeting in which the parliament would respond to the question of whether Macedonia is introducing its own currency.

Slovenia

Law on Republic Composition Discussed

LD2103210192 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] At its today's session, the Slovene Government paid main attention to the proposal to adopt a law on the government of the Republic of Slovenia. The law, which the government has adopted, envisions a new composition of the Slovene Government. There will be a prime minister and 17 ministers [words indistinct]. There will be no vice premiers. Several economic departments will be merged into the Ministry of Economic Affairs. At the same time, state scretariats will be set up.

The government has rejected the law on the actual rights of foreigners. As stated at the press conference after the session by Rajko Pirnat, participants in the discussion wondered whether we need such a restrictive law on foreigners. The present draft law was based on Swiss examples and the government rejected it. Now it must be harmonized.

The government also adopted reports on the implementation of the law on privatization and on the provision to determine guaranteed personal incomes. The new guaranteed gross [monthly] personal income will be 15,820 tolars.

Drnovsek Elected President of Liberal Party

AU2203182692 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The delegates of the second congress of the Slovene Liberal Democratic Party elected Janez Drnovsek as the new party president.

The new president of the Slovene Liberal Democrats spoke in favor of elections at which the Slovene citizens will be able to express their opinion as to whom they would entrust country's development in the next four year period. Former party President Jozef Skolc also favored new elections and formation of a competent government. The congress also endorsed party's statute and party's program resolution which is based on the program that the party endorsed at its fist congress in Zagorje ob Savi a year and a half ago.